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INFORMS Nashville – 2016

26

SA26

SA26

110B-MCC

Procurement Auctions and Bidding

Invited: Auctions

Invited Session

Chair: Kartikeya Puranam, La Salle University, 1900 West Olney Ave,

Philadephia, PA, 19141, United States,

puranam@lasalle.edu

1 - Behavioral Analysis Of A + B Sealed Bid Procurement Auctions

Bernardo F. Quiroga, Assistant Professor, Clemson University,

Clemson, SC, 29634, United States,

bquirog@g.clemson.edu

Brent Moritz, Xiaosong Wu

Using a laboratory experiment, we study the effect of complexity in

multidimensional bidding in A+B governmental procurement auctions. Varying

the number of bidders and the dimensionality of the bid, we offer an explanation

for over/underbidding, and suggest potential solutions to the welfare implications

of the observed biases. In our analyses, we evaluate several different explanations

to rationalize this behavior, including risk attitudes, bounded rationality, loss

aversion, quantile response equilibria measures, and structural estimation of the

implied private value of the contracts.

2 - Score Auction Bidding Under Quality Uncertainty:

Effort, Risk And Agency Considerations

Daniel Nielubowicz, Clemson University,

dnielub@g.clemson.edu

Bernardo F. Quiroga

In a price-and-quality score procurement auction setting, we model the effect of

quality uncertainty on bidding behavior under the presence of moral hazard,

using a sealed-bid-first-score mechanism. In our scenario, bidders submit prices

and target quality levels, and are subject to a failure-to-deliver penalty from

deviations below said target. We present our analytical model and offer policy

implications in presence and absence of default risk/renegotiation, and offer light

to a dynamic extension of this model (in which credibility plays a fundamental

role).

3 - Bidding With Learning In Repeated Auctions

Kartikeya Puranam, La Salle University,

puranam@lasalle.edu

,

Michael N Katehakis

We consider the problem of a firm that procures items in a sequence of auctions

by bidding against the “market.” The firm has two bid levels available (High and

Low). The firm and the “market” learn from each winning bid. We study bidding

strategies for the firm when the objective of the firm is to minimize the expected

total cost of acquiring items to meet demand.

SA27

201A-MCC

Behavioral Operations

Sponsored: Manufacturing & Service Oper Mgmt

Sponsored Session

Chair: Javad Nasiry, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology-

HKUST, Hong Kong,

nasiry@ust.hk

Co-Chair: Xiaoyang Long, Hong Kong University of Science and

Technology, Hong Kong,

xlongaa@connect.ust.hk

1 - Trust, Social Networks, And Information Sharing

Among Executives

Ozalp Ozer, The University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, TX,

75080, United States,

oozer@utdallas.edu

, Emily Choi,

Yanchong Zheng

We experimentally study how trust and social networks influence forecast

information sharing behavior among executives with an average 17 years of

professional experience. We demonstrate how trust preconditioned by prior

experiences and trust measured from social network jointly influence information

sharing behavior and the resulting supply chain efficiency.

2 - A Behavioral Study On Abandonment Decisions In

Multi-stage Projects

Xiaoyang Long, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology,

Hong Kong, Hong Kong,

xlongaa@connect.ust.hk

Javad Nasiry, Yaozhong Wu

We experimentally investigate continuation/abandonment decisions in a multi-

stage project under two conditions: when the project is reviewed at every stage

and when review opportunities are limited. We find systematic deviations from

the optimal solution: subjects may wrongly continue or abandon the project, and

their decisions are path dependent. We propose a behavioral model which

explains the behavioral regularities.

3 - Newsvendor Problem In The Presence Of Strategic Customers:

Theory And Laboratory Evidence

Yang Zhang, Tsinghua University,

yangzhanguser@mail.tsinghua.edu.cn

, Benny Mantin,

Yaozhong Wu

How would a newsvendor react to strategic customers who may delay their

purchase until a price discount to take place? In theory, the newsvendor should

optimally order less than the conventional critical fractile, in order to signal a

shortage of products so that strategic customers herd into purchases at full price.

In the laboratory however, retailers tend to psychologically overreact to the

strategic customer behavior, which produces the so-called pull-below-center bias.

We develop a behavioral model based on reference dependence to explain the

observed ordering patterns, comparative statics, and the presence and asymmetry

of pull-below-center bias across treatments.

4 - Competitive Dynamic Pricing Under Capacity Constraints:

An Experimental Study

Bahriye Cesaret, Ozyegin University, Istanbul, Turkey,

bahriye.cesaret@ozyegin.edu.tr,

Elena Katok

We present an experimental study of a stylized competitive dynamic pricing

model for a duopoly. We designed a set laboratory experiments to investigate how

human decision makers price their fixed units of capacity over a multiple-period

selling season when they face a competition in the market. We report on the

results of four experiments. The results show that our laboratory participant tends

to underprice (i.e., price over-competitively) at the beginning of a selling season,

and as the selling deadline gets closer she tends to overprice (i.e., price not

competitive enough) her units.

SA28

201B-MCC

MSOM Student Paper Competition Finalists – I

Sponsored: Manufacturing & Service Oper Mgmt

Sponsored Session

Chair: Sameer Hasija, Insead, 1 Ayer Rajah Avenue, Singapore, 138676,

Singapore,

sameer.hasija@insead.edu

Co-Chair: Tolga Tezcan, London Business School, Regent’s Park,

London, IL, NW1 4SA, United Kingdom,

ttezcan@london.edu

Co-Chair: Nicos Savva, London Business School, Regent’s Park,

London, NW1 4SA, United Kingdom,

nsavva@london.edu

The MSOM Student Paper Competition is awarded annually by the

Manufacturing & Service Operations Management Society at the INFORMS

Annual Meeting for papers judged to be the best in the field of operations man-

agement.

1 - Buyer Intermediation in Supplier Finance

Weiming Zhu, Smith School of Business, College Park, MD,

United States,

zhuwm923@gmail.com

Abstract to come

2 - Using Patient-Centric Quality Information to Unlock Hidden

Health Care Capabilities

Guihua Wang, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI,

United States,

guihuaw@umich.edu

Abstract to come

3 - Strategic Open Routing in Service Networks

Andrew Frazelle, Duke University, Durham, NC, United States,

andrew.frazelle@duke.edu

Abstract to come