![Show Menu](styles/mobile-menu.png)
![Page Background](./../common/page-substrates/page0028.png)
INFORMS Nashville – 2016
26
SA26
SA26
110B-MCC
Procurement Auctions and Bidding
Invited: Auctions
Invited Session
Chair: Kartikeya Puranam, La Salle University, 1900 West Olney Ave,
Philadephia, PA, 19141, United States,
puranam@lasalle.edu1 - Behavioral Analysis Of A + B Sealed Bid Procurement Auctions
Bernardo F. Quiroga, Assistant Professor, Clemson University,
Clemson, SC, 29634, United States,
bquirog@g.clemson.eduBrent Moritz, Xiaosong Wu
Using a laboratory experiment, we study the effect of complexity in
multidimensional bidding in A+B governmental procurement auctions. Varying
the number of bidders and the dimensionality of the bid, we offer an explanation
for over/underbidding, and suggest potential solutions to the welfare implications
of the observed biases. In our analyses, we evaluate several different explanations
to rationalize this behavior, including risk attitudes, bounded rationality, loss
aversion, quantile response equilibria measures, and structural estimation of the
implied private value of the contracts.
2 - Score Auction Bidding Under Quality Uncertainty:
Effort, Risk And Agency Considerations
Daniel Nielubowicz, Clemson University,
dnielub@g.clemson.eduBernardo F. Quiroga
In a price-and-quality score procurement auction setting, we model the effect of
quality uncertainty on bidding behavior under the presence of moral hazard,
using a sealed-bid-first-score mechanism. In our scenario, bidders submit prices
and target quality levels, and are subject to a failure-to-deliver penalty from
deviations below said target. We present our analytical model and offer policy
implications in presence and absence of default risk/renegotiation, and offer light
to a dynamic extension of this model (in which credibility plays a fundamental
role).
3 - Bidding With Learning In Repeated Auctions
Kartikeya Puranam, La Salle University,
puranam@lasalle.edu,
Michael N Katehakis
We consider the problem of a firm that procures items in a sequence of auctions
by bidding against the “market.” The firm has two bid levels available (High and
Low). The firm and the “market” learn from each winning bid. We study bidding
strategies for the firm when the objective of the firm is to minimize the expected
total cost of acquiring items to meet demand.
SA27
201A-MCC
Behavioral Operations
Sponsored: Manufacturing & Service Oper Mgmt
Sponsored Session
Chair: Javad Nasiry, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology-
HKUST, Hong Kong,
nasiry@ust.hkCo-Chair: Xiaoyang Long, Hong Kong University of Science and
Technology, Hong Kong,
xlongaa@connect.ust.hk1 - Trust, Social Networks, And Information Sharing
Among Executives
Ozalp Ozer, The University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, TX,
75080, United States,
oozer@utdallas.edu, Emily Choi,
Yanchong Zheng
We experimentally study how trust and social networks influence forecast
information sharing behavior among executives with an average 17 years of
professional experience. We demonstrate how trust preconditioned by prior
experiences and trust measured from social network jointly influence information
sharing behavior and the resulting supply chain efficiency.
2 - A Behavioral Study On Abandonment Decisions In
Multi-stage Projects
Xiaoyang Long, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology,
Hong Kong, Hong Kong,
xlongaa@connect.ust.hkJavad Nasiry, Yaozhong Wu
We experimentally investigate continuation/abandonment decisions in a multi-
stage project under two conditions: when the project is reviewed at every stage
and when review opportunities are limited. We find systematic deviations from
the optimal solution: subjects may wrongly continue or abandon the project, and
their decisions are path dependent. We propose a behavioral model which
explains the behavioral regularities.
3 - Newsvendor Problem In The Presence Of Strategic Customers:
Theory And Laboratory Evidence
Yang Zhang, Tsinghua University,
yangzhanguser@mail.tsinghua.edu.cn, Benny Mantin,
Yaozhong Wu
How would a newsvendor react to strategic customers who may delay their
purchase until a price discount to take place? In theory, the newsvendor should
optimally order less than the conventional critical fractile, in order to signal a
shortage of products so that strategic customers herd into purchases at full price.
In the laboratory however, retailers tend to psychologically overreact to the
strategic customer behavior, which produces the so-called pull-below-center bias.
We develop a behavioral model based on reference dependence to explain the
observed ordering patterns, comparative statics, and the presence and asymmetry
of pull-below-center bias across treatments.
4 - Competitive Dynamic Pricing Under Capacity Constraints:
An Experimental Study
Bahriye Cesaret, Ozyegin University, Istanbul, Turkey,
bahriye.cesaret@ozyegin.edu.tr,Elena Katok
We present an experimental study of a stylized competitive dynamic pricing
model for a duopoly. We designed a set laboratory experiments to investigate how
human decision makers price their fixed units of capacity over a multiple-period
selling season when they face a competition in the market. We report on the
results of four experiments. The results show that our laboratory participant tends
to underprice (i.e., price over-competitively) at the beginning of a selling season,
and as the selling deadline gets closer she tends to overprice (i.e., price not
competitive enough) her units.
SA28
201B-MCC
MSOM Student Paper Competition Finalists – I
Sponsored: Manufacturing & Service Oper Mgmt
Sponsored Session
Chair: Sameer Hasija, Insead, 1 Ayer Rajah Avenue, Singapore, 138676,
Singapore,
sameer.hasija@insead.eduCo-Chair: Tolga Tezcan, London Business School, Regent’s Park,
London, IL, NW1 4SA, United Kingdom,
ttezcan@london.eduCo-Chair: Nicos Savva, London Business School, Regent’s Park,
London, NW1 4SA, United Kingdom,
nsavva@london.eduThe MSOM Student Paper Competition is awarded annually by the
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management Society at the INFORMS
Annual Meeting for papers judged to be the best in the field of operations man-
agement.
1 - Buyer Intermediation in Supplier Finance
Weiming Zhu, Smith School of Business, College Park, MD,
United States,
zhuwm923@gmail.comAbstract to come
2 - Using Patient-Centric Quality Information to Unlock Hidden
Health Care Capabilities
Guihua Wang, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI,
United States,
guihuaw@umich.eduAbstract to come
3 - Strategic Open Routing in Service Networks
Andrew Frazelle, Duke University, Durham, NC, United States,
andrew.frazelle@duke.eduAbstract to come