2016 INFORMS Annual Meeting Program

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INFORMS Nashville – 2016
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2 - Waste Reduction Strategies: Less Is More
Luca Berchicci, Erasmus University, Rotterdam School of Business,
Rotterdam, Netherlands, Berchicci
Nilanjana Dutt, Will G Mitchell
Manufacturing firms seek to develop and implement techniques to improve
production efficiency by obtaining information from various knowledge sources.
Examining a greater number of knowledge sources should help firms find a viable
solution to improve production efficiency, but it also raises the costs of collecting
and using new information, which may ultimately hinder performance. Due to
these tradeoffs, a key initial choice is how many knowledge sources to search.
Based on U.S. manufacturing facilities that seek to improve production efficiency
by reducing their annual toxic waste output, our results indicate that examining
one knowledge source is the best approach.
3 - Reload And Relaunch: Strategic Governance Of
Platform Ecosystems
Joost Rietveld, Erasmus University, Burgemeester Oudlaan 50,
Mandeville (T) Building, Room 7-41, Rotterdam, 3072AP,
Netherlands, , Melissa A Schilling,
Christiano Bellavitis
Platforms have a number of levers for managing their ecosystems. However, they
must use them carefully: how and by whom value is captured is shaped by the
dynamics between complementors and the platform itself. We develop a
framework of value creation and value capture yielding implications for whether
and when platforms should selectively promote complements. We analyze data
from seventh generation video games, assessing both how games are selected for
promotion, and how promotion affects sales. Platform owners do not promote
best in class complements; they invest in underappreciated ones where there is
more marginal value to be unlocked, and with whom the platform has greater
bargaining power.
4 - Value-Based Outsourcing
Joaquín Poblete, Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile, s, s,
Chile, Jorge Martabit
Using a value-based approach we analyze make-or-buy choices in settings in
which value created by activities depend on the set of activities being performed.
We show that when activities are complements, optimal make or buy choices
tend to follow a common pattern, i.e., they are all insourced or outsourced,
whereas firms tend to choose different governance modes when activities are
substitutes. We also found that coordination advantages of insourcing are more
important when activities are complements, while cost advantages of outsourcing
are more important when activities are substitutes.
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110A-MCC
Improving Efficiency of Supply Chains
through Scheduling
Invited: Project Management and Scheduling
Invited Session
Chair: Chelliah Sriskandarajah, Texas A&M University, College Station,
TX, United States,
Co-Chair: Yunxia Peter Zhu, Assistant Professor, Rider University,
Sweigart Hall 358, 2083 Lawrenceville Road, Lawrenceville, NJ, 08648,
United States,
1 - Provider Selection Framework For Bundled Payments
In Healthcare
Seokjun Youn, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX,
United States, , Anupam Agrawal,
Subodha Kumar, Chelliah Sriskandarajah
Well-designed incentive system can lead to the successful operation of bundled
payment program. Focusing on provider selection and evaluation problems, we
develop a framework that aims to select better providers than existing method
while balancing cost reduction, quality of care, and efficiency measures.
2 - A Framework For Analyzing The U. S. Coin Supply Chain
Yiwei Huang, Visiting Assistant Professor, The Pennsylvania State
University, State College, PA, United States,
This is the first study that addresses operational issues within a Coin Supply Chain
(CSC) and presents a framework, an optimal/near-optimal operating policy, and a
robust planning system for the Federal Reserve System and Depository
Institutions to increase their efficiency and effectiveness of coin ordering,
producing, packaging, distribution, and inventory management by treating the
U.S. CSC as a closed-loop supply chain from both supply and demand-side
perspectives.
3 - Recent Results In Scheduling Dual Gripper Robotics Cells
Kyung Sung Jung, University of Florida,
Harry Neil Geismar, Michael L Pinedo, Chelliah Sriskandarajah
We focus on the problem of finding 1-unit cyclic sequence of robot movements in
dual-gripper buffer-less robotic cells designed to produce identical parts under the
free-pickup criterion. We establish conditions where the problem of finding an
optimal cycle is NP-hard. The remaining cases can be shown to be polynomial
solvable.
4 - Cross-dock Terminal Scheduling
Yunxia Zhu, Rider University,
Harry Neil Geismar, Chelliah Sriskandarajah, Inna Drobouchevitch
We study various scheduling problems encountered in cross-dock terminals. In a
general cross-dock scheduling problem, a set of inbound trucks are assigned to a
fixed number of unload docks. Items are first unloaded from these trucks then are
transferred to outbound trucks to be dispatched to customers. The typical
objective is to minimize the total time spent to perform such unloading and
loading operations for a planning horizon. We also study other objective functions
under various cross-dock terminal environments (e.g., with no-wait processing
and with the presence of temporary storage).
SB26
110B-MCC
Procurement Auctions
Invited: Auctions
Invited Session
Chair: Martin Bichler, Technische Universitat Munchen, Munich,
Germany,
1 - Trust In Procurement Interactions
Nicolas Fugger, ZEW Mannheim, L7, 1, Mannheim, 68161,
Germany, Elena Katok
We investigate the observation that auctions in procurement can be detrimental
to the buyer-seller relationship. Poor relationship can result in a decrease in trust
by the buyer during the sourcing and an increase in opportunistic behavior by the
supplier after the sourcing. We consider a setting in which the winning supplier
decides on the level of costly quality to provide to the buyer, and compare a
standard reverse auction and a buyer-determined reverse auction in the
laboratory. We find that buyer-determined auctions result in higher prices but
also improve cooperation between the buyer and the selected supplier.
2 - An Optimal Procurement Mechanism With Post-auction
Cost-reduction Investigations
Qi (George) Chen, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI,
United States, , Damian Beil, Izak Duenyas
This paper studies the optimal mechanism design problem of a buyer who needs
to procure from a pool of qualified suppliers in a setting where she can choose to
investigate the suppliers to identify cost-reduction opportunities which reduce
their costs after the bids are collected, and then awards the contract. We fully
characterize the optimal mechanisms and show that for symmetric suppliers, our
mechanisms create ex ante win-win situations for everyone compared to the
optimal mechanism without investigations. The win-win situation may break
down when suppliers are sufficiently asymmetric, but no supplier has the
incentive to unilaterally block investigation.
3 - Linear Pricing In Large-scale Combinatorial Exchanges
Vladimir Fux, Technical University of Munich,
, Martin Bichler
Linear and anonymous competitive equilibrium prices are desirable in multi-
object auctions, but unfortunately such prices typically do not exist in
combinatorial exchanges. We discuss the market design of a large-scale
combinatorial exchange for fishery access rights where linear and anonymous
prices is a requirement and minor efficiency loss can be tolerated. We analyze the
trade-offs of different payment rules relevant for an auction designer, in particular
with respect to the welfare loss they incur. Via analytical models and numerical
simulations, we show that these losses can be up to 100% in worst-case scenarios,
but that these losses are small on average in larger markets.
4 - Equilibrium Bidding Strategies In Ex-post Split-award Auctions
With Diseconomies Of Scale
Gian-Marco Kokott, Technical University of Munich, Munich,
Germany, , Martin Bichler, Per Paulsen
Ex-post split-award auctions are a wide-spread form of combinatorial
procurement auctions. We focus on markets with diseconomies of scale, which is
practically relevant and strategically challenging, since bidders have to coordinate
on the efficient outcome. We show that the first-price sealed-bid and the Dutch
ex-post split-award auction are not strategically equivalent. The first-price sealed-
bid format exhibits a coordination problem for bidders, whereas the Dutch has a
unique and efficient equilibrium. We also analyze a combination of both formats
and compare all three auctions with respect to efficiency and costs. In lab
experiments, we find support for the theoretical results.
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