GAZETTE
JULY/AUGUST
1983
precluding the Arbitrator from awarding
compensation.
The Court held: It was clearly
demonstrated that if the Undertaking to
grant Permission were to be equated to a
grant of permission, it would not be
possible to give the expression a sensible
construction consistent with the other
provisions and regulations ofthe Planning
Acts. The function of the Court when
presented with the statutory requirements
of the Oireachtas is to accept them, inept
though they may be, and so far as possible
to give them effect in a sensible manner in
accordance with the manifest intention of
the statute as shown by its provisions.
It is not intended that the Undertaking
to grant Permission, is to be equated to a
grant of Permission, nor is it necessary
that they should be equated. Section 57
can be construed despite the demon-
strated weakness of expression, and can
only be construed as meaning that Section
57 precludes an award ofcompensation to
a Claimant, such as the Claimant in this
case, who has land capable of being
developed in a manner indicated in sub-
section 4 of Section 57 if the Planning
Authority expressly states that it under-
takes that it will grant permission for some
such development. Accordingly, the
questions submitted by the Arbitrator
were answered to the effect that the
Respondents had power to and did give a
valid Undertaking, that the Undertaking
was in force for the purposes of Section 57
and was given in time to preclude the
Arbitrator from awarding compensation
as aforesaid.
Ignatius Byrne
v.
Dublin Co. Council.
(High Court (per Gannon J.) — 29 July
1982 unreported.
William Dundon
CONTRACT — INSURANCE
Fire — building destroyed — no
reinstatement clause In policy. Whether
insured entitled to indemnity against
loss or cost of reinstatement —
negotiations presumed to be conducted
on basis of brokers knowledge of policy
conditions.
The Plaintiff Company entered into
associated Contracts of Insurance in
respect of property situate at Maxwell
Street, Glasgow, purchased in May 1977,
with other adjoining property, for
approximately £25,000.00. Of this price
£15,000 approximately was apportioned
to the property with which this case was
concerned. Having purchased the
property the Plaintiff employed afirm of
Brokers to arrange to have it insured
against fire risks. The Brokers sought
cover from the second named Defendants
('Provincial') for £30,000.00. By letter
dated 24 May 1977 to the Brokers
Provincial confirmed cover for £30,000
and went on to state "thefloor area of the
building is about 4,000 square feet so that
the total floor area is some 20,000 square
feet. The present sum insured of £30,000
therefore affords a rebuilding cover of
£1.50 per square foot. A realistic figure
should befixed; but please note that whilst
the building remains unoccupied our
maximum acceptance would be £50,000
so that we should expect you to find co-
insurers for the balance above this
amount". The Brokers then approached
the first named Defendant ('Sun
Alliance') and by letter dated 23 June
1977 they wrote to Atlantic as follows:
"Dear Sirs,
Fire Proposal
... St. Albans
Investment Company Limited, 69
Highfield Road, Rathgar. With reference
to your recent conversation with ourMr.
Murphy regarding the premises No. 85
Maxwell Street, Glasgow, we confirm
holding cover for a sum of £250,000 for
Fire Perils only. We understand the
premises will shortly be occupied and we
will then arrange to have the risk
surveyed. As soon as our Surveyors
Report is available we will contact you
again."
During June and July the proprietor of
the PlaintiffCompany consultedArchitects
and Quantity Surveyors for the
preparation of plans for converting part of
the premises into a public house and the
preparation of the necessary documents
for an application for a liquor licence.
Before any Policy was issued and before
any further step had been taken the
property was destroyed by fire dn 15
August. A short time later Policies were
issued by both Defendants in the standard
Policy form which provided for payment
to the insured of the value of the property
at the time of the happening of its
destruction' with an option to the
Company to reinstate the property.
Evidence was given that where the
reinstatement of property is required by
an insured, the Policy will contain what is
described as a "reinstatement clause".
No such clause was contained in these
Policies.
As a result ofthefire the building had to
be taken down at a cost estimated by the
Court at £9,000. The value of the site
after demolition was estimated at
£20,000.00. The Plaintiff claimed
entitlement to the sum of £300,000.00,
the cost of rebuilding being considerably
more than this.
Both Defendants denied that they
insured the premises on the basis of
rebuilding or reinstating them and
evidence was given that such cover was
not sought and that the Policies issued
after the fire were in accordance with the
original agreement between the parties.
They explained the reference to rebuild-
ing in the letter of 24 May 1977 as an
indication to the Brokers that in the case
of partial damage a clause as to "general
average" would apply and that in the case
of partial destruction the Insured would
only recover such proportion ofthe cost of
repair as the total sum insured would bear
to the cost of rebuilding the entire
premises if totally destroyed. They
claimed, therefore, that the Plaintiff was
entitled to compensation only on the basis
of the market value of the premises at the
time of the fire less the site value after
deduction of the cost of demolition. They
relied very strongly on the fact that the
Plaintiff placed its insurance through a
Broker who should have been fully aware
that an agreement to indemnify the cost of
rebuilding would require a reinstatement
clause in the Policy and should have been
fully aware of the application of general
average provisions.
The Court held that on the facts, the
Policies did not cover the cost ofreinstate-
ment. The Plaintiff originally proposed to
insure on the basis of being compensated
for loss in accordance with the value ofthe
property and it is a reasonable proposition
that negotiations must be presumed to
have been conducted on the basis of the
Brokers' knowledge of the position about
reinstatement Clauses. The Plaintiff was
awarded £54,000.00 calculated on the
value of the property at £65,000.00 from
which must be deducted the value of the
site, less the cost of the demolition.
St. Albans Investment Company v. Sun
Alliance & London Insurance Limited
and Provincial Insurance Company
Limited.
The High Court (per McWUliam
J.) 30 April 1982 — unreported.
Franklin J. O'Sullivan
CONSTITUTIONAL/
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Constitutionality of Sections 29 and 30,
Turf Development Act, 1946 —
Articles 40 and 43 — Compulsory
Acquisition — Natural and Con-
stitutional Justice.
In November, 1978 Bord Na Mona
(BNM) published advertisements in the
newspapers indicating their intention to
acquire certain lands, including 132 acres
the property of the Plaintiff, pursuant to
their powers under Section 29 and 30 of
the TurfDevelopment Act, 1946. Section
29 empowers BNM to acquire land per-
manently or temporarily by agreement or
compulsorily and to acquire various rights
in or over land. Section 30 empowers
BNM prior to agreement on compensation
to enter and take possession of any land or
exercise any right in land. The Plaintiff
objected in writing through his Solicitor on
1 December, 1979. The Plaintiffwith other
affected landowners then wrote to BNM
setting out general objections to the
proposed acquisitions applicable to all the
owners of the lands in question. At a
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