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GAZETTE

JULY/AUGUST

1

Recent

Irish

Cases

TRADE MARKS

Unauthorised use of registered

trade mark. Whether exclusive

rights, under Section 12 of Trade

Marks Act 1963 in respect of

registered trade marks are limited

to use of the goods in the course of

trade.

The Plaintiffs were registered pro-

prietors of the mark "Conquest" in Part A

of the Register Class 34 in respect of the

goods tobacco, whether manufactured or

unmanufactured.

The Defendants, The Health Educa-

tion Bureau, produced an imitation packet

of cigarettes, containing pieces of paper

folded to look like cigarettes, on which

were printed pieces of advice on how

to give up smoking. To the casual observer

the packet looked like and was intended to

look like a packet of cigarettes bearing the

brand name "C o n q u e s t ".

The

Defendants had been unaware that by

using the word "Conquest" it was making

use of a registered trade mark — it had

caused a search to be made in the Register

but the searcher had failed to search in

Class 34.

The Plaintiffs claimed that the

exclusive statutory rights given to them by

Section 12 of the Trade Marks Act 1963

had been infringed and secondly and

alternatively that the Defendant had been

in breach of a duty of care which it owed to

all persons lawfully engaged in the trade of

selling tobacco products not to so conduct

its campaign as to damage the legitimate

rights of property which such persons are

entitled to enjoy.

The Defendants denied a breach df the

Plaintiffs statutory rights as it had not

used the Plaintiffs' mark in relation to

cigarettes but in relation to a health educa-

tion campaign. The Defendant also

argued that the exclusive right given

by Section 12 is a right to use the mark in

relation to goods in the course of trade,

and that even if it had used the mark "in

relation to" cigarettes it did not use it in

the course of trade.

HELD: That by giving the words of

Section 12 their ordinary and natural

meaning and applying them to the facts,

the Defendant had used the mark "in

relation to" cigarettes. The Plaintiffs'

mark, though little used by them, could

never again be used by them in relation to

cigarettes or tobacco products. The fact

that goodwill in a mark has been injured

lends considerable support to a claim that

there has been a use of the mark "in

relation to" the goods for which the mark

was registered.

That furthermore following the English

case of

Bismay v. Amblins (Chemists)

Limited

57. R.P.C. 209, Section 12 when

enacted had extended the law relating to

trade marks and that the exclusive

statutory right was not confined to use to

indicate the origin of the goods.

On the Defendants' submission that an

infringement contrary to Section 12 only

occurs if there is use of the mark by the

alleged infringer "in the course of trade"

(by reference to the definition of a trade

mark contained in Section 2 of the Act), it

was held that that would require the court

to construe the section by adding words to

it which it did not contain. As had been

seen in the present case, a non trading

unauthorised use of the mark could result

in irreparable damage to the mark and

there was no reason why the legislature

did not intend to grant effective protection

against such "non-trading" use.

As the mark could not be used further,

a sum of £350 would be incurred in regis-

tering another mark — which was the sum'

awarded to the Plaintiffs by way of

damages.

As the Plaintiffs were entitled to relief

under the first part of their claim it was

unnecessary to consider the alternative

claim based on the allegation of breach of a

common law duty of care.

Gallaher (Dublin) Limited, Hergall (1981)

Limited, and Gallaher Limited v. The

Health Education Bureau

— High Court

(per Costello J.) — 23 February 1982 —

[1982] ILRM 240.

Daire Hogan

VALUATION

Rateablllty of Educational Institu-

tion under the Provisions of Section

63 of The Poor Relief (Ireland) Act,

1838.

The question at issue in this case was

the rateability or otherwise of Wesley

College. This question depended on

whether or not Wesley College was an

Institution altogether of a public nature

and used exclusively for public purposes,

and therefore, coming within the

exemption provided by Section 63 of the

Poor Relief (Ireland) Act, 1893.

The Constitution of Wesley College

requires the Governors "to provide and

afford for Methodist and other children

and for so many of the children of

Ministers in connection with the

Methodist Church as may from'time to

time be elected or designated for such

purpose by the Conference (of the

Methodist Church in Ireland) subject to

such charges or scale of charges as may

from time to time be determined by the

Governors for the time being".

Statistics were provided for the Court

in respect of the year 1973 which showed

that of the 622 boys and girls attending the

College 19.3% were Methodist, 59.3%

were members of the Church of Ireland

and the remaining 12.54% were drawn

from other Protestant sects, Roman

Catholics, Jews and Muslims. The Court

was of the opinion, therefore, that while

the College was of unique benefit to the

small scattered Methodist Community in

Ireland it enured over-whelmingly for

the benefit of non-Methodists. The school

is essentially a private, fee-paying school

with grants and subventions from the

Department of Education which are avail-

able to recognized Secondary Schools.

The Court held that because one of the

conditions for the admittance for most of

the pupils is the payment of a sizeable fee,

it cannot be said that Wesley College is

altogether of a Public nature, or altogether

used for public purposes. It is a necessary

pre-requisite for exemption from rate-

ability that the College have an exclusively

public nature or purpose.

In reaching this conclusion the Court

referred to

Trustees of Magee College v.

Commissioner of Valuation

IR 4CL 438

and

Guardians of Waterford Union v.

Barton,

[1896] 21R 538. The Court dis-

tinguished the cases of

Pembroke UDC v.

Commissioner of Valuation

[1904] 21R 427

as in that case, Pembroke Technical School

was maintained by public money and

derived no private profit, was open to all

comers. The fee of 2/6d which each

student had to pay was disregarded by the

Court under the

de minimis

rule, because

it was intended to ensure that only bona

fide and serious students would enrol and

that the circumstances of Wesley

College were radically different. The

Court also distinguished the instant case

and that of

University College Cork v.

Commissioner of Valuation,

[ 1911 ] 21R 593

in which case the University College was

held exempt from rates as in that case the

relevant provision of the Irish

Universities Act, 1907 and of the Charter

of the National University and that of the

College itself marked the College as

having in terms of its objects, user and

financial accountability, characteristics

which made it altogether of a public

nature and used for public or exclusively

charitable purposes. Similar charac-

teristics were found wanting in the

instant case. At one stage the College

argued that in accordance with the

opinion of the House of Lords in

The

Governors of Campbell College Belfast v.

Commissioner of Valuation for Northern

Ireland[

1964] 1 WLR 912, that exemption

is to be sought in Section 2 of the Valua-

xvii