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tion (Ireland) Act, 1854, but ultimately
that suggestion was withdrawn and the
case solely rested on the exemption
provided by Section 63 of the Poor Relief
(Ireland) Act 1838. On the latter the Court
held that the tenements and heredita-
ments of Wesley College are not used
exclusively for charitable purposes and are
not of a public nature and dedicated to or
used exclusively for public purposes and
accordingly should not be thus
distinguished in the valuation lists.
Governors of Wesley College and the
Trustees of the Methodist Church in Ireland
v. Commissioner of Valuation.
Supreme
Court (per Henchy J. Nem Diss) 9
December 1982 — unreported.
Peter Connolly
CRIMINAL LAW
When sentencing a young person,
the District Court or Circuit Court,
which certifies that the unruly
character of the young person
prevents it from ordering that the
offender be detained in a place of
detention, may determine that a
sentence of imprisonment be
imposed.
L. was a young person within the
meaning of the Children Act, 1908, who
was sent forward to the Circuit Court for
sentence, having signed pleas of guilty to
over 80 offences. The Circuit Court Judge
certified L. to be "of so unruly a character
and of so depraved a character that he
cannot be detained in and is not a fit
person to be detained in a place of
detention for young persons under the
Children Act, 1908".Such a certificate
enables a sentence of imprisonment to be
imposed on a young person and a sentence
of two years in Mountjoy Prison was
passed.
L. obtained a conditional order and, in
time, an absolute order of certiorari in the
High Court on the ground that S.106 of
the Children Act, 1908, prohibited a
sentence of more than one month's
imprisonment for a young person. The
Respondent appealed to the Supreme
Court.
HELD: S. 106 of the Children Act,
1908 is an enabling one which allows the
District Justice or Circuit Judge, when he
considers that none of the other methods
with which the ease may legally be dealt
with is suitable, to commit a child or
young person to a specified place of
detention for a period not exceeding one
month instead of imposing a term of
imprisonment. In this case the Circuit
Judge considered that the other methods
of dealing with L. were not unsuitable.
Instead, the Judge determined that a
prison was the appropriate place to send
the applicant. S. 106 has no application
where such a determination is made and in
the instant case the Respondent acted
properly and within his jurisdiction.
The State (Laffey) v. Esmonde and Others.
Supreme Court (per O'Higgins C. J., and
Henchy J., Griffin J. concurring), 2 July,
1982 — unreported.
Ciaran A. O'Mara
ROAD TRAFFIC ACTS
Bye-Laws under Road Traffic Act,
1961, Sections 89,90 and 92 —Control
of Traffic and Parking on Specified
Public Roads —Control of Traffic on
the Occasion of Fairs and Markets
The Defendants in each of these two
groups of cases are street traders and were
prosecuted in the District Court,
convicted and fined for breaches of Bye-
Laws made under Sections 89 and 90 of
the Road Traffic Act, 1961 relating to the
regulation and control of traffic and the
parking of vehicles. Cases having been
stated, the High Court upheld all the con-
victions. A further Appeal was taken to the
Supreme Court.
Bye-Laws made under Sections 89 and
90 of the Road Traffic Act, 1961, are not,
and are not intended to be, effective to
regulate traffic and parking in a lawful
Market or Fair. The regulation of traffic
through a public road where a Fair or
Market is being lawfully held can be
effected only by Bye-Laws made under
Section 92 (1) and then only to the extent
allowed by that sub-section. Where the
evidence raises an inference that the
conduct complained of may consist of
trading in a lawful Market, the Prosecutor
must rebut that inference if he is to secure
a conviction for a breach of Bye-Laws
made under Sections 89 and 90.
The Supreme Court allowed all the
appeals and directed that the several
summonses should stand dismissed.
Director of Public Prosecutions (Long) v.
McDonald and Others; Same v. O 'Mahony
and Others; Same v. Biggs and Others. —
Supreme Court (per Hency. nem. diss.)
22 July, 1982) — unreported.
William Dundon
PLANNING —
Local Government (Planning and
Developments Acts) 1963/1976,
Housing Act 1960 — Whether
Decision to Refuse Decision Made
and Communicated within Statutory
Time Limits
The Plaintiff lodged an application with
the Defendants for permission to carry out
a development at Strand Road, Bray on or
about 6 October 1978. As the proposed
development would have entailed the
demolition of an existing habitable house,
a' separate application was made to the
Defendants for permission under the
Housing Act 1969 for the demolition of
the house. The Housing Act permission
was refused and an appeal brought to the
Minister for the Environment, who
granted permission for the demolition on
20 August 1979. The Defendants were,
under the provisions of Section 26(4)(a)
and (b) of the Local Government
(Planning and Development) Act 1963 as
amended by Section 10 of the Housing
Act 1969, required to make and give notice
of their decision in relation to the Planning
Application within a period of five weeks
from the date of final determination of the
application for the permission to
demolish.
The Defendants made a decision on the
application on 24 September 1979 and on
that day sometime after 4.30 p.m. an
official from the Planning Authority
handed in a registered letter, containing
the notice of decision to grant permission
and addressed to the Plaintiff, at Bray Post
Office. The latest time for posting
registered post each day at Bray Post
Office was 4.30 p.m. and a notice to this
effect was prominently displayed in the
post office. Any registered letters accepted
after that time would not go out until the
following morning.
The Plaintiff and Defendants both
issued proceedings seeking certain
declarations on the various issues. The
Court considered that the issues to be
determined could be resolved by
considering what answer should be given
to the following series of questions:
1. Is the day upon which the Minister's
decision was given on the appeal of the
Housing Act 1969 to be taken into
account in calculating the "appropriate
period" of five weeks within which a
decision should have been given on the
Planning application?
2. If it is and the five week period expired
on 23 September 1979 is the situation
affected by reason of fact that that date
fell on a Sunday?
3. If 24 September 1979 is to be regarded
as the last day of the statutory five week
period, was notice "given" within the
meaning of the Acts, when the
registered packet was handed into the
post office on that date and accepted
for posting by the person in charge?
4. If the notice was not given within the
requisite five week period is it now
open to the Plaintiff to challenge the
validity of the decision to refuse
permission, having regard to the time
limit for bringing proceedings imposed
as a result of the amendment of Section
82 of the Local Government (Planning
and Development) Act 1963 effected
by Section 42 of the amending Act of
1976.
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