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LAND REGISTRATION RULES,
1954 .
T
he
Land Registration Rules, 1954 (S.I. No.
180/1954) came into operation on 1st September,
1954, and substitute new rules relating to solicitors’
costs for rules 241 to 246 o f the Land Registration
Rules, 1937, as amended. The new rules are on
sale at the Government Publications Sale Office,
G.P.O. Arcade, Dublin, price 6d.
DECISIONS OF PROFESSIONAL
INTEREST.
Is a husband, who is mainly successful in an appli
cation made under Section
17
o f the Married
Women's Property A ct,
1882,
in respect o f his title to
certain moneys and property which his wife disputed, and
in which his wife was ordered to pay one-fifth o f his costs,
liable to pay f o r his w ife’s solicitors' claim f o r their
professional charges
?
Yes, said Stable J. These professional charges are
recoverable from the husband under common law,
as the wife was an agent of necessity. PerS tab leJ.:—•
“ The husband has called no evidence before me to
the effect that his former wife, who is now living in
Australia, apart from trifling personal matters, ever
possessed a penny piece. In this case the wife was
forced by straitened circumstances either to pledge
her husband’s credit to employ a solicitor or to do
withoutone. As regards the issue o f the proceedings,
although the result may fairly be said to have been
somewhat in the husband’s favour, I think the wife
was perfectly reasonable in fighting the summons.
It was highly advantageous for her to do so. Indeed,
as a result, she was left in the flat until alternative
accommodation was found for her by her husband.
It may be that the legislature may think fit to inter
vene and make some further provision which will
prevent impecunious wives from involving their
husbands in litigation under that particular section,
which, whatever the result may be, must end in
the financial discomfiture o f the husband; but that
is the business o f the legislature, if they so think, and
not for me.” (J. N. Nabarro & Sons
v.
Kennedy
(
1954
)
3
W .L.R., 296).
Has the Court, in actions under the Fatal Accidents
Acts, unlimited discretion under Section
5o
o f the Supreme
Court o f Judicature
(
Consolidation
)
Act.
1925,
cor
responding to Section
52
o f the Judicature A ct (Ireland),
1877,
to award costs on
(1)
a solicitor and client basis, or
(2)
a solicitor and own client basis, i.e., a complete indem
nity or,
(3)
is it limited by the terms o f the English Pules
o f the Supreme Court, Order
22,
Pule
14
(fo r which there
appears to be no corresponding Irish rule) which, in the
absence o f consent, limits the power to direct payment by
the defendant o f costs other than party and pa rty ?
No, said Willmer J ., as regards (1) and (2). In
the absence o f consent the rule takes precedence over
the Act, and there is no discretion in England to
award any other than party and party costs. Willmer
J. in a lengthy judgment reviews all the authorities
on the subject. (Thomason
v.
Swan, Hunter &
Wighman Richardson Ltd., re “ The Albion ”
(No. 2) (1954) 1. W .L.R., 1220).
In a motion f o r an order o f prohibition directed to a
statutory tribunal to prohibit them from fu rth er proceeding
on a reference made by a Minister after the application and
is refused, should the applicants pay the costs o f both the
Minister and a trade union who, though representing the
same interest, were separately represented by counsel ?
No, said a Queen’s Bench Divisional Court (Lord
Goddard, C. J ., Slade and Cassels).
Per Lord
Goddard, C. J. :— The Court does not like having
to give two sets o f costs in these cases. It seems to
us that if the Minister is satisfied that the trade
union is represented and argue the case, then the
Minister ought not to be represented—or vice-versa.
It is desirable to say that the opinion o f the Court is
that in future in matters o f this sort, not more than
one set o f costs will be granted.” (R.
v.
Industrial
Disputes Tribunal and National Union o f Bank
Employees—ex parte American Express Co. Inc.
(1954) 2, A ll E .R ., 764).
Can the Court, in an application by a widow under the
Inheritance (Family Provision) A ct,
1938,
f o r fu rther
provision to be made f o r her, rectify a mistake o f the
applicant's solicitor, who, not knowing the law, had not
made this appliction within six months after taking out
the grant o f probate, and duly applied f o r an extension
o f time
?
No, said Roxburgh J. The mistake o f the solicitors
was not a “ circumstance affecting the administration
or distribution o f the estate ” within the rule, so
that there was no jurisdiction to extend the time.
Per Roxburgh J . :—-“ The plaintiff had ample time
within the prescribed period, and even after negotia
tions were suspended (to consider points raised by
the Revenue) to issue the summons, and this step
would undoubtedly have been taken by anybody
aware o f the time limit. I certainly cannot lay down
a rule that it would be unfair not to extend the time
in every case in which no distribution had yet been
made, for this happens in the great majority of
cases.” (Re Greaves deed.—Greaves
v.
Greaves
(
1954
)
1
,
W .L.R., 760).
42