GAZETTE
MARCH 1986
product proved only to have been
defective,
in the sense
of falling short of the legitimate expectations of the
consumer. Thus, where a watch caused dermatitis, its
user could in certain circumstances sue the manufacturer
or supplier in tort but, if it merely went slow, the only
remedy lay in contract.
Since Costello, J.'s judgment in
Ward
-v-
McMaster
and Louth Co.
Co.,
18
it is now clear that in some cases it
will be possible to take negligence proceedings where the
defendant has produced a defective rather than danger-
ous product. Costello, J. endorsed this extension of the
scope of recovery with less hesitation than the majority
in the House of Lords decision of
Junior Books -v-
Veitchi
|y
a decision whose reasoning Costello, J. found
"persuasive".
But for the purposes of the Directive, as we have seen,
"defectiveness" does not have this wider meaning. Pro-
ducts that are safe but shoddy do not fall within its scope.
Let us now consider briefly the elements of defectiveness
specified in Article 6. The key word is
safety:
a product
is defective when it does not provide the safety which a
person is entitled to expect, taking all the circumstances
into account.
Article 6 mentions three specific circumstances, giving
them no particular weight relative to each other or
relative to other unspecified circumstances. What weight
each should have must depend on the facts of each
particular case. The first of these circumstances is " t he
presentation of the p r oduc t ". If, for example, a product
is represented in the advertising literature and in the
detailed descriptive quality, then a consumer who is
injured or suffers damage from the product's danger-
ousness in lacking this quality may have a right to action.
K SECURITY PRIVATE
INVESTIGATIONS LTD.
Founded 1947
Internationally represented »n 40 countries.
OUR SERVICES INCLUDE
• Matrimonial/Domestic investigations.
• Insurance Claims.
• Employment Tribunal/Industrial Relations
Employer/Employee.
• Fraud, Internal Theft.
• Copyright/Patent/Trade mark, Infringement.
• Commercial, Civil, Criminal, Plaintiff/Defence
• Trace Investigations
• Surveillance, Under Cover Agents.
• electronic Sweeping (Removal only).
• Hand-writing analysis.
• General investigations under P.I.L.
Fully Experienced Investigators conversant
with all aspects of Court Attendance,
Evidence etc.
RICHMOND CHAMBERS,
101 RICHMOND ROAD,
DUBLIN 3.
Tel 3 6 0 1 2 4 / 5 - 371906
(Incorporating
Summons
Servers
Ltd.)
So where a hot water bottle is represented as being
capable to taking boiling water, and it is not, an injured
user who relies on this representation may well succeed,
on this account, in showing that the hot water bottle did
not provide the safety which he was entitled to expect. It
would appear that the "presentation" of the product
includes an
omission
to provide information which
ought to have been given, to protect the user from harm.
Thus, the failure by a producer to refer to an allergic
reaction which was known to the producer to affect the
product could in some instances be relied on by an
injured consumer.
The second circumstance specified in Article 6 is " t he
use to which it could reasonably be expected that the
product would be p u t ". Clearly there are limits to what
reasonably may be expected: it is unreasonable, for
example, to expect that a hammer should be capable of
being used successfully as a car jack. Moreover, a com-
petent adult who deviates widely from the specified
instructions as to the use of a product may have no right
to complain about injuries resulting from his or her
failure to comply with the directions.
So far as misuse of a product is concerned, it may be
that the European Directives will be interpreted as
broadly as in the United States so as to apply a modif-
ication of the forseeability rule akin to that in
Hughes
-v-
Lord Advocate.
1
"
In
Moran
-v-
Faberge Inc.,
1]
a
seventeen-year-old girl injured a friend of hers when she
poured some cologne onto a lighting candle in order to
make it a scented candle. The cologne was highly inflam-
mable, but no warning to this effect was contained on
the bottle. Liability was imposed. The majority of Mary-
land Court of Appeals considered that it was not
necessary for the plaintiff to show that Faberge ought
to have foreseen that its cologne would be used in this
idiosyncratic manner; it was necessary only that "it be
foreseeable to the producer that its product, while in its
normal environment, may be brought near a catalyst,
likely to be found in that environment, which can untie
the chattel's inherent danger".
The third circumstance specified by Article 6 is " t he
time when the product was put into circulation". This
factor may operate in one of two ways. First, the passage
of time may be relevant as throwing light on what a person
is "entitled to expect". To take an obvious case, one
would not be entitled to expect that a chocolate cake
would be edible after a year. Indeed, one could surely
expect that any consumer products, after sufficient wear
and tear, would eventually become likely to be unsafe.
That is one of the reasons why we change our cars and
electrical appliances periodically.
The second way the time factor specified by Article 6
operates is somewhat different. It relates to the fact that
safety standards may change over a period of time. This
change may be as a result of a development in the state
cf scientific and technical knowledge: such a case is
covered by Article 7, clause (e) and will be considered
below. But safety standards mav also change without
direct reference to such scientific and technical develop-
ments. What may have been an acceptable risk from a
product twenty years ago may simply cease to be accept-
able to the community over this period. For example,
there is a greater sensitivity to questions of hygiene and
road safety today than there was some time ago. The
thrust of Article 6 is to seek to ensure that producers will
41