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Central Eastern Europe GRIP 2017 |

55

Figure 4.10:

Direction of gas flow considered at each interconnection point under disruption

via Ukraine

Cross-border Entry/Exit capacity 2017 (EP_IN / XP_OUT)

Cross-border Entry/Exit capacity – planned 2018-2026 (EP_IN / XP_OUT)

UGS/Production Entry Capacity (S / P) – withdrawal

UGS Exit Capacity (S_X) – injection

Domestic Exit Capacity required for Demand (D_MAX / D_AS)

2017

2020

2025

Direction of gas flow:

CZ

SK

HU

SI

IT

PL

BG

HR

DE

AT

RO

GR

DK

2020

2021

2018

2019

2021

2020

2023

2018

2023

2020

2021

2024

2021

2019

2019

2019

2022

2020

2023

2019

Disrupted connection (UA)

Disrupted connection (UA)

Disrupted connection (UA)

Disrupted connections (UA)

Disrupted connections (UA)

LT

Disrupted connection (UA)

The analysis for the 2017 summer period resulted in the identification of a problem

in Bulgaria. Due to the lack of gas in Bulgaria that would be caused by a gas supply

disruption via Ukraine, there would be no gas for the underground storage facilities

in Bulgaria during the summer. This situation could lead to a deepening of the

problem identified during the winter period, because the underground storage facil-

ities would be empty. This problem will be solved by the implementation of planned

infrastructure projects in upcoming years. During the 2017 summer period, poten-

tial problems in injecting gas into underground storage facilities in Hungary and

Romania were also identified, but only if the disruption lasted more than 45 and 138

days, respectively. A potential problem was also identified in Austria (only if the

disruption lasted more than 116 days), but this would be caused by the fact that IP

Baumgarten is used in the AT>SK direction in the analysis. If it had been used in the

other direction, Austria would have no problem.

In the 2020 summer period, the potential problem of injecting gas into underground

storage facilities was detected in Hungary, but only if the gas supply disruption

through Ukraine lasted longer than 37 days.

The commissioning of projects in subsequent years will respond to all identified

problems.