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INFORMS Philadelphia – 2015

108

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45-Room 103C, CC

Revenue Management in Online Advertising

Sponsor: Revenue Management and Pricing

Sponsored Session

Chair: Hamid Nazerzadeh, University of Southern California, Bridge

Memorial Hall, 3670 Trousdale Parkway, Los Angeles, CA, 90089,

United States of America,

hamidnz@marshall.usc.edu

1 - Recent Results in Internet Advertising Allocations

Nitish Korula, Research Scientist, Google, New York,

nitish@google.com,

Morteza Zadimoghaddam, Hossein Esfandiari,

Vahab Mirrokni

Advertising provides the economic foundation of the Internet. Internet

advertising applications motivate a host of optimization problems with unique

challenges and as such, there is a large body of literature on optimizing various

aspects of ad allocations. I will survey some of the recent work in this field, with

special focus on two problems: Designing algorithms that work well in both

adversarial and stochastic settings, and algorithms that balance multiple system

objectives.

2 - Multi-stage Intermediation in Online Internet Advertising

Ozan Candogan, University of Chicago,

Booth School of Business, Chicago, United States of America,

ozan.candogan@chicagobooth.edu

, Santiago Balseiro,

Huseyin Gurkan

We consider a setting where an advertiser tries to acquire impressions from an ad

exchange, through a chain of intermediaries. We characterize equilibrium profits

of intermediaries as a function of their position in the chain. We consider three

value distributions for the advertiser: (i) exponential, (ii) Pareto, (iii) uniform. We

establish that in (i) all intermediaries have the same profit, whereas in (ii) and

(iii) respectively downstream/upstream intermediaries have higher profits.

3 - Adverse Selection and Auction Design for Internet

Display Advertising

Nick Arnosti, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, United States of

America,

narnosti@stanford.edu

, Marissa Beck, Paul Milgrom

We model an online display advertising environment with brand advertisers and

better-informed performance advertisers. We consider a mechanism which assigns

the item to the highest bidder only when the ratio of the highest bid to the second

highest bid is sufficiently large. For fat-tailed match-value distributions, this

mechanism captures most of the gains from good matching and improves match

values substantially compared to the common practice of setting aside impressions

in advance.

4 - Deals or No Deals: Contract Design for Selling Online Advertising

Hamid Nazerzadeh, University of Southern California, Bridge

Memorial Hall, 3670 Trousdale Parkway, Los Angeles, CA, 90089,

United States of America,

hamidnz@marshall.usc.edu

,

Vahab Mirrokni

I will discuss some of the challenges in maximizing revenue of online advertising

market. I will explain preferred deals: a new generation of contracts for selling

display advertising that allow publishers to offer their inventory to “first look”

buyers before the inventory is made available to other buyers (advertiser) in the

general auction. I present algorithms for deal recommendation and show that

deals can obtain significantly higher revenue than auctions.

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46-Room 104A, CC

Managing Professional Services

Sponsor: Manufacturing & Service Oper Mgmt/Service Operations

Sponsored Session

Chair: Morvarid Rahmani, Assistant Professor, Georgia Tech,

morvarid.rahmani@scheller.gatech.edu

1 - The Design of Multi-stage Service Processes

Ioannis Bellos, Assistant Professor, George Mason University-

ISOM Area, Enterprise Hall, 4400 University Drive, MS 5F4,

Fairfax, VA, 22030, United States of America,

ibellos@gmu.edu,

Stelios Kavadias

Motivated by the practices of design firms we build on the customer journey

concept, which describes services as multi-stage processes. We develop a

parsimonious model and we analyze the provider’s decisions on the amount of

effort she exerts at each stage of the process and the overall price she charges.

2 - Skill and Capacity Management in Large-scale

Service Marketplaces

Eren Cil, University of Oregon, 1585 East 13th Avenue,

Eugene, OR, United States of America,

erencil@uoregon.edu,

Achal Bassamboo, Gad Allon

We characterize the optimal skill screening mechanism of a firm moderating a

large-scale service marketplace where the ability of a service provider to cater

customers, who can be of two classes, varies. We show that when the values that

a service provider generates for each customer class are independent, the firm

may need to refuse some of the service providers via its screening mechanism

whereas this is never optimal when these values are perfectly correlated.

3 - Pricing Diagnosis-based Services when Customers Exhibit

Sunk Cost Bias

Guangwen Kong, University of Minnesota, 111 Church Street SE,

Minneapolis, MN, 55414, United States of America,

gkong@umn.edu

, Sampath Rajagopalan, Chunyang Tong

We build a model to shed light on how sunk-cost effect influences the SP’s choice

of pricing scheme. We provide an analysis on how the sunk cost effect influences

a monopolistic SP’s choice of pricing scheme, and then examine the impact of

sunk-cost effects in a competitive setting. Further, we consider customers with

differing levels of sophistication (being naïve or sophisticated) and investigate

how a mixture of customer types further impacts the choice of pricing scheme.

4 - Balancing Experience in Fluid Teams: Team Familiarity, Partner

Diversity and Performance

Sarang Deo, Assistant Professor, Indian School of Business

Hyderabad, ISB Hyderabad, Gachibowli, Hyderabad, TS, 500032,

India,

sarang_deo@isb.edu

, Kamalini Ramdas, Zeynep Aksin,

Jonas Jonasson

We use data from London Ambulance Service to study the impact of partner

diversity of new paramedics on their operational performance. We find that the

greater diversity in prior partners directly improves performance for an

unstandardized process. For a more standardized process, this effect is moderated

by a new recruit’s total experience. We explore the implications of our results for

team formation strategies by balancing the benefits of partner diversity with those

of team familiarity.

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47-Room 104B, CC

Incentives and Investment in Renewable Energy and

Energy Efficiency

Sponsor: Manufacturing & Service Oper Mgmt/Sustainable

Operations

Sponsored Session

Chair: Owen Wu, Indiana University, 1309 E. 10th Street,

Bloomington, IN, 47405, United States of America,

owenwu@indiana.edu

1 - Impact of Electricity Pricing Policy on Renewable Energy

Investments and Carbon Emissions

Safak Yucel, PhD Candidate, Duke University, 100 Fuqua Drive,

Durham, NC, 27708, United States of America,

safak.yucel@duke.edu

, Gurhan Kok, Kevin Shang

We investigate the impact of electricity pricing policy (i.e., flat pricing versus peak

pricing) on renewable energy investments and carbon emissions. We find that flat

pricing generally leads to a higher investment level and lower carbon emissions.

Furthermore, our results indicate that the pricing policy that leads to higher

investments may not reduce carbon emissions. We also study the effects of

subsidy policies on the investments and emissions.

2 - Robustness of Renewable Energy Support Schemes

Stefan Spinler, Professor, WHU-Otto Beisheim School of

Management, Burgplatz 2, Vallendar, 56179, Germany,

stefan.spinler@whu.edu

, Ingmar Ritzenhofen, John Birge

Renewable portfolio standards (RPS), feed-in-tariffs (FIT), and market premia

(MP) are widely used policy instruments to promote investments in renewable

energy sources (RES). Regulators continuously evaluate these instruments along

the main electricity policy objectives of affordability, reliability, and sustainability.

We assess these policies using a long-term dynamic capacity investment model

and compare their robustness in the light of uncertain RES feed-in and

ambiguous future regulation.

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