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INFORMS Philadelphia – 2015

382

5 - Open Priority Scheduling Protocol for Sourcing and

Supply Management

Katariina Kemppainen, School of Business, Aalto University,

Runeberginkatu 22-24, Helsinki, 00076 Aalt, Finland,

katariina.kemppainen@aalto.fi,

Ari Vepsäläinen

Are you happy with the first-come-first-served priority rule when ordering goods

online? The extensive scheduling literature has few answers from real-life

applications, whereas in procurement case studies abound but theoretical

analyses are few. We propose an open protocol for manufacturing and

procurement which beats consistently not only FCFS but any other rule. It offers

a sophisticated solution for one universal rule. Our protocol is backed up with

simulation results and real-life cases.

WA27

27-Room 404, Marriott

Multi-objective Optimization and Applications

Sponsor: Multiple Criteria Decision Making

Sponsored Session

Chair: Matthias Ehrgott, Professor, Department: Management Science,

Lancaster University, The Management School, Lancaster, 00, LA1 4YX,

United Kingdom,

m.ehrgott@lancaster.ac.uk

1 - Ultra-high-dimensional Optimization for Trade Space Exploration:

Challenges and Lessons Learned

Matthew Hoffman, Sandia National Laboratories, P.O. Box 5800

MS 1188, Albuquerque, NM, 87185-1188, United States of

America,

mjhoffm@sandia.gov,

Alexander Dessanti,

Stephen Henry, Jack Gauthier

In projects with many conflicting stakeholder objectives, negotiating compromise

requires understanding tradeoffs. Existing multiobjective approaches build

“coalitions” of objectives to reduce dimensionality – either explicitly via

aggregation, or implicitly – which favors solutions that compromise across many

objectives, but can severely obfuscate or distort the tradeoffs between them. We

discuss our progress thus far in true ultra-high-dimensional optimization for trade

space exploration.

2 - Special Constraint Treatment for Multi-objective Optimization

Sijie Liu, Graduate Student, University of Alabama, 714 1/2 12th

St. B, Tuscaloosa, AL, 35401, United States of America,

sliu28@crimson.ua.edu

Several methods has been developed for finding pareto set and pareto front for

multi-linear objective optimization problem subjective to one additional special

constraint(such as bi-linear constraint or N-linear constraint) over a bounded

interval domain subjective to linear equality constraint. These methods provide us

fast approaches to plot the entire pareto frontier. Algorithms have been proved

and numerical results demonstrate the effectiveness of these methods.

3 - A Nonparametric Approach to the Multi-Objective Sequential

Decision Problem

Young H. Chun, Professor, Louisiana State University,

E. J. Ourso College of Business, Baton Rouge, LA, 70820,

United States of America,

prof@drchun.net

Many choices are presented one at a time. You must decide whether to choose

the current choice and stop the search process or to reject it and move to the next

stage. The decision is irrevocable and each choice is evaluated based on multiple

objectives. We propose a rank-based optimal decision strategy that minimizes the

weighted rank of the selected choice. It can be shown that many sequential

decision problems are special cases of the generalized multi-objective sequential

decision problem.

4 - Deliverable Radiotherapy using Multiobjective Optimisatio and

Column Generation

Matthias Ehrgott, Professor, Department: Management Science,

Lancaster University, The Management School, Lancaster, 00,

LA1 4YX, United Kingdom,

m.ehrgott@lancaster.ac.uk

,

Kuan-min Lin

We propose a column generation based approach to compute deliverable

radiotherapy treatment plans based on a multi-objective optimisation problem.

We compute a representative set of non-dominated treatment plans using the

revised normal boundary intersection method. The generation of each non-

dominated treatment plan uses column generation to generate apertures that

directly deliverable, obviating the need for a separate segmentation step that

deteriorates plan quality.

WA28

28-Room 405, Marriott

Bidding Mechanisms

Cluster: Auctions

Invited Session

Chair: Bernardo Quiroga, Assistant Professor, Business and Behavioral

Science, Clemson University, 100 Sirrine Hall, Clemson, SC, 29634,

United States of America,

bfquirog@gmail.com

1 - One-dimensional Strategyproof Facility Location

Itai Feigenbaum, Columbia University, New York, NY,

United States of American,

itai@ieor.columbia.edu,

Chun Ye,

Jay Sethuraman

Consider a set of agents on an interval, where a planner wishes to locate a facility

so as to maximize some social benefit function. The agents have linear preferences

over the location of the facility, and their locations are unknown to the planner.

Thus, the planner wishes to locate the facility in a strategyproof manner while

approximating social benefit. We discuss mechanisms, lower bounds, and

characterizations for various versions of this model.

2 - Greening Multi-tenant Data Center Demand Response with

Supply Function Bidding

Niangjun Chen, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA,

United States of American,

ncchen@caltech.edu,

Adam Wierman,

Shaolei Ren, Xiaoqi Ren

Data centers have become critical resources for emergency demand response

(EDR). In this talk, we focus on “greening” demand response in multi-tenant data

centers by incentivizing tenants’ load reduction and reducing on-site diesel

generation. Our proposed mechanism, ColoEDR, which is based on parameterized

supply function mechanism, provides provably near-optimal efficiency

guarantees, both when tenants are price-taking and when they are price-

anticipating.

3 - Optimal Bidding for Bundles in Sequential Auctions

Karti Puranam, Assistant Professor, La Salle University, 1900 W

Olney Ave, Philadelphia, PA, 19141, United States of America,

puranam@lasalle.edu

, Michael Katehakis

We study the problem of optimal bidding for a firm that in each period procures

items to meet a random demand by participating in a finite sequence of auctions

where in each auction involves bids for bundles of items. We develop a new

model for a firm where its item valuation derives from the sale of the acquired.

We establish monotonicity properties for the value function and the optimal

dynamic bid strategy and we present computations.

4 - Complexity and Transparency in Sealed-bid Procurement

Auctions with Multi-dimensional Bids

Bernardo Quiroga, Assistant Professor, Business and Behavioral

Science, Clemson University, 100 Sirrine Hall, Clemson, SC,

29634, United States of America,

bfquirog@gmail.com

,

Brent Moritz, V. Daniel R. Guide, Jr.

We experimentally analyze A+B (price-and-quality) bidding behavior in two

closely related sealed-bid scenarios: One where the rule to assign the contract is

transparently communicated to bidders before they submit their offers, and

another where the assignment rule is only known to the buyer and not to the

bidders. Our results show substantial losses in terms of social welfare and buyer

surplus as a direct effect of transparency loss in this procurement system.

WA29

29-Room 406, Marriott

Applied Analytics

Sponsor: Analytics

Sponsored Session

Chair: Jon Alt, Assistant Professor, Naval Postgraduate School,

Department of Operations Research, Naval Postgraduate School,

Monterey, CA, 93943, United States of America,

jkalt@nps.edu

1 - Improved U.S. Army Reserve Stationing using Recruitable

Market Demographics

Nathan Parker, U.S. Army, 4120 Crest Rd, Pebble Beach, CA,

93953, United States of America,

nparker@nps.edu

The objective of this work is to develop a model to predict a U.S. Army Reserve

(USAR) unit’s manning level based on the demographics of the unit’s reserve

center recruitable market (RCRM). This study first develops an allocation method

to determine the RCRM available to each reserve center. Classification and

regression models are then developed to determine the ability of the RCRM to

support the reserve center’s manning requirements.

WA27