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INFORMS Philadelphia – 2015

387

4 - A Dynamic Learning Approach for Personalized

Promotion Recommendations

Adam Elmachtoub, Assistant Professor, Columbia IEOR, 500 West

120th St, New York, NY, United States of America,

adam@ieor.columbia.edu,

Markus Ettl, Sechan Oh, Marek Petrik

Many companies are aiming to offer real-time personalized promotions to online

shoppers with the goal of increasing conversion rates and revenue. In this work,

we provide a dynamic learning model and algorithm that simultaneously

maximizes revenue while learning how customers choose based on their

attributes and the promotions they receive. We provide theoretical bounds on the

regret as well as new analytical tools to determine feature importance in the

context of promotion recommendations.

WA44

44-Room 103B, CC

Dynamic Pricing

Sponsor: Revenue Management and Pricing

Sponsored Session

Chair: Candace Yano, University of California, Berkeley,

IEOR Dept.and Haas School of Business, Berkeley, CA, 94720,

United States of America,

yano@haas.berkeley.edu

1 - Optimal Dynamic Pricing for Trade-in Programs

Mohammad Ghuloum, Doctoral Student, Indiana University,

1309 E 10th St, Bloomington, IN, 47405, United States of

America,

mghuloum@indiana.edu

, Goker Aydin,

Gilvan (Gil) Souza

Trade-in managers continuously monitor their inventory of used products, and

adjust the acquisition and selling prices accordingly. Considering such a firm, we

study a novel dynamic pricing problem, where not only the demand of the

product is random and sensitive to the selling price, but also its supply is random

and sensitive to the acquisition price.

2 - Pricing in Crowdfunding

Ming Hu, Associate Professor, University of Toronto,

105 St. George Street, Toronto, Canada,

Ming.Hu@Rotman.Utoronto.Ca

, Mengze Shi, Xi Li, Longyuan Du

We study the pricing decisions under an all-or-nothing crowdfunding scheme.

First, menu or intertemporal pricing is more likely than a single price to be

optimal. Second, dynamic pricing (contingent on the pledge amount) can help

the creator to stay over the funding tipping point over time, increasing success

rate and profitability.

3 - Dynamic Competition under Market Size Dynamics:

Balancing the Exploitation-induction Trade-off

Nan Yang, Assistant Professor, University of Washington at

St. Louis, St. Louis, MO, 63130, United States of America,

yangn@wustl.edu,

Renyu Zhang

We study a dynamic competition model, in which retail firms periodically

compete on promotional effort, sales price, and service level over a finite planning

horizon. The key feature of our model is that the current decisions influence the

future market sizes through the service effect and the network effect. Using the

linear separability approach, we characterize the pure strategy Markov perfect

equilibrium in both the simultaneous competition and the promotion-first

competition.

4 - Optimizing Pre-season Order Quantities in the Presence of

Planned Promotions

Dimin Xu, UC Berkeley, Haas School of Business, Berkeley, CA,

United States of America,

dimin_xu@haas.berkeley.edu

,

Candace Yano

Most retailers plan major promotions well before a product’s selling season,

possibly to coincide with storewide sales events. We optimize the pre-season

order quantity for a product considering planned promotions (and consequent

time-varying prices), when demand is price- and time-sensitive and stochastic.

Our approach accounts for both systematic fluctuations and uncertainty in the

implied salvage value over the season. We present structural results and

managerial insights.

WA45

45-Room 103C, CC

Topics in Revenue Management

Sponsor: Revenue Management and Pricing

Sponsored Session

Chair: Florin Ciocan, INSEAD, Boulevard de Constance 77305,

Fontainebleu, France,

florin.ciocan@insead.edu

1 - When Fixed Pricing Meets Priority Auctions: Service Systems

with Dual Modes

Jiayang Gao, PhD Candidate, Cornell University, 507 Hasbrouck

Apts, Ithaca, NY, 14850, United States of America,

jg838@cornell.edu

, Huseyin Topaloglu, Krishnamurthy Iyer

Suppose a firm offers two modes of service: a fixed price, FIFO queue, and a

priority queue. Customers choose a mode to participate, as well as their bids if

they join the priority queue. We prove that in the unique symmetric equilibrium,

customer behavior has a threshold structure, in which customers with very high

and very low patience levels join the priority queue, whereas those with

intermediate patience levels join the FIFO queue. We then discuss the firm’s

server allocation problem.

2 - Product Support Forum: Customers as Partners in

Service Delivery

Konstantinos Stouras, PhD Candidate, INSEAD,

Bd. de Constance, Fontainebleau, 77305, France,

Konstantinos.Stouras@insead.edu

, Serguei Netessine,

Karan Girotra

Online product support forums where customers can post complaints and

questions, or report issues about a product or service abound. More and more

companies crowdsource their product and service support back to their

customers, employing a few dedicated service operators.Through an analytical

model, we characterize the equilibrium behavior of such a service system and

compare it with a call center model.

3 - Econometrics for Learning Agents

Vasilis Syrgkanis, Microsoft Research, 641 Avenue of the

Americas, New York, United States of America,

vasy@microsoft.com

, Eva Tardos, Denis Nekipelov

The goal of this paper is to develop a theory of inference of player valuations from

observed data in the generalized second price auction without relying on the

Nash equilibrium assumption. Existing work assumes that each player’s strategies

are best responses to the observed play of others. We show how to perform

inference relying on the weaker assumption that players use some form of no-

regret learning. We apply our techniques to a dataset from Microsoft’s sponsored

search auction system.

4 - Adwords Equilibria with Budgeted Bidders

Florin Ciocan, INSEAD, Boulevard de Constance 77305,

Fontainebleu, France,

florin.ciocan@insead.edu

,

Krishnamurthy Iyer

We examine a model of the AdWords market where bidders strategically choose

their budgets and bids, while the network can throttle bidders to optimize its own

revenues. We show the equilibria in this market take a simple form and that for

these equilibria the network’s optimal throttling policy is greedy.

WA46

46-Room 104A, CC

Empirical Studies in Public Services:

Health Care and Education

Sponsor: Manufacturing & Service Oper

Mgmt/Service Operations

Sponsored Session

Chair: Jun Li, Assistant Professor, Ross School of Business, University of

Michigan, 701 Tappan St, Ann Arbor, 48103, United States of America,

junwli@umich.edu

1 - A Multiple Case Study of Resource Flow in Education Systems

Samantha Meyer, Research Fellow, University of Michigan, Ross

School of Business, R5340, Ann Arbor, MI, 48109, United States

of America,

srmeyer@umich.edu,

Karen Smilowitz

The US spends more to educate its children than nearly every other developed

nation, but scores near the bottom on international tests. Yet, how the US could

better use its resources is hard to know. Social scientists focus on the way

resources influence power, trust, and competition, whereas operations scholars

focus on technical problems of resource distribution and use. The reality is that

both matter. In this study we examine the way social and technical issues interact

in education systems.

WA46