Informs 2015

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INFORMS Philadelphia – 2015
53
SA47
4 - Capacity and Price-matching Competition with
Strategic Consumers
Mikhail Nediak, Queen’s University, 143 Union Str., Kingston,
ON, K7L3N6, Canada, Yossi Aviv,
Andrei Bazhanov, Yuri Levin
Price matching (PM) is important to all market participants since PM can not only
mitigate the loss from strategic customer behavior but even lead to gains from
higher levels of this behavior under competition. Retailer profit with PM can be
less than the worst profit without PM. Manufacturer never benefits from PM
except for branded products when the sales at reduced prices are undesirable. On
the other hand, policymakers may encourage PM since it can improve the
aggregate welfare.
SA45
45-Room 103C, CC
Networks: Games and Control
Sponsor: Revenue Management and Pricing
Sponsored Session
Chair: Kimon Drakopoulos, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Cambridge, MA, United States of America,
Co-Chair: Asu Ozdaglar, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 32
Vassar St, Cambridge, MA, United States of America,
1 - Controlling Epidemics on Networks
Kimon Drakopoulos, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Cambridge, MA, United States of America,
, Asu Ozdaglar, John Tsitsiklis
We study the problem of optimally allocating curing resources to cure an
epidemic on a graph. We assume a curing budget constraint at each time instant.
We prove that for graphs with large CutWidth efficient curing is impossible while
for graphs with small CutWidth, efficient curing is possible and provide a near
optimal policy.
2 - Privacy Constrained Network Formation
Ali Makhdoumi, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
32 Vassar St, Cambridge, MA, 02139, United States of America,
Daron Acemoglu, Asu Ozdaglar,
Azarakhsh Malekian
With the increasing ease with which information can be shared in social media,
the issue of privacy has become central for the functioning of various online
platforms. In this talk, we consider how privacy concerns affect individual choices
in the context of a network formation game.
3 - Consensus Expectations and Conventions
Ben Golub, Assistant Professor, Harvard University, 1805
Cambridge St, Cambridge, MA, 02144, United States of America,
, Stephen Morris
Players have uncertainty over both an external random variable and each other’s
beliefs. We study the iteration of an operator that takes a network-weighted
average of others’ expectations. By relating this process to a Markov chain, we
characterize its limit, generalizing prior results on games with common priors and
on complete-information network games. As applications, we study coordination
games, over-the-counter financial markets, and the robustness of equilibrium.
4 - On the Efficiency of Networked Stackelberg Competition
Adam Wierman, California Institute of Technology, 1200 E
California Blvd, Pasadena, CA, 91125,
Desmond Cai, Yunjian Xu, Subhonmesh Bose
We study the impact of strategic anticipative behavior in networked markets. We
focus on the case of electricity markets and model the market as a game between
a system operator (market maker) and generators at different nodes of the
network. We compare the efficiency of a networked Stackelberg equilibrium,
where generators anticipate the market clearing actions of the system operator,
with a networked Cournot equilibrium, where generators are not anticipative.
SA46
46-Room 104A, CC
Empirical Research in Services and Retail
Sponsor: Manufacturing & Service Oper Mgmt/Service Operations
Sponsored Session
Chair: Santiago Gallino, Tuck School of Business, 100 Tuck Hall,
Hanover, NH, United States of America,
Co-Chair: Antonio Moreno-Garcia, Northwestern University,
2001 Sheridan Rd, Evanston, Il, 60208, United States of America,
1 - The Reference Effect of Delay Announcements
Qiuping Yu, Assistant Professor, Indiana University, 1309 E. 10th
Street, Bloomington, IN, 47405, United States of America,
Gad Allon, Achal Bassamboo, Pengfei Guo
We study whether delay announcements induce the reference effect using data
from a call center. Our empirical results show that customers are loss aversion in
response to the delay announcements. We then provide insights on whether and
how we should provide announcements to the customers accounting for their
loss averse behavior.
2 - The Operational Value of Social Media Information
Dennis Zhang, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern
University, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL, 60201,
United States of America, ,
Antonio Moreno-Garcia, Santiago Gallino, Ruomeng Cui
We study how social media information can be used to improve forecasting and
discuss the implications of this relation for operations management.
3 - The Value of Rapid Delivery in Online Retailing
Santiago Gallino, Tuck School of Business, 100 Tuck Hall,
Hanover, NH, United States of America,
, Marshall Fisher,
Joseph (Jiaqi) Xu
For online retailers who sell physical goods, every transaction has two main
components: the physical product a customer buys and the services by which the
retailer facilitates the customer’s purchase. Delivery speed is arguably the most
important service component for online retailers. We use a quasi-natural
experiment to assess the impact of faster delivery on revenue.
4 - A Holistic Perspective to Shrinkage: Antecedents
and Consequences
Daniel Corsten, IE Business School, Calle Maria de Moina 12
Bajo, Madrid, 28006, Spain, ,
Shivom Aggarwal
Vendor-side fraud has been overlooked in literature due to intractability, but
poses to be significant antecedent of shrinkage. Using multi-store longitudinal
data from a US retailer, we investigate holistic antecedents of shrinkage and how
they affect store performance. The unified framework will contribute to extant
literature on efficient retail operations.
SA47
47-Room 104B, CC
Emerging Topics in Healthcare Operations
Sponsor: Manufacturing & Service Oper Mgmt/Service Operations
Sponsored Session
Chair: Mor Armony, NYU Stern, 44 West 4th Street, New York, NY,
10012, United States of America,
1 - An Examination of Early ICU Admissions based on a Physiologic
Risk Score
Wenqi Hu, Columbia Business School, 3022 Broadway, Uris 4V,
New York, NY, 10027, United States of America,
, Gabriel Escobar, Carri Chan, José
Zubizarreta
Unplanned transfers of patients from the ward to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU)
can occur due to rapid deterioration and may increase the patients’ risk of death.
This work examines the potential costs and benefits of preventive ICU admissions
based on a new dynamic warning system. We find that preventive ICU admissions
have the potential to improve patient outcomes, and physicians’ fears of
needlessly clogging the ICU may not be as dire as initially assumed.