The Gazette 1961

of the estate of a woman who died of cancer in

hospital. He alleged that just before her death the

defendant solicitors had negligently caused or

permitted the deceased to purchase an annuity of

.£156 a year for £1,363, and that her estate was

thereby deprived of that sum of money. Barry J.

held that (i) the defendants were not negligent in

relation to the deceased as they were faced with the

dilemma of having to proceed with the purchase or

take action which would have led the deceased to

suspect that she was suffering from an incurable

disease; they were entitled to assume that at the

relevant time the doctors did not consider it un

economic to invest in such an annuity ;

(2) the

defendants owed no duty to the present plaintiff.

(The Times,

October 27, 1961.)

Vendor andpurchaser

—

contractfor sale—completion date.

In Smith

Mansi (October 20, 1961) Wilberforce J.

held that where a vendor and purchaser of property

fail to agree on the completion date for the sale there

is no legally binding contract even though the

parties have agreed on every other necessary term

in the agreement.

(The Guardian,

October 21, 1961.)

Crown proceedings—liability of Secretary of State—

negligence to prisoner. (Crown Proceedings Act,

1947

& ii

Geo. 6, c.

44),

2.)

The pursuer, at the time a prisoner, was injured

when he fell from a scaffolding while working in

prison. He brought an action for negligence against

the Secretary of State for Scotland on the following

grounds :

(i) that the accident was caused through

the fault of a fellow-prisoner, and (2) breach of the

defender's statutory duty to provide safe equipment.

Subsequently after the expiry of the limitation period,

the pursuer amended the pleading by inserting as a

futher cause of action, the defender's breach of the

common law duty to take reasonable care of the

prisoners under his control. The Sheriff's Court of

Midlothian held that the amendment was good in

that it did not radically alter the basis of the action.

It also held that the action failed on grounds (i) and

(2) because the master and servant relationship did

not exist between the parties, and failed on the

amendment because no specific averment of fault had

been made against the defender or his servants.

Keatings

Secretary of State for Scotland (1961, 77

Sh. Ct. Rep. 113.)

Tenantfor life—powers of-—leasingpowers.

A tenant for life has no power to grant a lease of

the settled land together with property of his own,

at any rate where there is no provision for apportion

ment of the rent. He may enter into an executory

agreement for the grant of a lease, as opposed to an

agreement for a lease which in equity is equivalent

to a lease, provided that the lease will be in confor

mity with the Settled Land Act when it is granted.

The tenant for life of certain properties in London

agreed to grant three leases for terms of 99 years

commencing not later than December, 1972. One of

the leases was to include property of which he was

the owner in fee.

The rent payable was to be

£17,500 per annum, which exceeded one-fifth of the

aggregate annual value of all the properties.

of the Settled Land Act, 1888, provides :

" Save

as hereinafter provided, every lease—(i) shall be by

deed, and be made to take effect in possession not

later than twelve months after its date .

." S. (3)

provides :

" Where the land is contracted to be

leased in lots, the entire amount of rent to be

ultimately payable may be apportioned among the

lots in any manner : Provided that .

. (iii) the rent

reserved by any lease shall not exceed one-fifth part

of the full annual value of the land comprised in

that lease with the buildings thereon when com

pleted." Held, (i) that in the absence of a provision

for apportionment of the rent between his own

property and the settled land, he had no power to

grant a lease including both ;

(2) that it was within

his power to agree to grant leases to commence at

a date more than twelve months after the date of

the agreement; (3) that he had no power to grant

the leases at the rent proposed, as it would be

impossible to apportion the rents in such a way as

to ensure that each property was let at a rent less

than one-fifth of the full annual value. Re Rycroft's

Settlement, Rycroft

Rycroft (1961, 3 W.L.R. 890 ;

105 S.J. 649, Wilberforce J.)

Memorandum. (Statute of Frauds (Ireland),

1695.)

In Godley

Power (1957) 95 I.L.T.R. 135 the

plaintiff claimed that the defendant had orally agreed

to purchase from him certain licensed premises,

known as " Toby Jug ", Cappoquin, and certain

articles therein. On the defendant attempting to with

draw from the agreement the plaintiff brought an

action for specific perofrmance and for breach of con

tract. At the hearing the defendant's solicitor testified

that the defendant had called with him and had in

structed him that he had purchased the premises for

£2,250.

In the defendant's presence his solicitor

telephoned the plaintiff's solicitor and later wrote to

him confirming that the defendant had agreed to

purchase the premises at the figure stated and that

the vendor would be liable for one-half of the

auctioneer's fees and asking him to have an inventory

of articles included in the agreement for sale. The

Supreme Court in Eire (Kingsmill-Moore, O'Daly

and Martin Maguire JJ ; Maguire C.J. and Lavery J.

dissenting, reversing Dixon J.) held that a contract

had been concluded between the parties and that