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INFORMS Nashville – 2016
106
SD36
205B-MCC
Economics of Operations Management
Sponsored: Manufacturing & Service Oper Mgmt, Supply Chain
Sponsored Session
Chair: Kenan Arifoglu, UCL, London, United Kingdom,
k.arifoglu@ucl.ac.uk1 - Money-back Guarantees When Physical And On-line
Retailers Compete
Hang Ren, University College London,
hang.ren.13@ucl.ac.ukTingliang Huang, Ying-Ju Chen, Christopher S Tang
We study the pricing and product return policies when physical and on-line stores
compete. We find that the on-line store offers money-back guarantees when its
salvage advantage outweighs total return hassle. Interestingly, better service
quality may hurt the on-line store. When consumers can showroom, i.e., buying
online after trying the product offline, the on-line store should offer hassle-free
money-back guarantees. Moreover, the showrooming behavior may benefit the
physical store while harming the online store.
2 - Licensing Contracts In Conspicuous Markets
Prateek Raj, University College London,
p.raj.12@ucl.ac.uk,
Kenan Arifoglu
We study licensing decision of a brand owning firm that sells its primary product
to conspicuous customers who value the brand exclusivity, and also licenses its
brand name to a licensing firm. We compare efficiency of fixed-fee, royalty and
mixed contracts and also explore the role of licensing under competition.
3 - Selling New Products Through Consumer Learning
Yufei Huang, University of Bath,
y.huang@bath.ac.uk,
Bilal Gokpinar, Christopher S. Tang, Onesun Steve Yoo
Due to uncertain valuation of a new product, consumers often seek to learn more
about the product before making purchasing decisions. In general, consumers can
learn from the firm directly, from making an individual effort to learn, or from
other consumers indirectly (through social learning). In this paper, we present a
unified framework of consumer learning in the context of rational and
heterogeneous consumers. Our goal is to examine, from the firm’s perspective,
when and why (i) investing in firm-induced learning can be superior to variable
pricing, (ii) subsidizing individual learning can be beneficial, and (iii) investing in
social learning (e.g., online forums) can be harmful.
4 - Is Reshoring Better Than Offshoring Under Offshore
Supply Dependence?
Hu Bin, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC,
United States,
bin_hu@unc.edu, Li Chen
We investigate offshore supply dependence’s impact on the offshoring-reshoring
comparison. We find that offshore supply dependence may hamper a reshoring
manufacturer’s responsiveness to demand information updates, such that
reshoring may yield lower profits than offshoring in many cases, including when
reshoring has no direct cost disadvantages. We then show that offshore supply
dependence also affects how customs duties and shipping costs influence the
offshoring-reshoring profit comparison. We further identify common-component
designs as an approach to mitigate reshoring firms’ offshore supply dependence
and help promote reshoring in its presence.
SD37
205C-MCC
Value Chain Transformations for Sustainability
Sponsored: Manufacturing & Service Oper Mgmt,
Sustainable Operations
Sponsored Session
Chair: Dan Andrei Iancu, Stanford University, 655 Knight Way,
Stanford, CA, 94305, United States,
daniancu@stanford.eduCo-Chair: Joann de Zegher, Stanford University, Y2E2 Suite 226,
Stanford, CA, 94305, United States,
jfdezegher@stanford.edu1 - Retail Clusters In Developing Countries
Xuying Zhao, University of Notre Dame,
Xuying.Zhao.29@nd.edu,
Hong Guo, Chao Ding, Jing-Sheng Jeannette Song
A retail cluster refers to a collection of horizontally differentiated retailers of a
particular business sector locating in close proximity. Retail clusters are commonly
seen in developing countries. In this paper, we develop a game-theoretic model to
explore why the retail cluster phenomenon is so popular in developing countries
and how the governments in these countries can foster retail clusters and
leverage them to improve social welfare.
2 - Achieving Sustainability Commitments In Commodity
Supply Chains
Joann Francoise de Zegher, Stanford University, Stanford, CA,
United States,
jfdezegher@stanford.edu,Hau Leung Lee,
Dan Andrei Iancu, Erica Plambeck
How can downstream companies in commodity supply chains incentivize small
producers to mitigate deforestation while also improving farmer welfare?
Motivated by field research in the palm oil industry, we propose an incentive
based on early payments. The dynamics of this incentive are distinct from a price
premium incentive, due to characteristics of small-farmer cash flow needs
upstream and large discrepancies in borrowing abilities of different supply chain
tiers. We build a theoretical model to analyze this setting and ground our analysis
through empirical work in the complex palm oil supply chain originating in
Indonesia.
3 - Effective Medical Surplus Recovery
Can Zhang, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, 30309,
United States,
czhang2012@gatech.edu,Atalay Atasu,
Beril L Toktay, Wee Meng Yeo
We analyze a Medical Surplus Recovery Organization (MSRO) that recovers and
manages reusable medical products to fulfill the needs of under-served healthcare
facilities in developing countries. Using a game theoretic analysis, we identify loss
of effectiveness caused by competition among recipients in a recipient-driven
model implemented by the MSRO. We then present operational mechanisms that
can improve the MSRO’s total value provision and we numerically validate our
results using real life data.
SD38
206A-MCC
Innovation and Entrepreneurship
Invited: New Product Development
Invited Session
Chair: Raul Chao, University of Virginia, UVA, Charlottesville, VA,
United States,
ChaoR@darden.virginia.edu1 - Risk Aversion And Joint Problem Solving: Experimental Evidence
Marc Christiaan Jansen, Cambridge Judge Business School,
Downing College, Regent Street, Cambridge, CB2 1DQ,
United Kingdom,
mcj32@cam.ac.uk, Nektarios Oraiopoulos,
Niyazi Taneri
We examine the effect of risk aversion on collaborative problem solving between
two partners. We design an experiment that measures subjects’ risk aversion and
allocates subjects to treatments accordingly. We show that subjects perform
relatively well in sharing the risk between them, but underperform relatively to
the optimal investments levels.
2 - Strategic Positioning In Global Entrepreneurship Ecosystems
Hyunwoo Park, Postdoctoral Fellow, Georgia Institute of
Technology, Atlanta, GA, 30332, United States,
hwpark@gatech.edu, Rahul C Basole, Raul Chao
Strategic positioning is particularly critical for entrepreneurial ventures, which
face a difficult trade-off in balancing legitimacy through similarity versus
innovativeness through differentiation. Using a computational approach based on
data mining, text analytics, and network visualization, we seek to gain an
understanding of the structure of strategic positioning of nearly 60,000 companies
in 35 global entrepreneurial ecosystems.
3 - Won’t Leave You At The Altar: Designing Alternative Mechanisms
For Startup Supply Chain Development
Emre Guzelsu, Boston University,
bguzelsu@bu.eduBrad Lee, Nitin Joglekar
Startup supply chain development spans two stages, early experimentation
without revenue followed by production scale-up and revenue generation. Early
experimentation involves single sourcing with another startup, while production
offers dual sourcing opportunity. We explore alternative mechanisms for startup
supplier alignment across both stages using a game theoretic framework.
4 - Optimal Supplier Allocation In Collaborative Product Development
With Competing Internal Teams
Svenja Sommer, HEC Paris, 1, Rue de la Liberation, Jouy-en-Josas,
France,
sommers@hec.fr,Timofey Shalpegin, Christian Van Delft
To reduce the uncertainty inherent in development, manufacturers sometimes
deploy competing internal teams, each working on a different technology or
design. Often this development takes place in collaboration with key suppliers.
We explore how manufacturers should allocate suppliers (with different
capabilities) to these teams, considering the impact on supplier efforts.
SD36