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INFORMS Nashville – 2016

77

2 - Markets For Technology And The Technological Trajectories Of

Entrepreneurial Startups

Mahka Moeen, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC, 03,

United States,

mahka_moeen@kenan-flagler.unc.edu

Seth Carnahan

This paper focuses on how entrepreneurial startups shape their opportunity set

for participation in the market for technology, by pursuing investments that

increase their attractiveness as a technology seller. Because startups in

technological proximity to a technology buyer may be considered favorable

technology sellers, we suggest that investment by potential buyers in a technical

domain is likely to spur investments by startups in the same or proximate

domains. We further examine the moderating effects of the direction of scientific

progress, commercial applicability, and density of the buyer’s alliance portfolio.

The empirical context is plant biotechnology field experiments.

3 - The Entrepreneurial Process: Evidence From A Nationally

Representative Survey

Aaron Chatterji, Duke University, Faqua School of Business,

100 Fuqua Drive, Durham, NC, 27708, United States,

ronnie@duke.edu

, Victor Bennett

Using data from a new nationally representative survey of Americans, we

document patterns in the process of firm entry via entrepreneurship. Only 1/3 of

our respondents have even considered starting a business, motivated in the vast

majority of cases by non-pecuniary concerns rather than the pursuit of significant

market opportunities. Fewer than half of those who considered starting a business

take even the lowest cost steps, like searching the Internet for potential

competitors or speaking with a friend. This surprising lack of progress is evident in

comparison to nationally representative evidence on job search activities.

4 - Venture Capital Investment Strategies Under Financing

Constraints: Evidence From The 2008 Financial Crisis

Annamaria Conti, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA,

30332, United States,

annamaria.conti@scheller.gatech.edu

Stuart Graham, Nishant Dass

Employing the 2008 financial crisis as an empirical setting, we examine the

investment strategies of venture capitalists (VCs) in response to liquidity supply

shocks. While predictably VCs reduce investment, we show that VCs reposition by

increasing their share of, and per-round funding to, startups operating in the VCs’

core sectors. These effects are driven by more-experienced VCs, and are strongest

in early-stage portfolio startups. Consistently, we find superior ex-post

performance among crisis-funded portfolio startups operating in more-

experienced VCs’ core sectors. Our findings point to more-experienced VCs

possessing information advantages, especially in their core sectors.

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110A-MCC

Latest Developments in Scheduling Research

Invited: Project Management and Scheduling

Invited Session

Chair: Zhi-Long Chen, Professor, University of Maryland,

Van Munching Hall, College Park, MD, 20742, United States,

zchen@rhsmith.umd.edu

1 - A Polyhedral Study Of The Physician Scheduling Problem With

Equalization Constraints

Pelin Damci-Kurt, Lightning Bolt Solutions, South San Francisco,

CA, United States,

pelin@lightning-bolt.com

, Minjiao Zhang

We study a physician scheduling problem in which the goal is to minimize the

penalties associated with different requirements over a finite horizon. The

problem is divided and solved in two phases according to penalty values. We

focus on a relaxation including assignment demand and equalization constraints.

We present a class of valid inequalities, and report preliminary computational

experiments with them in a branch-and-cut algorithm on our client data sets.

2 - Models For Workforce Scheduling In A Union Shop

John Mittenthal, The University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, AL,

35487, United States,

jmittent@cba.ua.edu,

Minjiao Zhang

We develop an assignment problem model for worker to job assignments that

deviates as little as possible from a shift supervisor’s allocation of these workers.

These deviations occur due to worker absences. In addition to validating the

model over four weeks of data, we investigate a number of what-if questions.

3 - An Integrated Production Scheduling And Outbound Vehicle

Routing Problem

Kunpeng Li, Huazhong University of Science and Technology,

likp@hust.edu.cn

In this integrated production scheduling and vehicle routing problem, there is a

single machine for production and limited vehicles with capacity constraints for

transportation. The objective is to determine the decisions about production

scheduling, transportation batching and vehicle routing, to minimize the

maximum order delivery time. Based on an optimal property for production

scheduling and transportation batching, backward and forward batching methods

are developed, which are embedded into an improved genetic algorithm. The

results show that the genetic algorithm can provide high quality solutions,

compared with a two-stage algorithm and a published genetic algorithm.

4 - Integrated Production, Inventory And Distribution Problems

Zhi-Long Chen, University of Maryland,

zchen@rhsmith.umd.edu

Feng Li, Lixin Tang

We consider several integrated production, inventory and delivery problems that

arise in practical settings where customer orders have pre-specified delivery time

windows and are first processed in a plant and then delivered to the customers by

transporters that have fixed delivery departure times. The objective is to find an

integrated schedule for processing the orders, keeping finished orders in

inventory if necessary, and delivering them to the customers such that the total

inventory and delivery cost is minimum. We study complexity and propose

algorithms for various problems. For the two most general problems, we propose

combined column generation and tabu search heuristic algorithms.

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110B-MCC

Auction Design Topics

Invited: Auctions

Invited Session

Chair: Sasa Pekec, Duke University, 100 Fuqua Drive, Durham, NC,

27708-0120, United States,

pekec@duke.edu

1 - Stable Matchings With Proportionality Constraints

Thanh Nguyen, Purdue University,

nguye161@purdue.edu

,

Rakesh Vinay Vohra

In designing two sided markets, a stable matching is often desired to satisfy

certain additional side constraints. Current literature has mainly focused on

constraints where the relevant “right hand sides” are absolute numbers specified

a-priori; before agents on the “proposing” side make their participation decisions.

There is a danger, then, of over constraining the problem. It is sometimes more

natural to express the relevant constraints as proportions. We develop a

framework to obtain stable matchings that almost satisfy floor and ceiling

proportional side constraints. Our results are based on a generalization of Scarf’s

lemma, which is of independent interest.

2 - Budget-constrained Procurement

Alexandre Belloni, Duke University,

abn5@duke.edu

Giuseppe Lopomo, Leslie Marx, Roberto Steri

We consider a setting where a buyer procures up to D units of a homogeneous

good (e.g. a medical drug) but needs to satisfy a hard budget constraint of

spending at most B in total payments. Furthermore, the buyer faces suppliers

with privately known costs. We characterize the optimal procurement mechanism

as well as new simple mechanisms (which are at least as good as the second price

auction with reservation price) that are easy to implement via a sequential

auction. In particular we highlight how the budget constrain fundamentally alters

the structure of the optimal mechanism.

3 - Robust Bidding Policies

Sasa Pekec, Duke University,

pekec@duke.edu

We study the best-response decision problem of an auction bidder who wants to

maximize her worst-case payoff, while facing uncertainty about rivals’ objectives

and bids. The information about rivals is modeled via an uncertainty set

consisting of all possible realizations of rivals’ bids. Maximizing the bidder’s worst-

case payoff over this set yields robust bidding policies that do not depend on

distributional assumptions. Robust bidding policies are constructed for several

multi-item auction formats, depending on how supply (homogeneous or

heterogeneous items) and demand (unit-demand or multiple-demand bidders) is

handled.

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