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INFORMS Nashville – 2016

81

3 - Is The FDA Too Conservative Or Too Aggressive?:

A Bayesian Decision Analysis Of Clinical Trial Design

Andrew W Lo, Charles E. and Susan T. Harris Professor, MIT, 100

Main Street, E62-618, Cambridge, MA, 02142, United States,

alo-admin@mit.edu,

Andrew W Lo, Charles E. and Susan T. Harris

Professor, MIT, 32 Vassar Street, Cambridge, MA, 02139, United

States,

alo-admin@mit.edu,

Leah Isakov, Vahid Montazerhodjat

We explore the application of Bayesian decision analysis (BDA) to minimize the

expected cost of drug approval, where the relative costs of Type I and Type II

errors are calibrated using burden of disease data. For terminal illnesses with no

existing therapies such as pancreatic cancer, the standard Type I error threshold of

2.5% is substantially more conservative than the BDA-optimal threshold of

23.9% to 27.8%. We compute BDA-optimal sizes for 25 of the most lethal

diseases and show how a BDA-informed approval process can incorporate all

stakeholders’ views in a systematic, transparent, internally consistent, and

repeatable manner.

4 - A Comparison Between The Robust Risk-aware And Risk-seeking

Managers In R&D Portfolio Management

Aurelie Thiele, Associate Professor, Southern Methodist University,

Dallas, TX, United States,

aurelie@alum.mit.edu

Shuyi Wang

We analyze via simulation two mathematical modeling frameworks that reflect

different managerial attitudes toward upside risk in R&D portfolio selection. The

manager seeks to allocate a development budget between low-risk, low-reward

projects, called incremental projects, and high-risk, high-reward projects, called

innovational projects. We study the differences in strategy and portfolio’s risk

profile that arise between a risk-aware manager, who takes upside risk because he

has to for the long-term competitive advantage of his company, and a risk-seeking

manager, who will take as big a bet as allowed by the model.

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205A-MCC

Frontiers of Supply Chain Research

Sponsored: Manufacturing & Service Oper Mgmt, Supply Chain

Sponsored Session

Chair: Karen Zheng, MIT Sloan School of Management, Cambridge,

MA, 02142,

yanchong@mit.edu

1 - Dual Co-product Technologies: Implications For Process

Development And Adoption

Brian Tomlin, Tuck School of Business,

brian.tomlin@tuck.dartmouth.edu

, Ying-Ju Chen, Yimin Wang

Many industries operate technologies in which multiple outputs (co-products) are

jointly produced. Three important attributes of a co-product technology are its

production cost, its overall yield, and its co-product split. Process development

often wrestles with an inherent trade-off: improvement in one attribute comes at

the expense of another. In this talk, we first explore production and pricing

decisions for a firm with two technologies and then use this foundation to

examine implications for process development and process adoption.

2 - Impact Of Grocery Store Density And Market Structure On

Food Waste

Elena Belavina, University of Chicago Booth School of Business,

elena.belavina@chicagobooth.edu

Food waste is one of the major contributors of greenhouse gas emissions. If food

waste was a country, it would be third largest polluter shortly after US and China.

About $1 trillion dollars of food is wasted every year, which is equivalent to 1%

of GDP globally. This study explores the impact of store density and market

structure on consumer food waste.

3 - Self-policing In A Supply Chain Under Threat Of Public Disclosure

Sang-Hyun Kim, Associate Professor, Yale University, New Haven,

CT, United States,

sang.kim@yale.edu,

Saed Alizamir

We study incentive dynamics among supply chain members and an external

stakeholder (e.g., NGO) that impact environmental performance. A buyer inspects

a supplier’s production in its supply chain to detect and correct environmental

compliance violations. The buyer’s primary motive is to deter the NGO from

discovering the violation first and publicize it, from which the buyer incurs a

reputational penalty. The buyer and the NGO engage in a game to competitively

set their inspection intensities, which influence the supplier’s decision to restore

compliance. Together, the actions made by all parties determine the

environmental outcome and and social welfare.

4 - Increasing Retail Sales Via Improved Store Staffing:

An Empirical Study With Implemented Results

Santiago Gallino, Dartmouth College,

santiago.gallino@tuck.dartmouth.edu

, Marshall L Fisher,

Serguei Netessine

We analyzed 30 months of a retailer’s history on store-month sales and potential

sales drivers to measure the impact of store selling staff level on revenue. We

identified a third of the stores where our analysis indicated that increasing staffing

would increase sales. The retailer confirmed this finding via a 16 store test which

showed that a 10% increase in sales staff resulted in a 9.9% sales increase, and

was highly profitable. The retailer is now implementing our finding in other

stores.

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205B-MCC

Information and Risk in Supply Chain Networks

General Session

Chair: Kostas Bimpikis, Stanford Graduate School of Business,

650 Knight Way, Stanford, CA, 94305, United States,

kostasb@stanford.edu

1 - Inventory Management With Censored Demand Data:

The Adversarial Case

Michail Markakis, Universitat Pompeu Fabra,

mihalis.markakis@upf.edu

We consider a repeated newsvendor problem where the demand distribution is

unknown ex ante and has to be learned from sales/censored data. To shed light to

scenarios where the demand may be non-stationary, e.g., exhibiting trends or

seasonalities, we model the problem as a game between the inventory manager

and an oblivious opponent, who prior to the game decides a sequence of demands

for the different periods arbitrarily. We propose randomized inventory

management policies that perform well with respect to the regret criterion, i.e.,

the difference between a policy’s cumulative cost and the cumulative cost of the

best fixed action/ordering decision in hindsight, for any given demand sequence.

2 - Optimizing Local Content Requirements Under Technology Gaps

Shiliang Cui, Georgetown University,

shiliang.cui@georgetown.edu

, Lauren Xiaoyuan Lu

We study the optimal Local Content Requirements (LCR) and innovation policies

of a developing economy in which a foreign Original Equipment Manufacturer

(OEM) produces and sells a final product. We find that as the domestic

component supply base becomes more cost efficient, surprisingly, the OEM’s

profit could decrease.

3 - Take-rate Crowdsourcing Contracts

Yun Zhou, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada,

yzhou.zj@gmail.com,

Ming Hu

Motivated by the surge pricing strategy by the ridesharing platforms, we consider

the pricing problem in a two-sided market. The total amount of supply is an

increasing function of the wage and the amount of demand depends on the price.

We model supply and demand uncertainty by a number of different scenarios,

and show that the take-rate price contract is optimal for maximizing the

platform’s profit or the total utility of the platform and the supply side when only

the market size is scenario dependent. In more general cases, we derive

performance bounds for the take-rate contract.

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205C-MCC

Revenue Management, Assortments and

Choice Models

Sponsored: Manufacturing & Service Oper Mgmt, Supply Chain

Sponsored Session

Chair: Ozge Sahin, Johns Hopkins University, Brooklyn, NY,

United States,

ozge.sahin@jhu.edu

1 - Consumer Choice Under Rational Inattention And Implications

For Assortment Planning

Tamer Boyaci, ESMT Berlin, Berlin, 10178, Germany,

Tamer.Boyaci@esmt.org,

Frank Huettner, Yalcin Akcay

We study the choice behavior of rationally inattentive customers who optimally

acquire information about available options with ex-ante uncertain values

through potentially different channels with different costs. Customers trade-off

the benefits of better information obtained by asking questions with the

associated cost. We quantify acquired information and its cost through a novel

function based on conditional mutual information. We solve the consumer’s

choice problem and analytically characterize the resulting optimal choice

behavior. We illustrate some properties of the choice behavior and discuss

implications for assortment planning.

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