Background Image
Previous Page  301 / 552 Next Page
Information
Show Menu
Previous Page 301 / 552 Next Page
Page Background

INFORMS Philadelphia – 2015

299

TB43

43-Room 103A, CC

Choice Modeling and Assortment Optimization

Sponsor: Revenue Management and Pricing

Sponsored Session

Chair: Vineet Goyal, Columbia University IEOR department, 500 West

120th Street, 304 Mudd, New York, NY, 10027, United States of

America,

vg2277@columbia.edu

1 - Approximation Algorithms for Dynamic Assortment

Optimization Models

Ali Aouad, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 77

Massachusetts Avenue, Bldg. E40-149, Cambridge, MA, 02139,

United States of America,

aaouad@mit.edu,

Danny Segev,

Retsef Levi

We study the joint assortment and inventory management problem, where

demand consists in a random sequence of heterogeneous customers. Although

the problem is hard in general, we provide the first polynomial time algorithms

that attain constant approximations, for variants proposed in previous literature

as well as more general choice models. In addition, our algorithms provide

practical means for solving large-scale instances and for incorporating more

realistic contraints.

2 - Capacity Constrained Assortment Optimization under the Markov

Chain Based Choice Model

Chun Ye, Columbia University IEOR department, 500 West 120th

Street, Mudd 315, New York, NY, 10027, United States of

America,

cy2214@columbia.edu,

Danny Segev, Vineet Goyal,

Antoine Desir

We consider a capacity constrained assortment optimization problem under the

Markov Chain based choice model proposed by Blanchet et al. We first show that

even severely-restricted special cases are APX-hard. We then present a constant

factor approximation for the general problem. Our algorithm is based on a “local-

ratio” method that allows us to transform a non-linear revenue function into a

linear function over appropriately modified item prices.

3 - Assortment Optimization under a Random Swap Based

Distribution over Permutations Model

Antoine Desir, Columbia University IEOR department, 500 West

120th Street, Mudd 315, New York, NY, 10027, United States of

America,

ad2918@columbia.edu,

Vineet Goyal, Danny Segev

We consider a special class of distribution over permutations model based on

modeling the consumer preferences by a random number of random swaps from

a small set of fixed preference lists. This model is motivated from practical

applications where preferences of “similar” consumers differ in a small number of

products. We present polynomial time approximation schemes for capacity

constrained assortment optimization problem under the random swap based

distribution over permutation model.

4 - Design of an Optimal Membership Promotion Policy

with Experiments

Spyros Zoumpoulis, Insead,

spyros.zoumpoulis@insead.edu

,

Duncan Simester, Artem Timoshenko

Deciding what customer to target with what type of membership promotion is

among the most important decisions that wholesale clubs face. We use the results

of a large-scale membership promotion field experiment involving multiple types

of membership promotions to propose various promotion policies, each relying on

a different algorithm for customer segmentation. We then evaluate the

performance of the proposed policies as implemented in a large-scale field test.

TB44

44-Room 103B, CC

Machine Learning in Operations

Sponsor: Revenue Management and Pricing

Sponsored Session

Chair: Srikanth Jagabathula, NYU, 44 West Fourth Street, New York,

United States of America,

sjagabat@stern.nyu.edu

1 - Prediction vs Prescription in Data-driven Pricing

Nathan Kallus, MIT, 77 Massachusetts Ave., E40-149, Cambridge,

MA, 02139, United States of America,

kallus@mit.edu

,

Dimitris Bertsimas

We study the problem of data-driven pricing and show that a naive but common

predictive approach leaves money on the table. We bound missed revenue

relative to the prescriptive optimum, which we show is unidentifiable from data.

We provide conditions for identifiability and appropriate pricing schemes. A new

hypothesis test shows that predictive approaches are practically insufficient while

parametric approaches often suffice but only if they take into account the

problem’s prescriptive nature.

2 - The Big Data Newsvendor: Practical Insights from

Machine Learning

Gah-Yi Vahn, Assistant Professor, London Business School,

Sussex Place, Regent’s Park, London, NW1 4SA, United Kingdom,

gvahn@london.edu,

Cynthia Rudin

We study the newsvendor problem when one has n observations of p features

related to the demand as well as demand data. Both low- and high-dimensional

data are considered. We propose Machine Learning (ML) and Kernel

Optimization (KO) approaches, and derive tight bounds on their performance. In

a nurse staffing case study we find that the best KO and ML results beat best

practice by 23% and 24% respectively.

3 - Applying Machine Learning to Revenue Management at Groupon

David Simchi-levi, Professor, Massachusetts Institute of

Technology, 77 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA, 02139,

United States of America,

dslevi@mit.edu

, Alexander Weinstein,

He Wang, Wang Chi Cheung

We propose a new data-driven pricing algorithm for online retailers, which learns

customer demand from online transaction data. Our method first generates

multiple demand functions using a clustering algorithm, and then learns on the

fly which demand function is more likely to be correct. We will also discuss some

field experiment result through collaborating with Groupon, a large daily deal

website.

4 - Demand Forecasting when Customers Consider, Then Choose

Ying Liu, Stern School of Business, New York University, 44 West

4th Street, KMC 8-154, New York, NY, 10012, United States of

America,

yliu2@stern.nyu.edu

, Srikanth Jagabathula

We consider the problem of demand forecasting when customers choose by first

forming a consideration set and then choosing the most preferred product from

the consideration set. The consideration set is sampled from a general model over

subsets. We propose techniques to estimate such models from purchase

transaction data.

TB45

45-Room 103C, CC

Revenue Management for Marketing

Sponsor: Revenue Management and Pricing

Sponsored Session

Chair: John Turner, Assistant Professor, University of California, Irvine,

Room SB2 338, The Paul Merage School of Business, Irvine, CA,

92697-3125, United States of America,

john.turner@uci.edu

1 - Scheduling of Guaranteed Targeted Display Advertising under

Reach and Frequency Requirements

Ali Hojjat, University of California Irvine, Paul Merage School of

Business, Irvine, CA, 92697, United States of America,

hojjats@uci.edu,

John Turner, Suleyman Cetintas, Jian Yang

We propose a novel mechanism for the scheduling of guaranteed targeted

advertising in online media. We consider a new form of contract in which

advertisers specify the number of unique individuals (reach) and the minimum

number of times (frequency) each individual should be exposed. We further

integrate a variety of new features such as desired diversity and pacing of ads over

time or the number of competing brands seen by each individual. We perform

extensive numerical tests on industry data.

2 - Transaction Attributes and Customer Valuation

Michael Braun, Associate Professor Of Marketing, Southern

Methodist University, 6212 Bishop Blvd., Fincher 309, Dallas, TX,

75275, United States of America,

braunm@smu.edu,

Eli Stein,

David Schweidel

We propose a model of customer value and marketing ROI that incorporates

transaction-specific attributes and unobserved heterogeneity. From this model,

one can estimate an upper bound on the amount to invest in retaining a

customer. This amount depends on the recency and frequency of past customer

purchases. Using data from a B2B service provider, we estimate the revenue lost

by the firm when it fails to deliver a customer’s requested level of service.

3 - Auctions with Dynamic Costly Information Acquisition

Negin Golrezaei, Auctions With Dynamic Costly Information

Acquisition, University of Southern California, Bridge Memorial

Hall, 3670 Trousdale Parkway, Los Angeles, CA, 90089, United

States of America,

golrezae@usc.edu

, Hamid Nazerzadeh

We study the mechanism design problem for the seller of an indivisible good in a

setting where buyers can purchase the additional information and refine their

valuations for the good. This is motivated by information structures in online

advertising where advertisers can target users using cookie-matching services. For

this setting, we propose a rich class of dynamic mechanisms, called Sequential

Weighted Second-Price, which encompasses the optimal and the efficient

mechanisms as special cases.

TB45