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Ten Year Network Development Plan 2015 |
31
Rate of Return
Low price
of short term capacity
Capacity quotas
Lack of proper
transposition of
EU regulations
Other
%
22
4
3
5
66
Figure 3.3:
Overview of Regulatory related project barriers
3.3.1 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
For many projects the regulatory framework is perceived as not being appropriate to
ensure the delivery of new infrastructures even when they have been identified as
necessary to complete the integration of the European gas market. The following
graph shows in more detail the regulatory challenges faced by promoters according
to their project submission. The category “Other” covers promoters responses where
a specific category of barrier was not provided and the comments did not allow it to
be further categorized
1)
.
The level of rate of return is perceived as a major
obstacle. Setting the level is exclusively subject to the
national regulatory regimes but should encourage
long-term investments with a reasonable rate of return.
If the rate is too low or not sufficiently stable, then in-
vestments will be put at risk and consequently the
completion of the internal gas market. The setting of
the rate should strike the right balance between the
benefits of further market integration and the impact
on transmission tariffs which represent a moderate
share of the wholesale market price of gas.
The practice of applying incentives, such as premium
rates of return for higher risk projects, has already
been adopted by some Member States.
As part of the Framework Guidelines and Network
Code processes on Capacity Allocation Mechanism
and Harmonised Transmission Tariff Structures for
Gas, NRAs have followed the request of some market players in favouring low priced
short term capacity products and quotas. In addition to revenue recovery issues,
which such mechanisms could induce, they are inadequate for triggering new in-
vestments.
In addition, within the development process of the draft Tariff Network Code some
network users have claimed the right to cancel all or part of their capacity bookings
linked to tariff changes. If such situation would emerge, this will lead to cross-subsi-
dies between network users as a result of revenue neutrality for the operators
furthermore the value of any long term commitment would be weakened. This would
be major risk for investment realization.
The TEN-E Regulation was designed to support the delivery of key infrastructure
projects necessary to the completion of the Integrated Energy Market. Many network
users presume that associated EU financing will reduce their need of financial com-
mitment. Such expectation could result in an even lower willingness of the market
to commit in new infrastructures. In parallel, the cross-border cost allocation, which
was anticipated as new tool to foster investment decision, now appears to many pro-
moters as a source of delay and uncertainty.
The second selection of PCIs should address some concerns regarding the efficien-
cy of the selection process and could also help to identify good practices in terms of
permitting and regulatory incentives. Such mechanisms should then be extended to
all projects to help the market to deliver the required infrastructure projects.
Feedback from some project promoters suggests that the TEN-E Regulation, Gas
Target Model discussions and recent emphasis on Security of Supply seem to have
shifted the focus away from the full implementation of the Third Energy Package and
market-based solution across Europe. As identified by promoters, the resulting lack
of implementation in some parts of Europe is an obstacle to new investment deci-
sions.
1) Further explanation can be found in Annex A