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INFORMS Nashville – 2016
495
5 - Factors Affecting Public Private Partnership Acceptance
Vandit Shah, California State University, Fullerton, Fullerton, CA,
United States,
vandit_2293@csu.fullerton.edu,
Deepak Kanhaiyalal Sharma
Many highway projects have been successfully implemented as Public Private
Partnership (PPP) projects. The PPP projects, also known as toll roads, have been
beneficial to the public but have received varying level of acceptance across the
US. This research focuses on identifying the factors that differentiates the US
States on the basis of PPP acceptance. We have used Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) to identify education, gender, congestion (traffic volume) and
daily vehicle mile traveled as the most influential factors influencing PPP
acceptance. The results of this research will be useful for agencies to develop
outreach programs for better PPP project implementation.
WE35
205A-MCC
On-demand Service Platforms
Sponsored: Manufacturing & Service Oper Mgmt,
Service Operations
Sponsored Session
Chair: Itai Gurvich, Kellogg School of Management,
Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, 60208, United States,
i-gurvich@kellogg.northwestern.edu1 - On-demand Service Platforms
Terry Taylor, University of California - Berkeley, Berkeley, CA,
94720, United States,
taylor@haas.berkeley.eduAn on-demand service platform (e.g., Uber, Instacart) connects waiting-time
sensitive customers with independent service providers. This paper characterizes
how two defining features of an on-demand service platform – congestion-driven
delay and service provider independence—impact the platform’s optimal
per-service price and wage.
2 - The Efficacy Of Incentives In Scaling Up Marketplaces
Ashish Kabra, INSEAD, Boulevard de constance, Fontainebleau,
77305, France,
ashish.kabra@insead.edu, Elena Belavina,
Karan Girotra
Marketplaces spend billions in incentives to achieve scale, which is key to the
efficacy and survival of marketplaces. Using detailed transaction data from a
leading transportation marketplace, we estimate and compare the effects of
incentives given to the “buyer” side and “seller” side of the marketplace as well as
the effect of threshold and linear incentives.
3 - Labor Welfare In The Sharing Economy
Guangwen Kong, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN,
United States,
gkong@umn.edu,Saif Benjaafar, Jian-Ya Ding,
Terry Taylor
We consider an online service platform that relies on a self-employed and self-
scheduled workforce to provide a service. Workers vary in their availability and
their valuation of their time. The platform decides on wages and prices. We
examine the resulting labor profile and labor surplus.
4 - Perception Of Dynamic Pricing In On-Demand Services
Nil Karacaoglu, Northwestern University, Kellogg, Evanston, IL,
United States,
n-karacaoglu@kellogg.northwestern.edu,
Antonio Moreno-Garcia
Ride-sharing services such as Uber and Lyft adjust their prices using opaque
dynamic-pricing algorithms that take demand and supply into account. In this
research, we focus on how customers perceive and react to nontransparent
dynamic pricing practices in ride-sharing services.
WE36
205B-MCC
Sustainable Operations for Farmers
Sponsored: Manufacturing & Service Oper Mgmt, Supply Chain
Sponsored Session
Chair: Ming Hu, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada,
ming.hu@rotman.utoronto.ca1 - Distressed Selling By Farmers: Model And Analysis
Shivam Gupta, University of Texas-Dallas,
sxg104920@utdallas.edu,Milind Dawande, Ganesh Janakiraman,
Ashutosh Sarkar
In many developing countries, farmers sell a significant portion of their produce
at prices much lower than the support price offered by the government. Using a
dynamic programming model, we identify a near optimal policy to quantify
distressed sales and show that the model predictions are reasonably accurate
using real data.
2 - Knowledge Sharing And Learning Among Smallholders In
Developing Economies: Implications, Incentives, And
Reward Mechanisms
Shihong Xiao, HKUST, Hong Kong, Hong Kong,
sxiaoab@connect.ust.hk,Ying-Ju Chen, Christopher S Tang
NGOs and governments are advocating knowledge sharing and learning platforms
to improve smallholders’ productivity. Putting altruism aside, we examine the
economic implications for heterogeneous farmers to share their private farming
knowledge voluntarily with other farmers under competition. By analyzing a
multi-person sequential game, we provide a plausible reason for farmers’ sharing
motivation. We find that the voluntary knowledge shared level is always lower
than or equal to the “first best” knowledge shared level. Upon examining
different mechanisms, we establish a quota-based reward mechanism that can
entice farmers to share their knowledge up to the first-best level voluntarily.
3 - Altruistic Rationality: The Value Of Strategic Farmers And
Social Entrepreneurs In Crop Planting Decisions In
Developing Economies
Wenbin Wang, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,
Shanghai, China,
wang.wenbin@shufe.edu.cn,Ming Hu, Yan Liu
We study how farmers make crop-planting decisions over time. We consider both
strategic farmers who rationally anticipate the near-future crop prices as a basis
for making planting decisions, and naïve farmers who shortsightedly react to
recent prices. The latter behavior may cause recurring over- or under-production
which leads to price fluctuations. We examine the roles of the strategic farmers
and social entrepreneurs in influencing the farmers’ crop-planting decisions and
stabilizing the market price. Surprisingly, we find the self-serving behaviors from
a tiny amount of strategic farmers may be enough to reduce price volatility and
benefit all the farmers.
WE37
205C-MCC
Health Care, Other II
Contributed Session
Chair: Mostafa Hasan, Research Assistant, Wichita State University,
1629 N Fairmount St, Wichita, KS, 67208, United States,
mhasann16@yahoo.com1 - A System Dynamic Approach For Risk Assessment Of Lyme
Disease – A Case Study At Binghamton University Campus In
Broome County, New York State
Nasser Sharareh, PhD, Binghamton University, 4400 Vestal
Parkway East, Binghamton, NY, 13902, United States,
nsharar1@binghamton.edu,Nasim Sabounchi, Amanda Roome,
Ralph Garruto
Our objective in this paper is to develop a risk assessment framework of Lyme
disease that includes the pathogen, reservoir, vector and environmental factors as
well as social, behavioral and demographic risk factors. System Dynamics
modeling has been used to develop a simulation tool to evaluate significance of
different risk factors on the Binghamton University campus in replicating the
historical trend of Lyme disease cases. The data for human behavioral risk,
pathway risk, and tick density and infectivity have been gathered by direct
observation and laboratory analysis. The model provides recommendations for
preventive strategies and control of tick population growth.
WE37