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INFORMS Philadelphia – 2015

335

1 - Quality at the Source or Quality at the End? Managing Supplier’s

Quality under Information Asymmetry

Mohammad Nikoofal, Católica Lisbon School of Business &

Economics, UCP, Palma de Cima, Lisbon, 1649-023, Portugal,

mohammad.nikoofal@ucp.pt

In this paper, we first develop and then compare two different mechanisms for

the buyer in order to control quality improvement efforts exerted by the supplier

when the supplier has private information about his inborn reliability.

2 - Optimal Monitoring Decisions for Asset Based Lending

Nikolaos Trichakis, Harvard Business School, Boston, MA,

United States of America, HBS,

ntrichakis@hbs.edu,

Dan Iancu,

Do Young Yoon

We consider a firm financing its operations by collateralizing its working assets,

e.g., inventory. To mitigate the risk due to the assets’ uncertain valuation, the

lender has a monitoring option entitling him to early repayment by liquidation.

We derive the optimal liquidation policy, showing that it can have a nonthreshold

structure. We derive bounds on the optimal monitoring time, and leverage them

to devise simple heuristics, which perform well in numerical studies.

3 - Capital Structure with Flexible Future Investments

Qi Wu, Case Western University, Cleveland, OH, United States of

America, Weatherhead School of Management, CWRU,

qxw132@case.edu,

Peter Ritchken

We analyze the interaction between investment and financing decisions in a

dynamic contingent claims model where the firm has the ability to dynamically

control production decisions of assets in place and has growth options to invest in

that can be financed with debt and equity. The fundamental question to be

addressed is how investment timing and financing decisions are affected by the

existing capital structure and the nature of the operating flexibility inherent in

the growth options.

4 - Make-to-Order vs. Make-to-Stock when Firms Compete, Input

Costs, and Demand are Stochastic

Danko Turcic, Associate Professor of Operations, Olin Business

School, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO, United

States of America,

turcic@wustl.edu

, Guang Xiao, Panos Kouvelis

This paper provides a new rationale for why firms choose long and short

production lead times that is based, in part, on non-competitive behavior in

product markets. We identify a set of conditions, which imply that some,

otherwise identical, production firms want to choose long production lead times,

while others choose short production lead times. The conditions are: (i) stochastic

production costs, (ii) price-dependent demand, and (iii) strategic inventory

withholding.

TC49

49-Room 105B, CC

Multi-Echelon Inventory Modeling

Sponsor: Manufacturing & Service Oper Mgmt/Supply Chain

Sponsored Session

Chair: Sean Willems, University of Tennessee, 453 Haslam Business

Building, Knoxville, TN, 37996, United States of America,

willems@bu.edu

1 - Velocity-based Storage in a Semi-automated Order

Fulfillment System

Stephen Graves, MIT, 77 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA,

02139, United States of America,

sgraves@mit.edu

, Rong Yuan

Online retailers continue to invest in technology to improve the efficiency of

order fulfillment. This technology creates new operating challenges and

opportunities. We examine a semi-automated fulfillment system in which pickers

and stowers are stationary, and the inventory storage units are brought to them.

We evaluate the effectiveness of velocity-based storage and consider how to

deploy a velocity-based storage policy in light of picking, stowing and storage

decisions.

2 - Incorporating an Operational Layer into the Guaranteed-service

Inventory Optimization Approach

Steffen Klosterhalfen, University of Richmond, 1 Gateway Road,

Richmond, VA, 23173, United States of America,

steffenklosterhalfen@googlemail.com,

Daniel Dittmar

The existing guaranteed-service contributions assume bounded demand and do

not explicitly model how excess demand is handled by some type of flexibility

measure. The lack of a clear operational description leaves the material flow

representation somewhat incomplete and renders the approach controversial. We

incorporate operating flexibility in the form expediting. By doing so we can work

directly with the external (unbounded) demand and the entire material flow is

easy to trace and understand.

3 - Multi-item Spare Parts Inventory Planning with Selective use of

Advance Demand Information

Geert-Jan Van Houtum, Full Professor, Eindhoven University of

Technology, P.O. Box 513, Eindhoven, 5600MB, Netherlands,

g.j.v.houtum@tue.nl

, Tarkan Tan, Engin Topan

We propose a multi-item, spare parts inventory system model with a general

representation of imperfect demand information. We determine which parts

should be monitored and how much stock should be kept for each component so

that a given aggregate system availability is maintained. Our model allows excess

inventory on stock and on order to be returned to the central depot or external

supplier at a certain return cost. We also characterize the optimal ordering and

return policy.

TC50

50-Room 106A, CC

Operations Economics

Sponsor: Manufacturing & Service Operations Management

Sponsored Session

Chair: Terry Taylor, U.C. Berkeley, Haas School of Business,

2220 Piedmont Avenue, Berkeley, CA, United States of America,

taylor@haas.berkeley.edu

Co-Chair: Wenqiang Xiao, Associate Professor, New York University,

Stern School of Business, 44 West Fourth Street, 8-72, New York, NY,

10012, United States of America,

wxiao@stern.nyu.edu

1 - Strategic Outscouring under Competition and

Asymmetric Information

Lusheng Shao, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia,

lusheng.shao@unimelb.edu.au,

Xiaole Wu, Fuqiang Zhang

This paper studies two firms’ outsourcing strategies under competition and

asymmetric cost information. We find that without asymmetric information, the

firms will choose the supplier with smaller cost uncertainty. However, with

information asymmetry, the supplier with greater cost uncertainty may be

preferred.

2 - Information Preferences in the Supply Chain under

Strategic Inventory

Abhishek Roy, PhD Student, McCombs School of Business,

University of Texas at Austin, 2110 Speedway Stop B6500,

Austin, TX, 78712, United States of America,

abhishek.roy@utexas.edu

, Steve Gilbert, Guoming Lai

We investigate how the possibility of strategic inventory influences the

preferences for information sharing between supply chain partners. Among other

results, we show that the presence of strategic inventory may alter traditional

information preferences of the supply chain partners regarding the creation of a

mechanism for sharing information about the retailer’s operation with the

supplier.

3 - Product Quality in a Distribution Channel with Inventory Risk

Kinshuk Jerath, Columbia University, 521 Uris Hall, 3022

Broadway, New York, NY, 10027, United States of America,

jerath@columbia.edu

, Sang Kim, Robert Swinney

We analyze a situation in which a product has to be designed and sold under

demand uncertainty. We consider the jointly optimal quality and inventory

decision in both a centralized channel (a single firm determines both) and a

decentralized channel (a manufacturer determines quality while a retailer

determines inventory), and discuss how demand uncertainty impacts the optimal

quality-inventory pair and how coordination of the decentralized channel may be

achieved.

4 - Congested Platforms

Terry Taylor, U.C. Berkeley, Haas School of Business,

2220 Piedmont Avenue, Berkeley, CA, United States of America,

taylor@haas.berkeley.edu

In a platform business model, the platform firm provides a per-service wage

payment to independent agents (e.g., drivers in riding-sharing services (e.g.,

Uber), shoppers in delivery services (e.g., Instacart)) to motivate them to provide

service to customers. This paper using a queueing model to examine the impact of

congestion on the platform’s optimal price and wage.

TC50