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L1 - PS - what is risk Avignon |
1 |
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What is risk and what is making mistakes. |
1 |
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What is risk and what is making mistakes. |
2 |
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Delft, October 12th, 1654 |
3 |
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Danger |
4 |
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Slide Number 5 |
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Slide Number 6 |
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Slide Number 7 |
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Slide Number 8 |
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Slide Number 9 |
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Slide Number 10 |
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Slide Number 11 |
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Slide Number 12 |
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Risk or danger? |
13 |
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What are statistics? |
14 |
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What are statistics? |
15 |
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First application |
16 |
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What is risk? |
17 |
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Slide Number 18 |
18 |
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Slide Number 19 |
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Top 10 health technology hazards for 2013 |
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Slide Number 21 |
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Slide Number 22 |
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Slide Number 23 |
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Quizz… |
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Slide Number 25 |
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Toulouse, Sept 21, 2001 |
26 |
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Complex systems ? |
27 |
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Complex systems ? |
28 |
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Complex systems need elaborate monitoring and safety |
29 |
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Slide Number 30 |
30 |
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Paradox of automation |
31 |
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MAINTENANCE CAN SERIOUSLY DAMAGE YOUR SYSTEM… |
32 |
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Which aspect of maintenance is the most error prone? |
33 |
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The Heinrich triangle |
34 |
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Slide Number 35 |
35 |
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The lifespan of a hypothetical organisation through the production-protection space |
36 |
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L2 - TK - Setting the scene 2016 |
37 |
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Setting the Scene |
37 |
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Learning objectives |
38 |
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Six major accidents will be reviewed |
39 |
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1 – Erroneous commissioning of a linear accelerator for stereotactic treatments |
40 |
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Inappropriate calibration |
41 |
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Background |
42 |
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Discovery and impact of the accident |
43 |
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Lessons to learn |
44 |
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References |
45 |
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2 – Incorrect repair ofaccelerator |
46 |
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Events: an overview |
47 |
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A “faulty display” |
48 |
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Events: an overview |
49 |
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Consequences: an overview |
50 |
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Slide Number 15 |
51 |
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The Sagittaire accelerator |
52 |
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The electron path |
53 |
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During the repair |
54 |
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Lessons to learn: Radiotherapy Department |
55 |
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Aftermath |
56 |
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3 – Accelerator interlock failure |
57 |
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February 27, 2001 |
58 |
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Continue… |
59 |
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Action of the physicist |
60 |
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Action of the physicist |
61 |
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Vendor came in the next day |
62 |
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Steps to initiate radiation |
63 |
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Dose rate vs gun current |
64 |
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Lessons in short |
65 |
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4 – Mis-calibration of beam |
66 |
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Erroneous calibration, Exeter, UK, 1988 |
67 |
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Slide Number 33 |
68 |
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What went wrong and how it was detected? |
69 |
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Lessons |
70 |
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Lessons to learn |
71 |
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Looking around |
72 |
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5 – In-correct use of treatment planning system |
73 |
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North Staffordshire Royal Infirmary, 1982-1991 |
74 |
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News when detected |
75 |
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Lessons |
76 |
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Looker further – Calibration of TPS – Australia |
77 |
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6 – Non-updated data route or Erroneous use of treatment planning system and oncology information system |
78 |
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Incorrect manual parameter transfer |
79 |
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What happened? |
80 |
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What happened? |
81 |
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How did it hit the patient |
82 |
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Discovery of accident |
83 |
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Latent threat |
84 |
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Lessons to learn |
85 |
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Lessons to learn |
86 |
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Looking around |
87 |
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“Causes” of the accidents in this lecture |
88 |
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Slide Number 54 |
89 |
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L3 - EL - AUTOPSY OF EPINAL |
90 |
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Autopsy of the Epinal accident |
90 |
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Slide Number 2 |
91 |
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The RT department of Epinal |
92 |
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EPINAL |
93 |
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19 months ? |
94 |
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Why ? |
95 |
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The initial report IGAS/ASN feb 2007 |
96 |
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Interruption of the treatments |
97 |
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Group I : the 24 victims |
98 |
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Groupe II: the « 400» with excess of dose |
99 |
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Group III: the « 5000 » with error of calculation |
100 |
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Summary |
101 |
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Follow up of the patients |
102 |
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Fees |
103 |
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Insurance fees Sham |
104 |
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Starting the new treatments |
105 |
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The Trial |
106 |
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Accident in ToulouseApril 2006- April 2007 |
107 |
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Main differences |
108 |
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Conclusion |
109 |
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L4 - AV - Lessons learned from radiotherapy accidentsdis |
110 |
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Lessons learned from radiotherapy accidents |
110 |
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Learning objectives |
111 |
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Accidents in a healthcare |
112 |
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Accidents in radiotherapy |
113 |
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Potentiel for accidents in radiotherapy |
114 |
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Why this complexity? |
115 |
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Why this complexity? |
116 |
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Why this complexity? |
117 |
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Impact of complexity on errors in radiotherapy |
118 |
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Types of errors |
119 |
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Complexity and Automation |
120 |
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Human complexity |
121 |
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Human complexity |
122 |
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Barriers |
123 |
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Patient safety |
124 |
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Patient safety |
125 |
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Safety culture |
126 |
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Safety culture |
127 |
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Important points to remember |
128 |
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References |
129 |
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References |
130 |
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L5 - TK - The genesis of an accident - 2016 |
131 |
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The Genesis of an Accident |
131 |
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Slide Number 2 |
132 |
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Slide Number 3 |
133 |
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Radiotherapy process starts |
134 |
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Modified plan is created |
135 |
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Just occasionally??? |
136 |
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Next step |
137 |
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Continue |
138 |
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Slide Number 9 |
139 |
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Slide Number 10 |
140 |
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Slide Number 11 |
141 |
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St. Vincent’s Hospital, U.S.A. (2005) |
142 |
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Treatments continues with the altered/new plan |
143 |
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Treatment performed with the new plan |
144 |
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Discovery |
145 |
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Explanation of the erroneous dose |
146 |
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Slide Number 17 |
147 |
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Slide Number 18 |
148 |
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Slide Number 19 |
149 |
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Slide Number 20 |
150 |
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Slide Number 21 |
151 |
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Slide Number 22 |
152 |
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Patient informed |
153 |
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From the files of DOH - NYC |
154 |
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DOH files cont… 25 March 2005 |
155 |
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DOH files cont .. 19 April 2005 |
156 |
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Varian’s Response |
157 |
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Excerpt from a Varian letter to all customers |
158 |
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Lessons to learn |
159 |
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Slide Number 30 |
160 |
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Slide Number 31 |
161 |
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Slide Number 32 |
162 |
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Questions |
163 |
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Jan 2010 |
164 |
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Energy and Commerce - Subcommittee on Health held a hearing entitled "Medical Radiation: An Overview of the Issues" on Friday, February 26, 2010 |
165 |
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Mr Park’s Testimony Pt 1 |
166 |
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References |
167 |
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Thanks for listening |
168 |
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Slide Number 39 |
169 |
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Next session |
170 |
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Slide Number 41 |
171 |
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Slide Number 42 |
172 |
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Do Accidents Still Happens? |
173 |
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Aftermath |
174 |
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L7 - PS - Why reporting incidents |
175 |
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Why reporting incidents ? |
175 |
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Quality & safety management |
176 |
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Heinrich Triangle |
177 |
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Heinrich investigation |
178 |
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Heinrich investigation |
179 |
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Heinrich investigation |
180 |
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violation |
181 |
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Heinrich Triangle |
182 |
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Causes ? |
183 |
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One example (Brindisi) |
184 |
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Slide Number 11 |
185 |
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Slide Number 12 |
186 |
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Slide Number 13 |
187 |
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violations |
188 |
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Education and training |
189 |
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L8 - AV - Incident reportingdis |
190 |
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Incident reporting |
190 |
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Learning objectives |
191 |
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Incident reporting systems |
192 |
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Terms and definitions |
193 |
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Incident reporting systems |
194 |
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Incident reporting and LEARNING systems |
195 |
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Incident reporting and learning systems (IRLS) |
196 |
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1. Identifying the event |
197 |
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2. Reporting the event |
198 |
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3. Investigating the event |
199 |
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3. Investigating the event |
200 |
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4. Causal analysis |
201 |
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4. Causal analysis |
202 |
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5. Corrective actions |
203 |
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6. Learning |
204 |
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6. Learning |
205 |
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Prerequisites of IRLS |
206 |
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Prerequisites of IRLS |
207 |
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Prerequisites of IRLS |
208 |
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Prerequisites of IRLS |
209 |
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Prerequisites of IRLS |
210 |
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Prerequisites of IRLS |
211 |
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Prerequisites of IRLS |
212 |
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Types of IRLS |
213 |
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Internal versus external systems |
214 |
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Compulsory versus voluntary |
215 |
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Specialized versus institutional |
216 |
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Incident reporting and learning systems |
217 |
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Slide Number 29 |
218 |
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Safron |
219 |
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Important points to remember |
220 |
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REferences |
221 |
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REferences |
222 |
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L9 - EL - communication to the media |
223 |
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Slide Number 1 |
223 |
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Summary |
224 |
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19 months ? |
225 |
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Main differences |
226 |
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Slide Number 5 |
227 |
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4 families of risk factors |
228 |
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Slide Number 7 |
229 |
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Slide Number 8 |
230 |
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Slide Number 9 |
231 |
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Slide Number 10 |
232 |
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Roles and responsibilities |
233 |
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What’s a crisis ? An unexpected event that may damage your organization reputation (or more…) |
234 |
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Before a crisis |
235 |
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During: ACTION |
236 |
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AFTER |
237 |
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Which event to communicate on? |
238 |
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Slide Number 17 |
239 |
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Why getting the precursor events ? |
240 |
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But consequences are very different !!!!!! |
241 |
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Lille |
242 |
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When accident is known: |
243 |
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Slide Number 22 |
244 |
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Not to get it again (the crisis): |
245 |
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Conclusion |
246 |
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L10 - PD - ESTRO-Taxonomy2016 |
247 |
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Slide Number 1 |
247 |
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Slide Number 2 |
248 |
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Slide Number 3 |
249 |
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Slide Number 4 |
250 |
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Slide Number 5 |
251 |
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Slide Number 6 |
252 |
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Slide Number 7 |
253 |
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Slide Number 8 |
254 |
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Slide Number 9 |
255 |
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Slide Number 10 |
256 |
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Slide Number 11 |
257 |
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Slide Number 12 |
258 |
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Slide Number 13 |
259 |
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Slide Number 14 |
260 |
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Slide Number 15 |
261 |
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Slide Number 16 |
262 |
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Slide Number 17 |
263 |
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Slide Number 18 |
264 |
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Slide Number 19 |
265 |
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Slide Number 20 |
266 |
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Slide Number 21 |
267 |
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Slide Number 22 |
268 |
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Slide Number 23 |
269 |
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Slide Number 24 |
270 |
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Slide Number 25 |
271 |
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Slide Number 26 |
272 |
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Slide Number 27 |
273 |
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TG 100’s Process Tree |
274 |
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Ford’s Process Map |
275 |
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Slide Number 30 |
276 |
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Slide Number 31 |
277 |
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Slide Number 32 |
278 |
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Slide Number 33 |
279 |
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Slide Number 34 |
280 |
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Slide Number 35 |
281 |
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Slide Number 36 |
282 |
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Slide Number 37 |
283 |
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Slide Number 38 |
284 |
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Slide Number 39 |
285 |
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Slide Number 40 |
286 |
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Slide Number 41 |
287 |
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Slide Number 42 |
288 |
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Slide Number 43 |
289 |
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Slide Number 44 |
290 |
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Slide Number 45 |
291 |
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Slide Number 46 |
292 |
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Slide Number 47 |
293 |
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Slide Number 48 |
294 |
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Slide Number 49 |
295 |
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Slide Number 50 |
296 |
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Slide Number 51 |
297 |
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Slide Number 52 |
298 |
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Slide Number 53 |
299 |
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Slide Number 54 |
300 |
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Slide Number 55 |
301 |
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Slide Number 56 |
302 |
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Slide Number 57 |
303 |
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Slide Number 58 |
304 |
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L11 - PR - sundayPrisma and PRISMA-rt |
305 |
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Prisma model & PRISMA-RT |
305 |
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Slide Number 2 |
306 |
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(part 1) PRISMA in MAASTRO |
307 |
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What do we want from the reports? |
308 |
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PRISMA - model |
309 |
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PRISMA-model |
310 |
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Advantages of the PRISMA-model |
311 |
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Slide Number 8 |
312 |
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patient data exchange |
313 |
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classifications codes of rootcauses |
314 |
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Slide Number 11 |
315 |
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management actions |
316 |
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Action / Classification Matrix |
317 |
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example of data analyse |
318 |
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Slide Number 15 |
319 |
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Slide Number 16 |
320 |
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deviation between location of treatment |
321 |
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Slide Number 18 |
322 |
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who report over who? |
323 |
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trends in H/T/O |
324 |
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Slide Number 21 |
325 |
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reporting committee |
326 |
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reporting committee |
327 |
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Conclusions |
328 |
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(part 2) PRISMA explanation |
329 |
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Humans in complex situation |
330 |
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Error is Inevitable Because of Human Limitations |
331 |
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(part 3): PRISMA-explanation |
332 |
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Slide Number 29 |
333 |
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Slide Number 30 |
334 |
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Slide Number 31 |
335 |
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Slide Number 32 |
336 |
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Contextvariable MAASTRO |
337 |
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PRISMA manual |
338 |
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(part 3) PRISMA –rt collaboration |
339 |
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Advantages of a national system |
340 |
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association between of 17 Dutch radiotherapy departments |
341 |
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1. content of the local part of database |
342 |
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Slide Number 39 |
343 |
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Slide Number 40 |
344 |
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Slide Number 41 |
345 |
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2. content of the benchmark |
346 |
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Slide Number 43 |
347 |
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example: Benchmark information used in a department |
348 |
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Slide Number 45 |
349 |
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Method LIBB ( interobserver variability research) |
350 |
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Results LIBB, |
351 |
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Results PRISMA-RT NL |
352 |
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Slide Number 49 |
353 |
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Futur ? |
354 |
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Questions ??????Petra.reijnders@maastro.nl |
355 |
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L12 - PR - sunday workshop PRISMA |
356 |
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PRISMA workshop guide Lines |
356 |
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Learning objectives |
357 |
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PRISMA-tree development |
358 |
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Slide Number 4 |
359 |
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Steps of a PRISMA analyse |
360 |
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Stopping rules |
361 |
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Slide Number 7 |
362 |
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Group exercise (1 hour) |
363 |
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questions!!!! |
364 |
|
L13 - EL - legal aspects final |
365 |
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Slide Number 1 |
365 |
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Radiotherapy Process |
366 |
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Slide Number 3 |
367 |
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|
368 |
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Slide Number 5 |
369 |
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Slide Number 6 |
370 |
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Slide Number 7 |
371 |
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Slide Number 8 |
372 |
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Slide Number 9 |
373 |
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Notification system |
374 |
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Notification system |
375 |
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Notification system |
376 |
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Notification system |
377 |
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Slide Number 14 |
378 |
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Slide Number 15 |
379 |
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Slide Number 16 |
380 |
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Slide Number 17 |
381 |
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|
382 |
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Slide Number 19 |
383 |
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Slide Number 20 |
384 |
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Slide Number 21 |
385 |
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Slide Number 22 |
386 |
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|
387 |
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|
388 |
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|
389 |
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Slide Number 26 |
390 |
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Equipments/drugs AFSSAPS/ANSM |
391 |
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Slide Number 28 |
392 |
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Outside of France |
393 |
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UK recommendations |
394 |
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Slide Number 31 |
395 |
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Conclusion n°4 |
396 |
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Conclusion n°6 |
397 |
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Slide Number 34 |
398 |
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L14 - PD - ESTRO-Ethics2016 |
399 |
|
Slide Number 1 |
399 |
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Slide Number 2 |
400 |
|
Ethics for Radiation Medicine Professionals |
401 |
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Ethics for Radiation Medicine Professionals |
402 |
|
Slide Number 5 |
403 |
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Slide Number 6 |
404 |
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Slide Number 7 |
405 |
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Slide Number 8 |
406 |
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Slide Number 9 |
407 |
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Slide Number 10 |
408 |
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Slide Number 11 |
409 |
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Slide Number 12 |
410 |
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Slide Number 13 |
411 |
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Slide Number 14 |
412 |
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Slide Number 15 |
413 |
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Slide Number 16 |
414 |
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Slide Number 17 |
415 |
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Slide Number 18 |
416 |
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Slide Number 19 |
417 |
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Slide Number 20 |
418 |
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Slide Number 21 |
419 |
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Slide Number 22 |
420 |
|
Slide Number 23 |
421 |
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Slide Number 24 |
422 |
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Slide Number 25 |
423 |
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Slide Number 26 |
424 |
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Slide Number 27 |
425 |
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Slide Number 28 |
426 |
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Slide Number 29 |
427 |
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Slide Number 30 |
428 |
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Slide Number 31 |
429 |
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Slide Number 32 |
430 |
|
Slide Number 33 |
431 |
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Slide Number 34 |
432 |
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Slide Number 35 |
433 |
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Slide Number 36 |
434 |
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Slide Number 37 |
435 |
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Slide Number 38 |
436 |
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Slide Number 39 |
437 |
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Slide Number 40 |
438 |
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Slide Number 41 |
439 |
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Slide Number 42 |
440 |
|
Slide Number 43 |
441 |
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Slide Number 44 |
442 |
|
Slide Number 45 |
443 |
|
Slide Number 46 |
444 |
|
Slide Number 47 |
445 |
|
Slide Number 48 |
446 |
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Slide Number 49 |
447 |
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Slide Number 50 |
448 |
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Slide Number 51 |
449 |
|
Slide Number 52 |
450 |
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Slide Number 53 |
451 |
|
Slide Number 54 |
452 |
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Slide Number 55 |
453 |
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Slide Number 56 |
454 |
|
Slide Number 57 |
455 |
|
Slide Number 58 |
456 |
|
L15 - PS - Just culture Avignon |
457 |
|
A Just culture |
457 |
|
So, what are Human Factors? |
458 |
|
So, what are Human Factors? |
459 |
|
Blame Culture |
460 |
|
Blame Culture |
461 |
|
Problems with a blame culture |
462 |
|
Problems with a blame culture |
463 |
|
Problems with a blame culture |
464 |
|
tchernobyl |
465 |
|
Problems with a blame culture |
466 |
|
Problems with a blame culture |
467 |
|
Problems with a blame culture |
468 |
|
No-Blame Culture |
469 |
|
Safety rules on an air carrier |
470 |
|
Safety rules on an air carrier |
471 |
|
Problems with a No-blame culture |
472 |
|
A ‘Just’ Culture |
473 |
|
Just Culture |
474 |
|
Why we do need a “Just” Culture? |
475 |
|
Why we do need a “Just” Culture? |
476 |
|
A problem in 1996 |
477 |
|
A plane crash a day |
478 |
|
Problems with a Just Culture |
479 |
|
Just Culture Code of Practice (1) |
480 |
|
Just Culture Code of Practice (2) |
481 |
|
Just Culture Code of Practice (3) |
482 |
|
tchernobyl |
483 |
|
Two sides of a same coin |
484 |
|
Toulouse, Sept 21, 2001 |
485 |
|
Slide Number 30 |
486 |
|
Problem 1 |
487 |
|
Problem 2 |
488 |
|
Problem 3 |
489 |
|
Problem 4 |
490 |
|
Two key operational realities a just culture policy needs to accommodate |
491 |
|
The Operational Reality : Professional dilemmas |
492 |
|
Key professional dilemmas |
493 |
|
The Operational Reality : Routine Non-Compliance |
494 |
|
Organisational Learning |
495 |
|
Absence of Just Culture can cause |
496 |
|
Learning from Errors & Incidents |
497 |
|
L16 - PD - ESTRO-Near Miss2016 |
498 |
|
Slide Number 1 |
498 |
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Slide Number 2 |
499 |
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Slide Number 3 |
500 |
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Slide Number 4 |
501 |
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Slide Number 5 |
502 |
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Slide Number 6 |
503 |
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Slide Number 7 |
504 |
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Slide Number 8 |
505 |
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Slide Number 9 |
506 |
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Slide Number 10 |
507 |
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Slide Number 11 |
508 |
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Slide Number 12 |
509 |
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Slide Number 13 |
510 |
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Slide Number 14 |
511 |
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Slide Number 15 |
512 |
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Slide Number 16 |
513 |
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Slide Number 17 |
514 |
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Slide Number 18 |
515 |
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Slide Number 19 |
516 |
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Slide Number 20 |
517 |
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Slide Number 21 |
518 |
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Slide Number 22 |
519 |
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Slide Number 23 |
520 |
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Slide Number 24 |
521 |
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Slide Number 25 |
522 |
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Slide Number 26 |
523 |
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Slide Number 27 |
524 |
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Slide Number 28 |
525 |
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Slide Number 29 |
526 |
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Slide Number 30 |
527 |
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Slide Number 31 |
528 |
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Slide Number 32 |
529 |
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Slide Number 33 |
530 |
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Slide Number 34 |
531 |
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Slide Number 35 |
532 |
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Slide Number 36 |
533 |
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Slide Number 37 |
534 |
|
Slide Number 38 |
535 |
|
Slide Number 39 |
536 |
|
Slide Number 40 |
537 |
|
Slide Number 41 |
538 |
|
Slide Number 42 |
539 |
|
Slide Number 43 |
540 |
|
Slide Number 44 |
541 |
|
Slide Number 45 |
542 |
|
Slide Number 46 |
543 |
|
Slide Number 47 |
544 |
|
Slide Number 48 |
545 |
|
Slide Number 49 |
546 |
|
IAEA’s e-learning program |
547 |
|
Slide Number 51 |
548 |
|
L17 - AV - Safety in the RT departmentdis |
549 |
|
Safety in the RT department |
549 |
|
Learning objectives |
550 |
|
Human complexity |
551 |
|
Effectiveness of different approaches in preventing errors |
552 |
|
Forcing functions |
553 |
|
Forcing functions |
554 |
|
Effectiveness of different approaches in preventing errors |
555 |
|
Automation and computerization |
556 |
|
Automation and computerization |
557 |
|
Slide Number 10 |
558 |
|
Slide Number 11 |
559 |
|
Effectiveness of different approaches in preventing errors |
560 |
|
Simplification and standardisation |
561 |
|
Effectiveness of different approaches in preventing errors |
562 |
|
Checklist |
563 |
|
Slide Number 16 |
564 |
|
Workflow management systems |
565 |
|
Open source solution – iTP |
566 |
|
Double checks |
567 |
|
Effectiveness of different approaches in preventing errors |
568 |
|
Slide Number 21 |
569 |
|
Effectiveness of different approaches in preventing errors |
570 |
|
Training |
571 |
|
Points to remember |
572 |
|
References |
573 |
|
L18 - PR - monday HFMEA |
574 |
|
Health care Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (HFMEA), a prospective method |
574 |
|
content of presentation |
575 |
|
Retrospective |
576 |
|
Proactive |
577 |
|
Slide Number 5 |
578 |
|
Learning Objectives |
579 |
|
prospective risk models |
580 |
|
overview proactive risk models |
581 |
|
Rough deviation of the models |
582 |
|
COSO/ERM |
583 |
|
Six Sigma/Lean |
584 |
|
Food and drink industry: HACCP |
585 |
|
HAZOP / HAZAN |
586 |
|
What is (H)FMEA? |
587 |
|
History of FMEA |
588 |
|
(H)FMEA |
589 |
|
HFMEA |
590 |
|
HFMEA-organization |
591 |
|
Process prescription as fundament for HFMEA |
592 |
|
Slide Number 20 |
593 |
|
Process prescription f.e. |
594 |
|
tips for process description |
595 |
|
What is a Failure Mode? |
596 |
|
6 M’s to define the failure modes |
597 |
|
HFMEA Procedure (1) |
598 |
|
HFMEA Procedure (2) |
599 |
|
Flow of the Analysis |
600 |
|
Risk Priority Number (RPN) |
601 |
|
Rating Scales |
602 |
|
Scaling severity and probability (for example) |
603 |
|
checklist |
604 |
|
HFMEA form |
605 |
|
After Calculation RPN |
606 |
|
conclusions |
607 |
|
Are there no incidents after doing a HFMEA? |
608 |
|
MAASTRO’s experience |
609 |
|
research within MAASTRO |
610 |
|
References |
611 |
|
Tips and tricks |
612 |
|
tip |
613 |
|
HFMEA and the RCA Process |
614 |
|
questions!!!! |
615 |
|
simple exercise |
616 |
|
sub processes |
617 |
|
2. taking breakfast |
618 |
|
2.3 break an egg |
619 |
|
Slide Number 47 |
620 |
|
HFMEA analyses MAASTRO |
621 |
|
Relationship between prospective and retrospective risk analyses |
622 |
|
questions!!!! |
623 |
|
L19 - PR - monday workshop HFMEA |
624 |
|
workshop HFMEA |
624 |
|
Learning Objectives |
625 |
|
(H)FMEA |
626 |
|
method |
627 |
|
HFMEA Organisation (1) |
628 |
|
(2) |
629 |
|
Division of roles between membres and Time involved |
630 |
|
Exercise |
631 |
|
examples of process |
632 |
|
define process/subprocesses and select a piece of a subprocess |
633 |
|
tips for process description |
634 |
|
Slide Number 12 |
635 |
|
questions!!!! |
636 |
|
L20 - PR - monday combining retrospective and prospective |
637 |
|
Pracitical example how to use Patient Safetytools during transitioncombining prospective and retrospective risk management |
637 |
|
MAASTRO |
638 |
|
Facts - Staff |
639 |
|
Facts- Treatments |
640 |
|
content of the presentation |
641 |
|
Risk Rt and transitions |
642 |
|
Impact transitions |
643 |
|
tools used |
644 |
|
1: PRISMA - model |
645 |
|
Varian equipment |
646 |
|
Bilocation Venlo |
647 |
|
Histogram of the classification code |
648 |
|
tools used |
649 |
|
Varian equipment |
650 |
|
Bilocation Venlo |
651 |
|
Slide Number 16 |
652 |
|
Improve bord |
653 |
|
tools used |
654 |
|
New items for selective treatment check |
655 |
|
Culture & communication |
656 |
|
tools used |
657 |
|
2013 visitation of our member of the board |
658 |
|
tools used |
659 |
|
RTT with area of interest Patient safety |
660 |
|
Slide Number 25 |
661 |
|
Publication national RTT journal |
662 |
|
ERM/enterprise risk management |
663 |
|
Risk area’s |
664 |
|
Slide Number 29 |
665 |
|
L21 - AV - Communication in safetydis |
666 |
|
Communication in safety |
666 |
|
Learning objectives |
667 |
|
Communication in safety |
668 |
|
Communication to prevent errors |
669 |
|
Slide Number 5 |
670 |
|
Slide Number 6 |
671 |
|
Checklist in surgery? |
672 |
|
Slide Number 8 |
673 |
|
Communication to prevent errors |
674 |
|
Communication within the organization/with the patients |
675 |
|
Post incident management |
676 |
|
Who are the victims of an error? |
677 |
|
What the patient/family wants… |
678 |
|
What the patient/family wants… |
679 |
|
Communication with victims – Who, when and what |
680 |
|
Communication with victims – Who, when and what |
681 |
|
Communication with victims – Who, when and what |
682 |
|
Communication with victims – Who, when and what |
683 |
|
Communicating with the second victims |
684 |
|
Third victim… |
685 |
|
Important points to remember |
686 |
|
References |
687 |
|
L22 - PD - ESTRO-Human Factors 2016 |
688 |
|
Slide Number 1 |
688 |
|
Slide Number 2 |
689 |
|
Slide Number 3 |
690 |
|
Slide Number 4 |
691 |
|
Slide Number 5 |
692 |
|
Skill-based performance |
693 |
|
Rule-based performance |
694 |
|
Knowledge-based performance |
695 |
|
Performance categories |
696 |
|
Where does competency fit in? |
697 |
|
Slide Number 11 |
698 |
|
How might our performance be sub-optimal? |
699 |
|
Error – Expanded definition |
700 |
|
Skill – Based Errors |
701 |
|
Skill – Based Errors |
702 |
|
Skill – Based Errors |
703 |
|
Skill – Based Errors |
704 |
|
Rule – Based Issues |
705 |
|
Rule – Based Issues |
706 |
|
Knowledge – Based Mistakes |
707 |
|
Knowledge – Based Mistakes |
708 |
|
Violations |
709 |
|
Violations |
710 |
|
Violations |
711 |
|
Comparison of Error Types |
712 |
|
Slide Number 26 |
713 |
|
Mapping Performance Levels to Error Types |
714 |
|
Is There Another Way of Classifying Errors? |
715 |
|
Mapping Error Categories to Error Types |
716 |
|
Slide Number 30 |
717 |
|
Performance categories |
718 |
|
Violations – Preventive Measures |
719 |
|
Knowledge–Preventive Measures |
720 |
|
Rules – Preventive Measures |
721 |
|
Skills – Preventive Measures |
722 |
|
Time-outs |
723 |
|
Time-outs |
724 |
|
No Interruption Zone (NIZ) |
725 |
|
No Interruption Zone |
726 |
|
No Interruption Zone |
727 |
|
No Interruption Zone |
728 |
|
First Date Rule |
729 |
|
First Date Rule |
730 |
|
Intuition |
731 |
|
Power Distance Index |
732 |
|
Power Distance Index |
733 |
|
Power Distance Index |
734 |
|
Power Distance Index |
735 |
|
Power Distance Index |
736 |
|
Slide Number 50 |
737 |
|
Slide Number 51 |
738 |
|
Slide Number 52 |
739 |
|
Slide Number 53 |
740 |
|
Slide Number 54 |
741 |
|
Slide Number 55 |
742 |
|
Slide Number 56 |
743 |
|
Slide Number 57 |
744 |
|
Slide Number 58 |
745 |
|
L23 - Role play |
746 |
|
Role play |
746 |
|
A voluntary |
747 |
|
A voluntary |
748 |
|
A voluntary |
749 |
|
A voluntary |
750 |
|
A voluntary |
751 |
|
A voluntary |
752 |
|
A voluntary |
753 |
|
The scenario |
754 |


