103 / 122
Southern Corridor GRIP 2017–2026 |
103
20–40%
<20%
<40%
10–30%
>20%
0–50GWh/d
0–80% of capacity
50–250GWh/d
250–600GWh/d
600–1100GWh/d
>1100GWh/d
<30%
80–99% of capacity
99–100% of capacity
20–40%
<20%
<40%
10–30%
>20%
0–50GWh/d
0–80% of capacity
50–250GWh/d
250–600GWh/d
600–1100GWh/d
>1100GWh/d
<30%
80–99% of capacity
99–100% of capacity
20–40%
<20%
<40%
10–30%
>20%
0–50GWh/d
0–80% of cap
50–250GWh/d
250–600GWh/d
600–1100GWh/d
>1100GWh/d
<30%
80–99% of ca
99–100% of c
20–40%
<20%
<40%
10–30%
>20%
0–50GWh/d
0–80% of capa
50–250GWh/d
250–600GWh/d
600–1100GWh/d
>1100GWh/d
<30%
80–99% of cap
99–100% of ca
Figure 7.3.5:
2020 Low UA disruption
Figure 7.3.7:
2020 PCI UA disruption
Figure 7.3.6:
2030 Low UA disruption
Figure 7.3.8:
2030 PCI UA disruption
Legend
20–40%
<20%
<40%
10–30%
>20%
0–50GWh/d
0–80% of capacity
50–250GWh/d
250–600GWh/d
600–1100GWh/d
>1100GWh/d
<30%
80–99% of capacity
99–100% of capacity
20–40%
<20%
<40%
10–30%
>20%
0–50GWh/d
0–80% of capacity
50–250GWh/d
250–600GWh/d
60 –1 0 GWh/d
>1 0 GWh/d
<30%
80–9 % of capacity
9 –10 % of capacity
7.3.2.1 Remaining Flexibility and Flows in UA Disruption case
As shown in the following Figures 7.3.5 to 7.3.8 some of the countries lose entirely
their Remaining flexibility and experience Demand Disruptions. As expected the
worst situation is encountered in 2030 and in the Low infrastructure scenario, where
the increased demand, the decline in national production and the lack of important
additional infrastructure result to less Remaining Flexibility.