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Southern Corridor GRIP 2017–2026

In the above graphs we can also see the improvement of the supply situation in the

2030-PCI case, where the additional capacity offered by the PCI project counterbal-

ances the increase of demand and the decrease of national production.

Further detail is given below, together with the analysis of the flows, for the Low

Infrastructure case.

In 2017, without any disruption, all supply sources, except for Russian supply, reach

their maximum supply potentials. Russian supply is limited by maximum capacities

at all entry points. Russian import routes towards Germany and Poland are fully

used. In case of UA disruption, only about half of Russian maximum supply potential

would be available due to infrastructure limitations therefore 

 4)

.

In 2020, the situation is very similar to 2017. Only LNG Greece would not reach its

maximum supply potential, as demand in Greece is met from other sources (first

year of TAP operation), and further transport from this source to the surrounding

countries is not yet possible. Maximum supply potential of TAP in 2020 is 131GWh/d

due to the rump-up phase of the Shah Deniz gas field (gradual increase of produc-

tion from 2019 to 2022). In 2022 maximum supply potential would increase to

297GWh/d.

In 2030, AZ, DZ, LY, NO and LNG sources sources (except for LNG Greece) would

be used close to their maximum potential. Utilisation of Russian supply would be

again constrained by maximum capacities of Yamal pipeline and Nordstream – only

half of Russian maximum supply potential could be used.

Italy would contribute to supply the Region with reverse flow to Austria.

Flow from Czech Republic via Slovakia will be mainly directed to Ukraine and

Hungary. Flow from Slovakia to Austria is very low and represents only a minor share

of the total interconnection capacity.

This flow pattern does not correspond to the incremental capacities expected to be

offered by all of the following projects: Nordstream 2, EUGAL, Capacity4Gas (C4G) –

DE/CZ, Capacity4Gas (C4G) – CZ/SK and Capacity increase at IP Lanžhot entry,

which are expected to mitigate the impact of a supply disruption through Ukraine.

In fact above mentioned projects are not considered in the cases presented in this

GRIP report as only Nordstream 2 has a FID status (and is therefore included in the

Low infrastructure level) and the other projects do not have a PCI label and are

therefore not included in the PCI infrastructure level. These new projects will (if im-

plemented) significantly expand the supply and transit route via Germany, Czech

Republic and Slovakia towards Austria. Consequently, they will increase remaining

flexibility in countries with sufficient cross-border capacity. Still, the demand

curtailment in South-Eastern Europe caused by infrastructure gaps would not be

mitigated by these projects due to restrictions in cross-border capacities.

 4) 2017: Russian maximum supply potential: 5,222 GWh/d, flow, probably equal to max. capacity at all entry points from

Russia. Without UA routes maximum supply potential is reduced to: 3,281 GWh/d. In 2020 supply potential reaches

6,338 GWh/d and flow: 3,355GWh/d.