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INFORMS Nashville – 2016
273
2 - New Core-Selecting Payment Rules With Better Fairness And
Incentive Properties
Benedikt Buenz, Stanford,
buenz@stanford.eduMost of the recent large-scale combinatorial auctions, e.g. for spectrum rights,
have used core-selecting payment rules. Such rules ensure that no subset of
players is willing to outbid the total payments charged the winning players.
However, while the particular rule used in practice, the Quadratic rule, is a core-
selecting rule, there are many alternatives. We examine several hundred
alternative core-selecting rules in Bayes-Nash equilibrium via a novel numerical
solver to identify better rules. We show that Quadratic is not the optimal rule in
terms of efficiency, incentives, revenue or fairness, and that we can design rules
that outperform Quadratic in all of these dimensions simultaneously.
3 - Linear Item Pricing In Combinatorial Auctions
Robert Day, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT,
Bob.Day@business.uconn.eduI will present new results regarding the use of linear item prices in combinatorial
auctions. Prices for items form a solution to an altered dual of WDP, are core-
selecting, and constitute a combinatorial winning-level equilibrium.
TB27
201A-MCC
Social Networks and Learning
Sponsored: Manufacturing & Service Oper Mgmt
Sponsored Session
Chair: Elena Belavina, University of Chicago Booth School of Business,
Chicago, IL, United States,
elena.belavina@chicagobooth.edu1 - The Use And Value Of Social Network Information In
Selective Selling
Ruslan Momot, INSEAD, Fontainebleau, France,
Ruslan.Momot@insead.edu, Elena Belavina, Karan Girotra
We consider the use and value of social network information in selectively selling
goods and services whose value derives from exclusive ownership among
network connections. Our model accommodates customers who are
heterogeneous in their number of friends (degree) and proclivity for social
comparisons (conspicuity). We show how the firm with information on either (or
both) of these traits can use it to increase profits making a product selectively
available to the firm’s best targets - high-conspicuity customers within
intermediate-degree segments. We find that information about degree is more
valuable than information about conspicuity and that the two are substitutes.
2 - The Sharing Newsboys
Ming Hu, Rotman School at University of Toronto,
Ming.Hu@Rotman.Utoronto.CaWe study resource sharing or demand referral behavior among a network of
connected newsboys. Each newsboy only locally knows the number of his
neighbors but does not know the number of his neighbor’s neighbors. Our focus
is to investigate the change of the degree distribution on the newsboy decisions
and social welfare. Surprisingly, we show that more connections may not lead to
a higher social welfare.
3 - Information Externalities In Crowdfunding Projects
Senthil Veeraraghavan, Wharton School,
senthilv@wharton.upenn.edu, Jiding Zhang
We study the information externalities associated with crowdfunding projects.
Crowdfunding projects suffer from the tragedy of the commons. To raise capital
for successful funds requires overcoming the “startup problem”. We study and
compare mechanisms to improve the project success — lotteries, seeking altruistic
investments, up-front payments and quick dissemination of information.
4 - Managing Service Systems In Presence Of Social Networks
Gad Allon, Wharton School, Philadelphia, PA, 19010, United
States,
gadallon@wharton.upenn.edu, Dennis Zhang
We study a service system with the presence of a social network. In our model,
firms can differentiate resource allocations among customers, and customers learn
the service qualities from the social network. We study the interplay among
network structure, customer characteristics, and information structure, and
characterize the optimal policy. We further calibrate our model with data from
Yelp.comand quantify the value of social network knowledge empirically.
TB29
202A-MCC
Incentives Issues in Sustainable Operations
Sponsored: Manufacturing & Service Oper Mgmt,
Sustainable Operations
Sponsored Session
Chair: Luyi Gui, The Paul Merage School of Business, UC - Irvine,
Irvine, CA, United States,
luyig@uci.edu1 - Green Sourcing-the Role Of Premium Sharing And
Consulting Services
Xi Chen, University of Michigan - Dearborn,
xichenxi@umich.eduCertified sustainable products often times enjoy a significant green premium in
the retail market. In this paper, we study a retailer’s use of a sourcing contract as a
tool of incentivizing suppliers to exert greening efforts which improves the
chances of receiving certification, and in turn capturing the green premium. We
also explore the rationale for retailer to involve in suppliers’ greening efforts.
2 - Inducing Prompt Disclosure In The Presence Of Evasive Effort
Shouqiang Wang, The University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson,
TX, United States,
Shouqiang.Wang@utdallas.edu,Peng Sun,
Francis E De Vericourt
In supply chains, firms are typically exposed to negative impacts resulting from
random adverse events that occur at and are privately observable to their
suppliers. The firm can use fiscal instrument as well as inspections to uncover the
adverse event. The supplier, however, prefers to conceal and even deliberately
hide such adverse event so as to evade its responsibility. The goal of this paper is
to devise optimal strategies for firms to induce the supplier’s prompt disclosure in
the presence of such evasive behavior.
3 - The Adoption Of Smart Home Appliance For Energy Shifting
Wenbin Wang, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,
Shanghai, China,
wang.wenbin@shufe.edu.cn,Yannan Jin
Smart home appliances can shift energy consumption in response to energy price
and thus hold great potential for reducing the energy cost. This paper uses a game
theoretical approach to analyze the consumers’ decisions on adopting smart home
appliances. We study how the adoption decisions are affected by the pricing
decisions of the appliance manufacturer and the utility company, as well as the
government subsidy. We find the appliance manufacturer or the utility company
alone may offer sufficient incentives to adopt smart home appliances. However, to
increase the social welfare the government may need to interfere with these
incentive programs.
4 - Incentives For Joint Product And Process Improvement Under
Collective Extended Producer Responsibility
Luyi Gui, UC Irvine,
luyig@uci.eduExtended producer responsibility legislation mandates producers’ financial
responsibility of proper post-use treatment of their products. This study
investigates how the widely-adopted collective implementation of EPR legislation
can promote more environmentally friendly product design and more efficient
recycling technology. In particular, we analyze the impact of cost allocation
choices on the joint design-technology advancement.
TB30
202B-MCC
Predictive Modeling in Healthcare
Sponsored: Manufacturing & Service Oper Mgmt,
Healthcare Operations
Sponsored Session
Chair: Anita L Tucker, Brandeis, 415 South Street, MS 032,
Waltham, MA, 02453-2728, United States,
atucker@brandeis.eduCo-Chair: Hummy Song, Harvard University, Soldiers Field, Boston,
MA, 02163, United States,
hsong@hbs.edu1 - Accurate Emergency Department Wait Time Prediction
Mohsen Bayati, Stanford University,
bayati@stanford.edu,
Erjie Ang, Sara Kwasnick, Erica Plambeck, Michael Aratow
In this talk we discuss Q-Lasso method for wait time prediction, which combines
statistical learning with fluid model estimators. In historical data from four
remarkably different hospitals, Q-Lasso predicts the emergency department (ED)
wait time for low-acuity patients with greater accuracy than existing methods. Q-
Lasso achieves greater accuracy largely by correcting errors of underestimation in
which a patient waits for longer than predicted. Implemented on the external
website and in the triage room of the San Mateo Medical Center (SMMC), Q-
Lasso achieves over 30% lower mean squared prediction error than would occur
with the best rolling average method.
TB30