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Herausgeber · Editeurs · Editrici Jürg-Beat Ackermann Bernhard Sträuli Wolfgang Wohlers Schriftleitung · Direction de revue · Direzione della rivista Gunhild Godenzi

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AUFSÄTZE | ARTICLES | ARTICOLI

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Massimo Aliotta: Der Vergleich zwischen Täter und Opfer vor dem Strafrichter Wolfgang Wohlers: Konkurrenzprobleme bei Geldfälschungsdelikten Zugleich Besprechung von BGE 133 IV 256 sowie BGer v. 5.10.2007, 6B_392/2007

DOKUMENTATION | DOCUMENTATION | DOCUMENTAZIONI 124

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1. Jahrgang – Année – Anno; April – Avril – Aprile 2008 Erscheint sechsmal jährlich – Paraît six fois par année – Pubblicazione sei volte per anno Zitiervorschlag – Citation proposée – Citazione consigliata: FP Erscheinungsjahr, Seitenzahl – FP année de parution, numéro de page – FP anno di pubblicazione, numero di pagina ISSN 1662-5536 (Print)/ISSN 1662-551X (Internet) Prof. Dr. iur. Jürg-Beat Ackermann, Universität Luzern, Hirschengraben 31, Postfach 7460, CH-6000 Luzern 7, E-Mail: juerg-beat.ackermann@unilu.ch Bernhard Sträuli, Docteur en droit, Université de Genève/Ministère public du canton de Genève Uni-Mail, CH-1211 Genève 4, E-Mail: Bernhard.Strauli@droit.unige.ch Procureur général, Case postale 3565, CH-1211 Genève 3, E-Mail: Bernhard.Strauli@justice.ge.ch Prof. Dr. iur. Wolfgang Wohlers, Universität Zürich, Freiestrasse 15, CH-8032 Zürich, E-Mail: lst.wohlers@rwi.uzh.ch Assessorin Gunhild Godenzi LL.M., Universität Zürich, Freiestrasse 15, CH-8032 Zürich, Telefon: +41 (0)44 634 36 61, Telefax: +41 (0)44 634 43 88 E-Mail: forumpoenale@rwi.uzh.ch, Internet: www.forumpoenale.ch lic. iur. Christian Aebi, M.C.L., Oberstaatsanwalt, Staatsanwaltschaft des Kantons Zug; Dr. iur. Felix Bänziger, stv. Generalprokurator des Kantons Bern; lic. iur. Kurt Balmer, Präsident der III. Strafkammer, Obergericht des Kantons Zürich; Prof. Paolo Bernasconi, HSG-Titularprofessor, Rechts- anwalt, Peter, Bernasconi & Partners, Lugano; Dr.iur. Erwin Beyeler, Bundesanwalt; lic. iur. Lucius Richard Blattner, LL.M., CFE, BBA, CAMS, Rechts- anwalt; lic. iur. Corinne Bouvard, Oberstaatsanwaltschaft des Kantons Zürich; Dr. iur. Andreas Brunner, Leitender Oberstaatsanwalt, Oberstaats- anwaltschaft des Kantons Zürich; Dr. iur. Lorenz Erni, Rechtsanwalt; lic. iur. Thomas Fingerhuth, Rechtsanwalt; Prof. Dr. iur. Marc Forster, Rechtsan- walt, Titularprofessor für Straf- und Strafprozessrecht und internationales Strafrecht an der Universität St. Gallen, wissenschaftlicher Berater am Schweizerischen Bundesgericht; Dr. iur. Peter Goldschmid, Fürsprecher, Bundesamt für Justiz; Georges Greiner, Fürsprecher, Oberrichter des Kantons Bern; Dr. iur. Thomas Hansjakob, Erster Staatsanwalt, Staatsanwaltschaft des Kantons St. Gallen; lic. iur. Beat Hensler, Kommandant Kantonspolizei Luzern und Präsident der Konferenz der kantonalen Polizeikommandanten der Schweiz, KKPKS; Annemarie Hubschmid Volz, Gerichtspräsidentin Gerichtskreis V Burgdorf-Fraubrunnen; lic. iur. Christoph Ill, Staatsanwalt, Staatsanwaltschaft des Kantons St. Gallen, Studi- enleiter Forensik am CCFW, Hochschule Luzern; lic. iur. Konrad Jeker, M.B.L.-HSG, Rechtsanwalt, Solothurn; Dr. iur. Viktor Lieber, Generalsekretär des Kassationsgerichts des Kantons Zürich; Dr. iur. 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Hanspeter Uster, Rechtsanwalt und Notar, Leiter des CCFW, Stiftungsratspräsident des Schweizerischen Polizeiinstitutes (SPI); Dr. iur. Mark E. Villiger, Richter am EGMR, Titularprofessor Univ. Zürich; Dr. iur. h.c. Hans Wiprächtiger, Bundesrichter Die Aufnahme von Beiträgen erfolgt unter der Bedingung, dass das ausschliessliche Recht zur Vervielfältigung und Verbreitung an den Stämpfli Verlag AG übergeht. Der Verlag behält sich alle Rechte am Inhalt der Zeitschrift forumpoenale vor. Insbesondere die Vervielfälti- gung auf demWeg der Fotokopie, der Mikrokopie, der Übernahme auf elektronische Datenträger und andere Verwertungen jedes Teils dieser Zeitschrift bedürfen der Zustimmung des Verlags. L’acceptation de contributions se produit à la condition que le droit exclusif de reproduction et de diffusion passe à la maison d’édition Stämpfli SA. La maison d’édition se réserve tous les droits sur le contenu du journal forumpoenale. 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Region Doboy begangenen Völkermord beteiligt. Am 26. Septem­ ber 1997 wurde der Beschwerdeführer durch das Oberlandesge­ richt Düsseldorf unter anderem wegen Völkermords in elf Fällen sowie mehrfachen Mordes zu einer lebenslänglichen Freiheitsstra­ fe verurteilt. Nach der Überzeugung des Gerichts hatte der Be­ schwerdeführer eine paramilitärische Gruppe aufgebaut, mit der er sich dann an den von den Führern der bosnischen Serben angeord­ neten ethnischen Säuberungen beteiligt hat. Der Beschwerdeführer hat – so das Oberlandesgericht – die Aktionen der Gruppe geleitet und auch eigenhändig mehrere Personen getötet. Rechtsmittel des Beschwerdeführers zum Bundesgerichtshof und zum Bundesverfas­ sungsgericht blieben erfolglos (vgl. BGHSt 45, 64 m. Anm. Ambos, NStZ 1999, 404; BVerfG NStZ 2001, 240). Der Beschwerdeführer bestreitet – wie auch bereits in den Verfahren vor den nationalen Gerichten – zum einen die Zuständigkeit der deutschen Gerichte. Zum zweiten sei die von den deutschen Gerichte vertretene weite Auslegung des Völkermordtatbestands als unvereinbar mit Art. 7 EMRK. Das Gericht kommt einstimmig zu dem Ergebnis, dass die Zuständigkeit der deutschen Gerichte gegeben war und die von die­ sen Gerichte vorgenommene Auslegung des Völkermordtatbestands mit Art. 7 EMRK zu vereinbaren ist. 64.  The Court finds that the case primarily falls to be examined under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention under the head of whether the applicant was heard by a «tribunal es­ tablished by law». It reiterates that this expression reflects the principle of the rule of law, which is inherent in the sys­ tem of protection established by the Convention and its Pro­ tocols. «Law», within the meaning of Article 6 § 1, com­ prises in particular the legislation on the establishment and competence of judicial organs (see, inter alia, Lavents v. Latvia, no. 58442/00, § 114, 28 November 2002). Accord­ ingly, if a tribunal does not have jurisdiction to try a defen- dant in accordance with the provisions applicable under domestic law, it is not «established by law» within the mean­ ing of Article 6 § 1 (compare Coëme and Others v. Belgium, nos. 32492/96, 32547/96, 32548/96, 33209/96 and 33210/96, ECHR 2000-VII, §§ 99, 107-08). 65.  The Court further reiterates that, in principle, a vio- lation of the said domestic legal provisions on the establish­ ment and competence of judicial organs by a tribunal gives rise to a violation of Article 6 § 1. The Court is therefore competent to examine whether the national law has been complied with in this respect. However, having regard to the general principle according to which it is in the first place for the national courts themselves to interpret the provisions of domestic law, the Court finds that it may not question their interpretation unless there has been a flagrant viola­ tion of domestic law (see, mutatis mutandis, Coëme and Others, cited above, § 98 in fine, and Lavents , cited above, § 114). In this respect the Court also reiterates that Article 6 does not grant the defendant a right to choose the jurisdic­ tion of a court. The Court’s task is therefore limited to ex­ Aus den Erwägungen: […]

1. Internationales Strafrecht, EMRK und Verfassungsrecht Droit pénal international, CEDH et droit constitutionnel

Nr. 15 EGMR, Fifth Section, Case of Jorgic v. Germany, Urteil vom 12. Juli 2007, Application No. 74613/01

Art. 6 Abs. 1, 7 Abs. 1 EMRK: Weltrechtsprinzip bei Völkermord, nulla poena sine lege. Nationale Strafgerichte, deren Zuständigkeit für im Ausland begangene Taten des Völkermords sich aus einem von der natio­ nalen Strafrechtsordnung in Anspruch genommenen Weltrechts­ prinzips ergibt, sind auf Gesetz beruhende Gerichte (tribunal es­ tablished by law) im Sinne des Art. 6 Abs. 1 EMRK (§§ 64 ff.). Eine Auslegung des Merkmals der «Absicht, eine… Gruppe als solche ganz oder teilweise zu zerstören», die auch Verhaltenswei­ sen im Rahmen von ethnischen Säuberungen erfasst, ist mit den Anforderungen zu vereinbaren, die sich aus Art. 7 Abs. 1 EMRK ergeben (§§ 100 ff.). (Regeste der Schriftleitung) Art. 6 al. 1, 7 al. 1 CEDH: principe de l’universalité en cas de génocide, nulla poena sine lege. Les tribunaux nationaux, dont la compétence pour les actes de génocide commis à l’étranger découle du principe de l’univer- salité consacré par l’ordre juridique pénal national, sont des tribunaux établis par la loi (tribunal established by law) au sens de l’art. 6 al. 1 CEDH (§§ 64 ss). Une interprétation de l’élément du «dessein de détruire en tout ou en partie un groupe ...», qui comprend également des agissements dans le cadre d’épurations ethniques, est conciliable avec les exigences de l’art. 7 al. 1 CEDH (§§ 100 ss). (Résumé de la rédaction) Art. 6 cpv. 1, 7 cpv. 1 CEDU: principio dell’universalità in caso di genocidio, nulla poena sine lege. I tribunali penali nazionali la cui competenza per gli atti di geno­ cidio commessi all’estero si evince dal principio di universalità an­ corato in un ordinamento penale nazionale, sono i tribunali co­ stituiti per legge (tribunal established by law) ai sensi dell’art. 6 cpv. 1 CEDU (§§ 64 e seg.). L’interpretazione del tratto distintivo dell’«intento di distruggere, del tutto o in parte, un gruppo in quanto tale», che abbraccia anche i comportamenti connessi alle pulizie etniche, deve rispondere ai requisiti posti dall’art. 7 cpv. 1 CEDU (§§ 100 segg.). (Regesto a cura della Direzione della ri­ vista) Sachverhalt: Der Beschwerdeführer, Staatsangehöriger Bosnien-Herzegowinas, der von 1969 bis 1992 in Deutschland gelebt hatte, kehrte 1992 in seine Geburtsstadt in der Region Doboy zurück. Am 16. Dezember 1995 wurde er bei demVersuch, nach Deutschland einzureisen, ver­ haftet und wegen des Vorwurfs in Untersuchungshaft genommen, er habe sich zwischen Mai und September 1992 an einem in der

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terpreting the said Convention, to have recourse to the pre­ paratory documents, which play only a subsidiary role in the interpretation of public international law (see Articles 31 § 1 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969). 69.  The Court observes in this connection that the Ger­ man courts’ interpretation of Article VI of the Genocide Convention in the light of Article I of that Convention and their establishment of jurisdiction to try the applicant on charges of genocide is widely confirmed by the statutory provisions and case-law of numerous other Contracting States to the Convention (for the Protection of Human Rights) and by the Statute and case-law of the ICTY. It notes, in particular, that the Spanish Audiencia Nacional has in­ terpreted Article VI of the Genocide Convention in exactly the same way as the German courts (see paragraph 54 above). Furthermore, Article 9 § 1 of the ICTY Statute con­ firms the German courts’ view, providing for concurrent jurisdiction of the ICTY and national courts, without any restriction to domestic courts of particular countries. Indeed, the principle of universal jurisdiction for genocide has been expressly acknowledged by the ICTY (see paragraphs 50–51 above) and numerous Convention States authorize the pros­ ecution of genocide in accordance with that principle, or at least where, as in the applicant’s case, additional conditions – such as those required under the representation principle – are met (see paragraphs 52–53 above [Dort wird unter anderem auch auf die entsprechende Regelung im schwei- zerischen Recht verwiesen.]). 70.  The Court concludes that the German courts’ inter­ pretation of the applicable provisions and rules of public in­ ternational law, in the light of which the provisions of the Criminal Code had to be construed, was not arbitrary. They therefore had reasonable grounds for establishing their ju­ risdiction to try the applicant on charges of genocide. 71.  It follows that the applicant’s case was heard by a tribunal established by law within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. There has therefore been no viola­ tion of that provision. 72.  Having regard to the above finding under Article 6 § 1, namely, that the German courts had reasonably assumed jurisdiction to try the applicant on charges of genocide, the Court concludes that the applicant was also lawfully de­ tained after conviction «by a competent court» within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (a) of the Convention. According­ ly, there has been no violation of that Article either. […] 100.  The Court reiterates that the guarantee enshrined in Article 7 of the Convention is an essential element of the rule of law. It is not confined to prohibiting the retroactive application of criminal law to the disadvantage of an ac­ cused. It also embodies, more generally, the principle that only the law can define a crime and prescribe a penalty (nul­ lum crimen, nulla poena sine lege) and the principle that criminal law must not be extensively construed to the det

amining whether reasonable grounds existed for the author­ ities to establish jurisdiction (see, inter alia, G. v. Switzerland, no. 16875/90, Commission decision of 10 October 1990, and Kübli v. Switzerland, no. 17495/90, Commission deci­ sion of 2 December 1992). 66.  The Court notes that the German courts based their jurisdiction on Article 6 no. 1 of the Criminal Code, taken in conjunction with Article 220a of that Code (in their ver­ sions then in force). These provisions provided that German criminal law was applicable and that, consequently, German courts had jurisdiction to try persons charged with geno­ cide committed abroad, regardless of the defendant’s and the victims’ nationalities. The domestic courts had therefore established jurisdiction in accordance with the clear word­ ing of the pertinent provisions of the Criminal Code. 67.  In deciding whether the German courts had jurisdic­ tion under the material provisions of domestic law, the Court must further ascertain whether the domestic courts’ decision that they had jurisdiction over the applicant’s case was in compliance with the provisions of public international law applicable in Germany. It notes that the national courts found that the public international law principle of universal juris­ diction, which was codified in Article 6 no. 1 of the Crimi­ nal Code, established their jurisdiction while complying with the public international law duty of non-intervention. In their view, their competence under the principle of universal ju­ risdiction was not excluded by the wording of Article VI of the Genocide Convention, as that Article was to be under­ stood as establishing a duty for the courts named therein to try persons suspected of genocide, while not prohibiting the prosecution of genocide by other national courts. 68.  In determining whether the domestic courts’ inter­ pretation of the applicable rules and provisions of public in­ ternational law on jurisdiction was reasonable, the Court is in particular required to examine their interpretation of Ar­ ticle VI of the Genocide Convention. It observes, as was also noted by the domestic courts (see, in particular, paragraph 20 above), that the Contracting Parties to the Genocide Con­ vention, despite proposals in earlier drafts to that effect, had not agreed to codify the principle of universal jurisdiction over genocide for the domestic courts of all Contracting States in that Article (compare paragraphs 20 and 54 above). However, pursuant to Article I of the Genocide Convention, the Contracting Parties were under an erga omnes obliga­ tion to prevent and punish genocide, the prohibition of which forms part of the jus cogens. In view of this, the na­ tional courts’ reasoning that the purpose of the Genocide Convention, as expressed notably in that Article, did not ex­ clude jurisdiction for the punishment of genocide by States whose laws establish extraterritoriality in this respect must be considered as reasonable (and indeed convincing). Hav­ ing thus reached a reasonable and unequivocal interpreta­ tion of Article VI of the Genocide Convention in accordance with the aim of that Convention, there was no need, in in­

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ing in Bosnia and Herzegovina was consistent with the es­ sence of that offence and could reasonably be foreseen by the applicant at the material time. 104.  In determining, firstly, whether the German courts’ interpretation was consistent with the essence of the offence of genocide, the Court observes that the domestic courts did not construe the scope of that offence narrowly. They con­ sidered that the «intent to destroy» a group within the mean­ ing of Article 220a of the Criminal Code, as interpreted also in the light of Article II of the Genocide Convention, did not necessitate an intent to destroy that group in a physical or biological sense. It was sufficient that the perpetrator aimed at destroying the group in question as a social unit. 105.  The Court notes that the domestic courts construed the «intent to destroy a group as such» systematically in the context of Article 220a § 1 of the Criminal Code as a whole, having regard notably to alternatives no. 4 (imposition of measures which are intended to prevent births within the group) and no. 5 (forcible transfer of children of the group into another group) of that provision, which did not neces­ sitate a physical destruction of living members of the group in question. The Court finds that the domestic courts’ inter­ pretation of «intent to destroy a group» as not necessitat­ ing a physical destruction of the group, which has also been adopted by a number of scholars (see paragraphs 36 and 47 above [Verweis auf verschiedene deutsch- und englischspra­ chige Publikationen]), is therefore covered by the wording, read in its context, of the crime of genocide in the Criminal Code and does not appear unreasonable. 106.  Furthermore, the Court, like the national courts, considers it necessary, in order to determine the essence of the offence of genocide, to take into consideration also the codification of the prohibition of genocide in Article II of the Genocide Convention, for the observance of which Ar­ ticle 220a had been incorporated into the Criminal Code and in the light of which the said Article was to be con­ strued. As the wording of Article 220a of the Criminal Code corresponds to that of Article II of the Genocide Conven­ tion in so far as the definition of genocide is concerned, the above reasoning with respect to the scope of the prohibi­ tion of genocide equally applies. 107.  Moreover, the German courts’ interpretation has not only been supported by a number of scholars at the rele­ vant time of the commission of the crime (see paragraph 36 above). In its Resolution 47/121 of 18 December 1992 the UN General Assembly agreed with the wider interpretation adopted by the German courts in the present case (see paragraph 41 above [Resolution 47/121 (no. A/ RES/47/121) of 18 December 1992]). 108.  Consequently, the applicant’s acts, which he com­ mitted in the course of the ethnic cleansing in the Doboj re­ gion with intent to destroy the group of Muslims as a so­ cial unit, could reasonably be regarded as falling within the ambit of the offence of genocide.

riment of an accused, for instance by analogy. From these principles it follows that an offence must be clearly defined in the law. This requirement is satisfied where the individu­ al can know from the wording of the relevant provision and, if need be, with the assistance of the courts’ interpretation of it, what acts and omissions will make him criminally liable.When speaking of «law» Article 7 alludes to the very same concept as that to which the Convention refers else­ where when using that term, a concept which comprises written as well as unwritten law and implies qualitative re­ quirements, notably those of accessibility and foreseeabili­ ty (see, inter alia, S.W. v. the United Kingdom , judgment of 22November 1995, SeriesA no. 335-C, pp. 41–42, §§ 34–35; C.R. v. the United Kingdom , judgment of 22 November 1995, Series A no. 335-C, pp. 68–69, §§ 32–33; and Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany [GC], no. 34044/96, 35532/97, 44801/98, § 50, ECHR 2001-II). 101.  In any system of law, including criminal law, how­ ever clearly drafted a legal provision may be, there is an in­ evitable element of judicial interpretation. There will always be a need for elucidation of doubtful points and for adapta­ tion to changing circumstances. Indeed, in the Convention States, the progressive development of the criminal law through judicial law-making is a well entrenched and neces­ sary part of legal tradition. Article 7 of the Convention can­ not be read as outlawing the gradual clarification of the rules of criminal liability through judicial interpretation from case to case, provided that the resultant development is consistent with the essence of the offence and could reasonably be fore­ seen (see, inter alia, S.W. v. the United Kingdom , cited above, p. 42, § 36; C.R. v. the United Kingdom , cited above, p. 69, § 34; Streletz, Kessler and Krenz , cited above, § 50; and K.-H. W. v. Germany [GC], no. 37201/97, § 45, ECHR 2001-II). 102.  As regards the interpretation and application of domestic law, the Court reiterates that it is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law (see, mutatis mutandis, Kopp v. Swit- zerland , judgment of 25 March 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-II, p. 541, § 59, and Streletz, Kessler and Krenz , cited above, § 49).While the Court’s duty, in ac­ cordance with Article 19 of the Convention, is to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contract­ ing Parties to the Convention, it is not its function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a nation­ al court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Schenk v. Switzerland , judgment of 12 July 1988, Series A no. 140, p. 29, § 45, and Streletz, Kessler and Krenz , cited above, § 49). 103.  In the light of the above principles, the Court there­ fore needs to decide whether the national courts’ interpre­ tation of the crime of genocide under German law, notably of the genocidal «intent to destroy», so as to cover the ap­ plicant’s acts committed in the course of the ethnic cleans­

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v. Serbia and Montenegro]), in respect of their own domes­ tic or international codifications of the crime of genocide – were delivered subsequent to the commission of his offenc­ es, the applicant could not rely on this interpretation being taken by the German courts in respect of German law at the material time, that is, when he committed his offences. 113.  In view of the foregoing, the Court concludes that, while many authorities had favoured a narrow interpreta­ tion of the crime of genocide, there had already been sever­ al authorities at the material time which had construed the offence of genocide in the same wider way as the German courts. In these circumstances, the Court finds that the ap­ plicant, if need be with the assistance of a lawyer, could rea­ sonably have foreseen that he risked being charged with and convicted of genocide for the acts he had committed in 1992. In this context the Court also has regard to the fact that the applicant was found guilty of acts of a considerable severi­ ty and duration: the killing of several people and the deten­ tion and ill-treatment of a large number of people over a pe­ riod of several months as the leader of a paramilitary group in pursuit of the policy of ethnic cleansing. 114.  Therefore, the national courts’ interpretation of the crime of genocide could reasonably be regarded as consis­ tent with the essence of that offence and could reasonably be foreseen by the applicant at the material time. These re­ quirements being met, it was for the German courts to de­ cide which interpretation of the crime of genocide under do­ mestic law they wished to adopt. Accordingly, the applicant’s conviction for genocide was not in breach of Article 7 § 1 of the Convention. […] Bemerkungen: Der vorstehend abgedruckte Entscheid enthält Ausführungen zu zwei Problembereichen, die auch für das schweizerische Recht von Bedeutung sind: Der EGMR legt zum einen dar, dass die Inanspruchnahme des Weltrechtsprinzips im Rah­ men der Verfolgung von Völkermord mit den Vorgaben der EMRK an ein «tribunal established by law» (Art. 6 Abs. 1 EMRK) zu vereinbaren ist; zum anderen wird es als mit Art. 7 EMRK vereinbar anerkannt, dass die deutschen Straf­ gerichte die im Rahmen des deutschen Völkermordtatbe­ stands vorgesehene «Absicht, eine nationale, rassische, reli­ giöse oder ethnische Gruppe als solche ganz oder teilweise zu zerstören» (vgl. Art. 6 Abs. 1 VStGB, der zwischenzeitlich an die Stelle des wortgleichen § 220a StGB getreten ist) dahin­ gehend interpretiert haben, dass eine physische Einwirkung im Sinne einer Auslöschung der Gruppenmitglieder nicht zwingend erforderlich ist (vgl. BVerfG NStZ 2001, 240, 241; BGHSt 45, 64, 80; Jähnke, in: Jähnke/Laufhütte/Odersky (Hrsg.), Strafgesetzbuch, Leipziger Kommentar, 11. Aufl., 5. Band, Berlin 2005, § 220a N 13; kritisch hierzu Kress, in: Joecks/Miebach (Hrsg.),Münchener Kommentar zum Straf­ gesetzbuch, Band 3, München 2003, § 220a/§ 6 VStGB N 71

109.  In deciding, secondly, whether the domestic courts’ interpretation of the crime of genocide by the domestic courts could reasonably be foreseen by the applicant at the material time, the Court notes that the applicant is the first person to be convicted of genocide by German courts un­ der Article 220a since the incorporation of that Article into the Criminal Code in 1955. In these circumstances, the Court finds that, as opposed to cases concerning a rever­ sal of pre-existing case-law, an interpretation of the scope of the offence which was – as in the present case – consis­ tent with the essence of that offence, must, as a rule, be considered as foreseeable. Despite this, the Court does not exclude that, exceptionally, an applicant could rely on a particular interpretation of the provision being taken by the domestic courts in the special circumstances of the case. 110.  In the present case, which concerns the interpreta­ tion by national courts of a provision stemming from pub­ lic international law, the Court finds it necessary, in order to ensure that the protection guaranteed by Article 7 § 1 of the Convention remains effective, to examine whether there were special circumstances warranting the conclusion that the applicant, if necessary after having obtained legal advice, could rely on a narrower interpretation of the scope of the crime of genocide by the domestic courts, having re­ gard, notably, to the interpretation of the offence of geno­ cide by other authorities. 111.  The Court notes in this connection that at the ma­ terial time the scope of Article II of the Genocide Conven­ tion, on which Article 220a of the Criminal Code is based, was contested amongst scholars as regards the definition of «intent to destroy a group». Whereas the majority of legal writers took the view that ethnic cleansing, in the way in which it was carried out by the Serb forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to expel Muslims and Croats from their homes, did not constitute genocide, a considerable number of scholars suggested that these acts did indeed amount to genocide (see paragraph 47 above). 112.  The Court further observes that – also after the ap­ plicant committed the impugned acts – the scope of geno­ cide was interpreted differently by the international author­ ities. It is true that the ICTY, in its judgments in the cases of Prosecutor v. Krstic and Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, expressly disagreed with the wide interpretation of the «intent to de­ stroy» as adopted by the UN General Assembly and the Ger­ man courts. Referring to the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, the ICTY considered that genocide, as defined in pub­ lic international law, comprised only acts aimed at the phys­ ical or biological destruction of a protected group. How­ ever, as the judgments of the ICTY – as well as further decisions concerning this subject matter taken by national and international courts, in particular the International Court of Justice (see paragraph 45 above [judgment of 26 February 2007 in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina

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f.). Für die Schweiz ist dieser Entscheid deswegen von beson­ derer Relevanz, weil auch das schweizerische Recht für die Verfolgung von Völkermord das Weltrechtsprinzip vorsieht (Art. 264 Abs. 2 StGB) und der schweizerische Völkermord­ tatbestand ebenfalls voraussetzt, dass der Täter die Absicht hat, «eine durch ihre Staatsangehörigkeit, Rasse, Religion oder ethnische Zugehörigkeit gekennzeichnete Gruppe ganz oder teilweise zu vernichten» (Art. 264 Abs. 1 StGB). I. Nach Art. 264 Abs. 2 Satz 1 StGB ist das schweizeri­ sche Strafrecht auf imAusland begangene Völkermordtaten dann anwendbar, wenn sich der Täter in der Schweiz auf­ hält und nicht ausgeliefert werden kann. Nach dem verun­ glückten Verweis in Art. 264 Abs. 2 Satz 2 StGB, der sich nicht auf den – gar nicht mehr existenten – Art. 6 bis StGB bezieht, sondern auf Art. 6 Abs. 3 StGB (Stratenwerth/ Wohlers, Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch, Handkommen­ tar, Bern 2007, Art. 264 N 11), wird die Tat dann nicht mehr verfolgt, wenn der Täter durch ein ausländisches Gericht endgültig freigesprochen oder verurteilt und die Strafe voll­ zogen worden ist, es sei denn diese Verurteilung ist in einem Verfahren ergangen, mit dem in krasser Weise gegen die Grundsätze der Bundesverfassung und der EMRK versto­ ssen wurde. Die Inanspruchnahme des Weltrechtsprinzips ist in der schweizerischen Literatur allgemein als zulässig eingestuft worden (Wehrenberg, in: Niggli/Wipräch­ tiger (Hrsg.), BSK StGB II, 2. Aufl., Basel 2007, Art. 264 N 43 ff.; Donatsch/Wohlers, Strafrecht IV, Delikte gegen die Allgemeinheit, 3. Aufl., Zürich 2004, 239 f.; Straten­ werth, Schweizerisches Strafrecht, Besonderer Teil II, Straf­ taten gegen Gemeininteressen, 5. Aufl., Bern 2000, § 41 N 9). Dieser Standpunkt wird durch den vorstehend abge­ druckten Entscheid bestätigt. Hätte der Beschwerdeführer den Versuch unternommen, in die Schweiz einzureisen, wäre die Schweiz nach Art. 264 Abs. 2 StGB verpflichtet gewe­ sen, ihn – soweit nicht eine Auslieferung an einen anderen Staat oder an ein internationales Gericht möglich ist – we­ gen einer Straftat nach Art. 264 Abs. 1 StGB zu verfolgen. II. Die im Völkermordtatbestand des schweizerischen Rechts vorgesehene Absicht, eine durch bestimmte Merkma­ le charakterisierte Gruppe «ganz oder teilweise zu zerstören» entspricht der Sache nach dem Absichtsmerkmal des deut­ schen Völkermordtatbestands und wird in der schweizeri­ schen Lehre auch dahingehend verstanden, dass nicht nur die Fälle erfasst sind, in denen die Mitglieder der Gruppe ins­ gesamt oder in wesentlicher Anzahl physisch ausgelöscht werden sollen, sondern auch die Fälle, in denen die Gruppe dadurch untergeht, dass ihr Zusammenhalt vernichtet wird, z.B. auch durch die Zerstreuung der Gruppe im Rahmen eth­ nischer Säuberungen (BSK-Wehrenberg, Art. 254 N 36). Der EGMR hat diese international gesehen umstrittene Aus­ legungshypothese als vertretbar anerkannt (§§ 104 ff.) und darüber hinaus festgehalten, dass es ausreicht, dass die Mög­

lichkeit, dass dieses Straftatmerkmal entsprechend interpre­ tiert wird, für den Täter – gegebenenfalls mit anwaltlicher Unterstützung – vorhersehbar war (§ 113).

Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Wohlers

n

Nr. 16 EGMR, Third Section, Case of van Vondel v. the Netherlands vom 25. Oktober 2007, Application no. 38258/03

Art. 8 EMRK: Zurechnung privater Handlungen zumStaat, heim- liche Tonbandaufnahmen. Der Ausdruck «Privatleben» darf nicht restriktiv ausgelegt werden. Insbesondere ist es nicht angezeigt, berufliche oder ge­ schäftliche Tätigkeiten von vornherein aus dem Schutzbereich des Art. 8 EMRK auszunehmen. Auch zwischenmenschliche Vorgän­ ge, die in einem öffentlichen Kontext stehen, können daher demMerkmal «Privatleben» unterfallen (§ 48). Die Zurech­ nung privater Handlungen zum Staat setzt einen massgeblichen Beitrag des Staates zur Ausführung der Tat voraus (§ 46). Vorlie­ gend ist dem Staat die Herstellung heimlicher technischer Auf­ zeichnungen durch eine Privatperson zurechenbar mit der Folge, dass ein staatlicher Eingriff in Art. 8 EMRK gegeben ist (§ 49). Solange das nationale Recht keine gesetzliche Eingriffsgrundlage vorsieht, die den Anforderungen des Art. 8 Abs. 2 EMRK genügt, ist dieser Eingriff unzulässig (§§ 50-54). Dies gilt auch dann, wenn die staatliche Mitwirkungshandlung im Interesse eines schutzbe­ dürfigen Bürgers liegt (§ 53). (Regeste der Schriftleitung) Art. 8 CEDH: imputation d’agissements privés à l’Etat, enregis- trements audios clandestins. L’expression «vie privée» ne doit pas être interprétée de manière restrictive. Il n’y a notamment pas lieu d’exclure d’emblée les ac­ tivités professionnelles ou commerciales du champ d’application de l’art. 8 CEDH. Les relations interpersonnelles qui s’inscrivent dans un contexte public peuvent dès lors relever de la «vie privée» (§ 48). L’imputation d’agissements privés à l’Etat suppose une contribution essentielle de ce dernier à l’exécution de l’acte (§ 46). En l’espèce, la réalisation d’enregistrements techniques clandes­ tins par un particulier est imputable à l’Etat; partant, il y a une ingérence de l’autorité publique dans l’exercice d’un droit proté­ gé par l’art. 8 CEDH (§ 49). Cette ingérence est inadmissible tant et aussi longtemps que le droit national ne prévoit pas de base lé­ gale satisfaisant aux exigences de l’art. 8 al. 2 CEDH (§§ 50–54). Cela vaut quand bien même l’Etat interviendrait dans l’intérêt d’un citoyen nécessitant sa protection (§ 53). (Résumé de la ré­ daction) Art. 8 CEDU: imputazione di atti privati allo Stato, registrazioni audio segrete. L’espressione «vita privata» non dev’essere interpretata restritti­ vamente. In particolare, l’esclusione a priori delle attività profes­ sionali o commerciali dall’ambito protetto dell’art. 8 CEDU non è adeguata. Anche le vicende interpersonali che stanno in un con­ testo pubblico possono quindi presentare il tratto distintivo del

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to what information should be obtained from the applicant, namely an admission of payments by him to Mr R. 30. The Court of Appeal held that, according to domes­ tic case-law, the mere tape-recording of a (telephone) con­ versation without the permission (or knowledge) of the con­ versation partner did not, in itself, entail a violation of that conversation partner’s right to respect for privacy; for that to be the case, additional circumstances were required. In the instant case, the additional circumstances were that a number of conversations had been recorded, including the applicant’s contributions to those conversations. Further­ more, the (telephone) conversations had been conducted by the applicant as the former «runner» of a (former) police informer about matters having occurred during the period in which the applicant «ran» Mr R. as informer and the winding-up of that relationship. As these conversations – in any event on the part of the applicant – were of an exclu­ sively professional nature and content, the Court of Appeal held that, in view of domestic case-law on this point, this allowed no other conclusion than that the applicant’s pri­ vate life did not come into play in respect of the recorded (telephone) conversations at issue. It further held that Mr R.’s recourse to a recording device – and Mr R. had been entirely free to decide whether or not to activate it as well as to make the recordings available to the Fort-team – had mainly been prompted by Mr R.’s need to substantiate his account of the «fruit-juice channel» in order to be believed. The Court of Appeal therefore considered that it could not be said that there had been interference on the part of the authorities in respect of the recording. It only accepted the existence of such interference in breach of Article 8 § 1 in respect of the one recorded conversation for which Mr R. had received explicit instructions, to the extent that this con­ versation related to matters falling within the applicant’s sphere of privacy. It did not use that particular statement in evidence. […] 45. The applicant maintained that there had been a vi­ olation of his right to privacy as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. 46. The Government submitted that the authorities did not themselves record the conversations concerned but that these were recorded by one of the parties to the conversa­ tions. In the Government’s opinion, such cases give rise to State responsibility under the Convention only if the au­ thorities «made a crucial contribution to the execution of the scheme» and, in the instant case and unlike the cases of A. v. France (judgment of 23 November 1993, Series A no. 277‑B, p. 49, § 36) and M.M. v. the Netherlands ([no. 39339/98, judgment of 8 April 2003], § 40), it could not be said that there was either a «crucial contribution» or a «scheme». 47. In the case at hand, Mr R. recorded various conver­ sations with the applicant but Mr R. himself decided wheth­ er he would record a conversation and, if so, whether he

la «vita privata» (§ 48). L’imputazione di atti privati allo Stato presuppone che il contributo dello Stato all’esecuzione dell’atto sia determinante (§ 46). Nel caso in esame, allo Stato è imputabi­ le l’allestimento di registrazioni tecniche segrete da parte di un privato, con la conseguenza che vi è un’ingerenza dello Stato nell’art. 8 CEDU (§ 49). Finché il diritto nazionale non prevede una base legale che ossequia i requisiti dell’art. 8 CEDU, tale in­ gerenza è inammissibile (§§ 50–54). Ciò vale anche nel caso in cui lo Stato interviene nell’interesse di un cittadino che necessita di protezione (§ 53). (Regesto a cura della Direzione della rivista) Sachverhalt: Der Beschwerdeführer van Vondel war in den Jahren 1989 bis 1994 als Polizist beim «Kennemerland Regional Criminal Intelligence Ser­ vice» ( Regionale Criminele Inlichtingendienst; «RCID» ) für die Füh­ rung und Betreuung ziviler Informanten zuständig. Im Jahre 1994 wurde eine parlamentarische Untersuchungskommission einberu­ fen, welche die polizeilichen Ermittlungsmethoden in den Nieder­ landen überprüfen sollte ( parlementaire enquêtecommissie opspo- ringsmethoden; «PEC» ). Zudem erhielt ein sog. «Fort-Team» des National Police Internal Investigation Department ( rijksrecherche ) den Auftrag, im Rahmen einer nichtstrafrechtlichen Untersuchung den Ermittlungsmethoden des RCID in der Zeit von 1990 bis 1995 nachzugehen. Das Fort-Team nahm imVerlaufe seiner Abklärungen Kontakt mit Mr. R. auf, einem belgischen Fruchtsaftproduzenten, der von dubiosen Geschäften berichtete, die er als polizeilicher In­ formant im Auftrag des Beschwerdeführers abgewickelt hatte. Im Rahmen einer öffentlichen Anhörung der PEC sagte der Beschwer­ deführer unter Eid zu den Vorfällen aus. Daraufhin wurde gegen den Beschwerdeführer eine strafrechtliche Untersuchung wegen mehrfa­ chen Meineids und Einschüchterung des Zeugen Mr. R. eingeleitet. Die nationalen Gerichte verurteilten den Beschwerdeführer und stützten ihren Entscheid unter anderem auf heimliche Tonbandauf­ zeichnungen, die Mr. R. – unter staatlicher Mithilfe – von mehreren Gesprächen mit dem Beschwerdeführer angefertigt hatte. Der Be­ schwerdeführer macht geltend, durch die Herstellung der Aufnah­ men in seiner Privatsphäre verletzt worden zu sein. Der EGMR hat einen Verstoss gegen Art. 8 EMRK bejaht. 29. The Court of Appeal […] found it established that, in the course of nine hearing sessions between 2 June 1995 and 7 March 1996, Mr R. had made statements to the Fort­ team about the «fruit-juice channel», that four face‑to‑face conversations (between April and August 1995) and four tel­ ephone conversations (between July and August 1995) be­ tween the applicant and Mr R. had been recorded by Mr R., that he had done so on a voluntary basis and with the aid of devices provided by the Fort-team at Mr R.’s own request as he was initially disbelieved and as he also wished this for personal safety considerations, that one of the four record­ ed telephone conversations only consisted of a recording of what Mr R. had said, and that only in respect of one partic­ ular conversation had Mr R. received specific instructions as Aus den Erwägungen: […]

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poses, the equipment was provided by the authorities, who on at least one occasion gave him specific instructions as to what information should be obtained from the appli­ cant. In these circumstances, the Court considers that the authorities «made a crucial contribution to executing the scheme» and it is not persuaded that it was ultimately Mr R. who was in control of events. To hold otherwise would be tantamount to allowing investigating authorities to evade their responsibilities under the Convention by the use of private agents (see M.M. v. the Netherlands , cited above, § 40). 50. It must therefore be determined whether the inter­ ference in the present case was justified under Article 8 § 2, notably whether it was «in accordance with the law» and «necessary in a democratic society» for one or more of the purposes enumerated in that paragraph. 51. As to the question whether the interference was «in accordance with the law», the Court reiterates that this ex­ pression requires firstly that the impugned measure should have some basis in domestic law; it also refers to the quali­ ty of the law in question, requiring that it should be acces­ sible to the person concerned, who must moreover be able to foresee its consequences for him, and be compatible with the rule of law (see, for instance, Narinen v. Finland , no. 45027/98, § 34, 1 June 2004). 52. The Court notes that the Government has not pre­ sented any arguments to the effect that the interference at issue was based on and in compliance with any statutory or other legal rule. It further notes that, as the investigation in the context of which the interference occurred was a fact‑finding inquiry, the National Police Internal Investiga­ tion Department was not allowed to have recourse to any investigative powers such as, for instance, the covert record­ ing of (telephone) conversations. 53. Although the Court understands the practical diffi­ culties for an individual who is or who fears to be disbe­ lieved by investigation authorities to substantiate an account given to such authorities and that – for that reason – such a person may need technical assistance from these authori­ ties, it cannot accept that the provision of that kind of as­ sistance by the authorities is not governed by rules aimed at providing legal guarantees against arbitrary acts. It is there­ fore of the opinion that, in respect of the interference com­ plained of, the applicant was deprived of the minimum de­ gree of protection to which he was entitled under the rule of law in a democratic society. 54. In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the interference in issue was not «in accordance with law». This finding suffices for the Court to hold that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. It is not therefore necessary to examine whether the interference in question pursued a «legitimate aim» or was «necessary in a demo­ cratic society» in pursuit thereof (see Heglas v. the Czech Republic , no. 5935/02, § 75, 1 March 2007).

would hand the tape over to the National Police Internal Investigation Department. Mr R.’s acts were based on his wish to demonstrate his own credibility in respect of the statements given by him in the Fort-team fact-finding in­ quiry as well as for personal safety considerations. Against this background, the Government considered the provision of recording equipment as a perfectly responsible move on the part of the National Police Internal Investigation De­ partment. As the recording of the conversations by Mr R. could not be equated with an investigative act by a private citizen, the Government submitted that there had been no interference with the applicant’s rights under Article 8 § 1 of the Convention requiring justification under the second paragraph of this provision. The Government further add­ ed that, in their view, a strict interpretation of the M.M. v. the Netherlands judgment would mean that in future the authorities would be unnecessarily cautious in rendering as­ sistance to members of the public. 48. The Court reiterates that the term «private life» must not be interpreted restrictively. In particular, respect for pri­ vate life comprises the right to establish and develop rela­ tionships with other human beings; furthermore, there is no reason of principle to justify excluding activities of a pro­ fessional or business nature from the notion of «private life». There is therefore a zone of interaction of a person with others, even in a public context, which may fall with­ in the scope of «private life» (see Niemietz v. Germany , judgment of 16 December 1992, Series A no. 251-B, pp. 33-34, § 29; Halford v. the United Kingdom , judgment of 25 June 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑III, p. 1015, § 42; and P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom , no. 44787/98, § 56, ECHR 2001‑IX). 49. The Court is of the opinion that the obtention by the National Police Internal Investigation Department – for the purposes of an officially commissioned fact-finding in­ quiry – of recordings of (telephone) conversations between the applicant and Mr R. that had been made by the latter with technical equipment made available for this purpose by the National Police Internal Investigation Department constituted an interference with the applicant’s private life and/or correspondence (in the sense of telephone commu­ nications) which was imputable to a public authority. The Court would note that the recording of private (telephone) conversations by a conversation partner and the private use of such recordings does not per se offend against Article 8 if this is done with private means, but that by its very na­ ture this is to be distinguished from the covert monitoring and recording of communications by a private person in the context of and for the benefit of an official inquiry – criminal or otherwise – and with the connivance and tech­ nical assistance of public investigation authorities. In that respect, the Court observes that in the present case, al­ though the recordings of the applicant’s conversations were made by Mr R. on a voluntary basis and for his own pur­

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55. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. […] Separate opinion of Judge M yjer : 1. In the Observations of the Government, much reference is made to an annotation to the case of M.M. v. the Neth- erlands (judgment of 8 April 2003) which was published in the NJCM-bulletin (Netherlands Human Rights Law Re­ view) 2003, p. 653-658: ‹If the present judgment by the ECtHR stands, it would mean – by extension – that in future, if a criminal makes all manner of threats to a victim by telephone, the victim goes to the police, and the police (with the victim’s) consent put a tap on his phone, the criminal would win his case in Strasbourg on the ground that his fundamental rights have been violated because his threatening calls had been recorded without a statutory basis; likewise, a kidnapper who rings the family of his victim to make the ransom demand could successfully claim to have been a victim of a violation of Article 8 ECtHR if the police record these telephone calls with the family’s consent but without a basis in statute law. In my opinion, it is really going too far to require that recordings of this kind may only be made in accordance with statutory procedures. A perpetrator who phones a victim to prepare for his offence or actually to commit the offence should not be able to pose successfully as a victim on the grounds that the recording of incoming calls at the victim’s end vi­ olated his right to the peaceful enjoyment of telephone communica­ tion. Or does the ECtHR truly mean to suggest that, in a case such as this one, the police should have sought permission under the rules of the Code of Criminal Procedure to place a normal tap on the tel­ ephone of none other than the victim, with all the extra infringe­ ments of her privacy that would entail? Or would the ECtHR per­ haps prefer the lawyer’s own telephone to have been tapped in accordance with all the rules, including all the safeguards against violations of his right to refuse to give evidence.› Since it was I – in another capacity and before I was elected to this Court – who wrote the annotation with which the Government apparently agree and which was in­ deed very critical of the reasoning of the majority in that judgment, and since I voted in the Van Vondel case in favour of a violation of Article 8, I feel obliged to write this separate opinion. 2. Yes, as far as the judgment in the case of M.M. is con­ cerned, I am still convinced that the reasoning of the major­ ity in that case may lead to bizarre and unwanted conse­ quences. In that particular case the police had helped a woman who had told the police that M.M., the defence counsel of her detained husband, had made sexual advanc­ es towards her. She feared that her word (the only availa­ ble evidence) would be insufficient against that of M.M. The police then supplied her with a tape recorder linked to her telephone, so that she could record incoming telephone conversations with that lawyer in order to obtain evidence against him. The majority concluded that Article 8 had been violated. My objections are basically the same as those made

in the dissenting opinion of former judge Elisabeth Palm, who was appointed by the Dutch Government to replace the former Dutch judge Wilhelmina Thomassen, who had withdrawn from the case. To me it was crucial that, unlike the A. v. France case (judgment of 23 November 1993) – where the police made a crucial contribution by making available for a short time the office of the police superin­ tendent, his telephone and his tape recorder and where an outgoing call was made to collect evidence – in the case of M.M. the woman only recorded incoming calls from M.M. Besides, she could decide herself if she wanted to hand these recordings over to the police or not. I am of the opinion that in these circumstances, from the point of view of the Con­ vention, there was no relevant interference with M.M.’s pri­ vacy rights. 3. In the present case, however, there is no matter of someone just waiting until the ‹suspect› might phone and make his self-incriminating remarks. Here, like in the case of Heglas v. the Czech Republic (judgment of 1 March 2007) and like in a lot of B-movies, a ‹walking bug› went himself to the applicant and recorded the conversations. The very fact that the police provided the devices (and in respect of one conversation gave specific instructions as to what in­ formation should be obtained) constitutes a crucial contri­ bution to an interference with the privacy rights of the ap­ plicant, as was laid down in the reasoning in paragraph 49. Since that interference was not ‹in accordance with the law›, there was also in my opinion a violation of Article 8. Bemerkungen: I. Der EGMR hat mit dem vorstehenden Entscheid seine bis­ herige Praxis fortgeschrieben, wonach ein Eingriff in die Rechte der EMRK auch dann gegeben sein kann, wenn eine vom Schutzbereich der Konventionsgarantien erfasste Hand­ lung zwar durch eine Privatperson ausgeführt wird, der Staat sich diese Handlung aber als eigene zurechnen lassen muss (§ 49; vgl. bereits EGMR v. 23.11.1993, A.v. France ; EGMR v. 8.4.2003, M.M. v. the Netherlands ; EGMR v. 1.3.2007, Heglas v. the Czech Republic ). Die Konsequenz der Zurechnung liegt darin, dass die von der Privatperson ausgeführte Handlung rechtlich betrachtet zu einem staat­ lichen Eingriff in Rechte des Betroffenen qualifiziert wird, womit genau diejenigen gesetzlichen Massstäbe gelten, nach denen die Zulässigkeit staatlicher Eingriffe auch sonst zu bewerten ist (vgl. §§ 49 ff.; BGE 129 V 323, 324 ff.; Demko, Zur Rechtsprechung des EGMR in Sachen «Hörfalle», HRRS 2004, 382, 384; Gaede, Das Verbot der Umgehung der EMRK durch den Einsatz von Privatpersonen bei der Strafverfolgung, StV 2004, 46, 48). Für die rechtliche Beurteilung eines Sachverhaltes ist die Zurechenbarkeit einer von einer Privatperson vorgenomme­ nen Handlung zum Staat richtungweisend: Sie entscheidet über die Anwendbarkeit sämtlicher Rechtssätze, die zwar den Staat, nicht aber Privatpersonen binden und verpflich

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